Method of and apparatus for preventing unauthorised access to a conditionally accessible system
8 claims: 2 independent, 6 dependent
- 1Zastrzeżenia patentowe 1. Sposób zabezpieczenia przed nieuprawnionym odbiorem kodowanego sygnału telewizyjnego, za pomocą układu dostępu warunkowego, dołączonego do odbiomika-dekodera abonenta, do którego to odbiomika-dekodera doprowadza się komunikat administracji EMM uprawnień dla grupy abonentów i na podstawie komunikatu EMM realizuje się dostęp dla danego abonenta, znamienny tym, że w odbiomiku-dekoderze sprawdza się, czy do odbiornika-dekodera został doprowadzony przynajmniej poprzedni komunikat eMm dla poprzedniego okresu kalendarza i jeżeli tak, wprowadza się aktualny komunikat EMM dla aktualnego okresu kalendarza oraz wtedy realizuje się dostęp dla danego abonenta.
- 2Sposób według zastrz. 1, znamienny tym, że przesyła się redundancyjną informację o dacie z aktualnym komunikatem EMM, a po dostarczeniu aktualnego komunikatu EMM stosuje się redundancyjną informację o dacie do sprawdzenia, czy poprzedni komunikat EMM został dostarczony.
- 3Sposób według zastrz. 2, znamienny tym, że wprowadza się do każdego komunikatu EMM informację o dacie aktualnego prawa dostępu i informację o dacie kontroli poprzedniego prawa dostępu, a jako taką informację o dacie kontroli stosuje się redundancyjną informację o dacie.
- 4Sposób według zastrz. 2, znamienny tym, że jako redundancyjną informację o dacie stosuje się klucz ECM komunikatu kontroli uprawnień dla poprzedniego okresu kalendarzowego.
- 5Sposób według zastrz. 4, znamienny tym, że stosuje się regularnie zmieniające się prawa abonenta i redundancyjną informację o dacie dla bezpośrednio poprzedniego okresu.
- 6Sposób według zastrz. 5, znamienny tym, że stosuje się okresy kalendarzowe niesąsiadujące ze sobą w czasie i/lub nieregularne przedziały czasu rzeczywistego między takimi okresami.
- 7Sposób według zastrz. 6, znamienny tym, że tylko opcjonalnie przy zmianach praw abonentów przesyła się aktualny komunikat EMm z mapą bitów abonentów, mająca pozycje dla poszczególnych praw abonentów w grupie.
- 8Układ zabezpieczenia przed nieuprawnionym odbiorem kodowanego sygnału telewizyjnego, zawierający układ dostępu warunkowego, dołączony do odbiomika-dekodera abonenta, znamienny tym, że do zintegrowanego odbiomika-dekodera (2020) abonenta jest dołączony układ interakcyjny (4000) dołączony również do multipleksera (2004) i umieszczony częściowo w stacji nadawczej i częściowo w dekoderze dla oddziaływania z różnymi aplikacjami przez modemowy kanał powrotny (4002).
Independent claims8
109 paragraphs in 7 sections, as filed
The subject of the invention is a method and system for protection against unauthorized reception of an encoded television signal by a subscriber's receiver-decoder, especially in the field of data transmission, where the transmitted encoded data is received and decoded e.g. by an authorized subscriber's receiver-decoder.
Reflex-decoder here means a receiver for receiving coded or uncoded signals, e.g. television and / or radio signals, or a decoder for decoding received signals. The receiver-decoder is, for example, an integrated decoder for decoding received signals or a decoder operating in conjunction with a physically separated receiver.
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The decoder is connected to the conditional access system, whereby it forms part or is separated from the conditional access system. The invention is suitable for use in a messaging system, preferably a radio and / or television broadcast system, in a satellite, cable or terrestrial transmission system. This circuit is a digital circuit using the MPEG compression standard, preferably MPEG-2, for data / signal transmission, with the possibility of interactivity and the use of smart cards. The system is connected, for example, with the transmission system of audiovisual or multimedia digital data or is adapted to filter data sent via a fixed telecommunications network for multimedia internet applications, etc. A smart card is any device in the form of an integrated circuit card containing, for example, a microprocessor and / or memory, or having another physical form, for example, in the shape of a key, which is often used in television set-top boxes. In known broadcasting systems, the smart card is used by the subscriber to obtain reception rights and there are problems in preventing the card from being misused in deceiving the rights holder.
In a known MPEG television subscriber system, the rights of different subscribers or groups of subscribers are checked centrally, for example, monthly and an authorization message is sent from the central station to each subscriber or group of subscribers to authorize or block the use of rights. However, if the original subscriber stops paying for the right, after the payment deadline expires, the system will no longer identify him in the previously assigned place and this place can be assigned to the new subscriber. If this new subscriber pays, there is a danger that the original subscriber will be confused with the new subscriber who has been authorized to use the rights and the original subscriber will receive the rights incorrectly.
The EMM authorization administration message is a message intended for one subscriber or group of subscribers and is generated by the authorization confirmation system and multiplexed with the MPEG-2 stream. It is usually encoded with a so-called management key, for example for group use, so it can be encoded with a key common to all subscribers in the group.
The ECM entitlement control message is a message sent in connection with a given coded program. The ECM message allows the user to decode a control word to obtain the right to decode a TV program or similar. The ECM key is transmitted in the EMM message to the subscriber because the smart card used by the subscriber requires the use of the ECM key to decode the ECM message. The decoded ECM message is used to decode the control word and then to decode the program.
It is known from WO 8500718 a security system for coding a television signal in which a conditional access system for overhead transmission and reception of coded television signals improves reception reliability by transmitting a key signal used to decode a television signal in an information block that is itself coded by the key signal . On receiving, the receiver, after decoding the information block, compares the key signal obtained from the block with the key signal provided at the receiver for block decoding. Decoding will only be allowed if the comparison shows that the two key signals are the same. The system also provides information on each user's credit status, transmitted overhead. In order to ensure fast operation, the credit signal is sent repeatedly and finally another signal is added, which is used in the receiver to prevent repetitive accumulation of credit. Another arrangement is used for the transmitter to broadcast a signal indicating the total amount of credit ever acquired by the user and for the user receiver to enter the meter to store all fees for the programs seen. A simple comparison of these two signals is enough to determine if the viewer can see the program or not.
The method and device for copying and unauthorized vision for the digital broadcasting system are known from European patent specification EP 0763936. The method includes transmitting an audio / video signal for multiplexing and transmitting an audio / video bit stream encoded in control words and
189 201 information, where control words and CPTC information to protect against unauthorized copying / vision are encoded and receive audio / video signals to decode the transmitted bit stream to analyze CPTC information and control words, deciding whether recording is allowed or not allowed to be recorded on tape cassette and using control words and implementing decoding of acoustic / video output signals for control, protecting copyright.
An access control system based on a smart card with improved security is known from WO 9606504. The smart card, which contains a decryptor to decrypt information and permission data, provides improved access control by controlling the way some of the permission information for the data stream passes through the smart card. Permission data that is decrypted and applied to the smart card with respect to functions such as key generation is again encrypted into the high speed data output of the smart card. The smart card contains a variable delay device for control when encrypted permission data is re-entered into the data stream. Changing the delay allows you to determine the required time relationship between the re-entered data and other data in the data stream that exits the smart card. For example, encrypted data permissions in the output stream can be used to show essentially the same time relationship with other data as exists in the input stream.
It is known from WO 9529560 a conditional access information system in which a device, placed in a receiver for processing transmitted control information, includes a packet transport processor for selecting packets of signals having payloads containing a conditional access header and other permission data. Individual payload headers contain groups of bytes that are encoded in a way that enables or prevents the processing of entitlement data by a particular receiver. The conditional access filter, pre-programmed by a specific subscriber's conditional access code word, examines the individual groups of bytes of the conditional access header to match a specific subscriber's conditional access code word. Only when the match takes place can the processor process permission data. The permission data is then used to generate the decoding keys to decode a portion of the transmitted signal.
In known broadcast programs in the MPEG standard, in order to reduce the bandwidth required to send monthly EMM rights administration messages, usually a group renewal EMM message, encoded by a group management key, common to all subscribers in the group is used.
The method according to the invention consists in the fact that the receiver / decoder checks whether at least the previous EMM message for the previous calendar period has been fed to the receiver / decoder and if so, the current EMM message for the current calendar period is entered and then access for the given subscriber.
Preferably, redundancy date information is sent with the current EMM message, and after delivery of the current EMM message, redundant date information is used to check that the previous EMM message has been delivered.
Preferably, information about the date of the current access right and information about the date of control of the previous access right is entered into each EMM message, and as such information about the date of control redundant date information is used.
Preferably, the ECM key of the entitlement control message for the previous calendar period is used as redundant date information.
Preferably, the subscriber's regularly changing rights and redundant date information for the immediately preceding period are used.
Preferably, non-adjacent calendar periods and / or irregular real-time intervals between such periods are used.
Preferably, only optionally, with changes in subscriber rights, a current EMM message is sent from a subscriber bit map having positions for individual subscriber rights in the group.
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In the system according to the invention, the integrated receiver-decoder is connected to an interactive system also connected to the multiplexer and placed partly in the transmitting station and partly in the decoder to interact with various applications via the modem return channel.
An advantage of the invention is to provide a method of transmitting data of the transmitter and receiver of the coder, which are used to provide data to, for example, subscribers or other purchasers of receiving rights with security. The invention allows rights to be allocated for reasons other than fees, and different subscribers may be authorized to access secured information.
The subject of the invention is illustrated in the embodiments in the drawing, in which Fig. 1 shows the general architecture of the digital television system, Fig. 2 - the general structure of the smart card, Fig. 3 - the structure of the authorization administration message used in the conditional access system, Fig. 4 - structure of the authorization administration message, coded by the group management key, common to all subscribers of a given group, fig. 5 - part of the structure of the rights administration message, coded according to the invention, Fig. 6 - embodiment of the structure of the rights administration message according to the invention, Fig. 7 - flowchart illustrating the embodiment of Figures 6 and 8 - another embodiment of the structure of the rights administration message according to the invention invention.
Figure 1 shows a digital transmission and reception system 1000 comprising a standard digital television system 2000 that uses the MPEG-2 compression system to transmit compressed digital signals. The MPEG-2 compressor 2002 in the broadcast station receives a stream of digital signals, usually a stream of video signals. Compressor 2002 is connected to the multiplexer and encoder 2004 system via the 2006 link. Multiplexer 2004 receives multiple input signals, creates one or more transport streams, and sends compressed digital signals to the transmitter of the transmitting station 2008 over the link 2010, which takes various forms, for example the form of a telecommunications link. Transmitter 2008 transmits electromagnetic signals over the 2012 Earth-Satellite link to the 2014 Satellite Relay, where they are electronically processed and emitted via the 2016 Satellite-Earth link to the 2018 terrestrial receiver / decoder 2018, usually in the form of a canopy owned or rented by the end user. The signals received by the receiver-decoder 2018 are sent to the integrated receiver-decoder 2020 owned or rented by the end user and connected to the 2022 end user television receiver. The receiver-decoder 2020 decodes the compressed MPEG-2 signal into a television signal for a 2022 television receiver.
The 3000 conditional access system, enabling conditional access, is connected to the 2004 multiplexer and the receiver / decoder 2020 and is located partly in the transmitting station and partly in the decoder. It allows the end user to access digital television programs broadcast by one or more program providers. A smart card, capable of decoding messages regarding commercial offers, i.e. one or several television programs sold by the program provider, is inserted into the receiver-decoder 2020. Using the decoder 2020 and the smart card, the end user can purchase events in subscription or payment mode for watching the program.
The 3000 conditional access system includes an SAS subscriber authorization system. The SAS system is connected to one or more SMS subscriber management systems, one for each program provider, via a TCP-IP connection or another. Alternatively, one SMS system is used by two program providers or one supplier uses two SMS systems etc.
The 4000 interactive system, also connected to the 2004 multiplexer and the 2020 decoder receiver, and also located partly in the transmitting station and partly in the decoder, allows the end user to interact with various applications via modem return channel 4002.
Figure 2 schematically depicts a subscriber smart card that includes an 8-bit microprocessor 100 having an input / output bus connected to a standard contact arrangement 102 which is connected to the contact arrangement in the receiver card reader during operation 6
189 201 of the decoder 2020. The microprocessor 100 is also equipped with bus connections with preferably masked ROM 104, RAM 106 and EEPROM 108 memories. The smart card complies with the ISO standards of protocols that specify certain physical parameters of the smart card, the location of contacts in the integrated circuit and certain links between the external system, in particular the receiver / decoder 2020, and the smart card. One of the functions of the microprocessor 100 is memory management in the smart card.
Figure 3 shows the structure of the eMm authority administration message. The EMM message is implemented as a series of bits of digital data and includes a 3060 header, a proper EMM 3062 message and a 3064 signature. In turn, header 3060 includes a type identifier 3066 to identify whether an individual, group, public or other type is used, then includes a length identifier 3068 that specifies the length of the EMm message, optional address 3070 for the EMM message, operator identifier 3072 and key identifier 3074. The actual EMM 3062 message varies considerably depending on the type. However, here the EMM message is the so-called EMM group renewal message, which will be briefly described. Finally, the 3064 signature, which is usually 8 bytes long, allows a number of tests to be performed regarding the distortion of other data in the EMM message.
In Fig. 4, the actual EMM 3062 message includes a subscriber bit map 3100, typically 256 bit. Each bit of the bit map corresponds to the subscriber. In the example given, the third bit corresponds to the subscriber # 3. The relevant EMM 3062 message also includes rights section 3102 detailing the subscriber rights of all subscribers in the group for a given month and containing the ECM key for that month and usually for the next month. Assuming that the subscriber correctly paid the subscription for January, the presence of a positive bit 1 here indicates to the subscriber's decoder, after decoding the message with the key Kg, that the subscriber is actually entitled to receive programs in this group, specified in the subscriber rights section. Individual programs are decoded with the effective use of an authorization ECM control message, decoded with an ECM key.
If the subscriber has not paid the due fee for February, the bitmap will contain zero bit 0 here. After decoding by the smart card in the message receiver / decoder, the presence of a zero for the third bit will indicate to the decoder that it is no longer authorized to receive these rights, and the smart card will record this and take appropriate action. In practice, a key removal instruction may be sent in a separate EMM message.
In March it is possible that a new subscriber will join the group. This happens quite regularly because subscriber groups are often reorganized to reduce the number of groups and the number of EMM messages that should be sent. In this case, the new subscriber will be assigned a third bit. When the new subscriber decodes the message with the Kg key, it detects a positive bit 1 here, indicating the permission to receive the rights corresponding to this group.
This system is relatively easy to cheat. In the case of subscriber # 3, he can simply disconnect the decoder in February. If he does, he will not receive an EMM message or a key removal instruction in February.
Reconnecting the decoder in March will allow the unauthorized decoder to decode the EMM message for March, containing the positive bit message, intended for the new subscriber, in the third bit. The decoder then concludes that it may continue to receive the rights associated with this group and an anomalous situation will arise in which the third bit of the group message will effectively give rights to two decoders: the new authorized subscriber and the previous cheating subscriber.
Figure 5 shows part of the structure of the authority administration message encoded according to the invention. Sequential, redundant information about the date of control is sent here with each EMM message. Each radio decoder 2020 is programmed to accept only an EMM message if it has received at least the EMM message from the previous month. Due to the fact that the laws change every month, you should simply compare the current rights stored in the decoder, contained in the section of current rights 3102, with the previous rights, contained in the section of previous rights 3104.
189 201
Figure 6 shows a first preferred embodiment of the structure of the authority administration message in which the rights remembered in the receiver / decoder are controlled against previous rights by means of redundant date information in the form of a control date 3110. Thus, the actual EMM 3062 message contains a control date 3110, in addition to the validity date or 3112 obsolete date, representing the date until which the new rights in the EMM message will be valid. The 3110 inspection date is one month or another prior to the expiration date. The actual EMM message also contains the rights themselves in the form of one or usually several ECM 3114 keys. At least the ECM key for the current month is provided, as well as in the preferred embodiment the ECM key for the next month.
Figure 6 also shows the content of the EEPROM 110 memory, corresponding to the EEPROM 108 of the smart card shown in Fig. 2. This content is the expiry date 3116 stored in the smart card.
Figure 7 illustrates how group renewal EMM messages are now processed, based on a flowchart. In the first stage 3200, the EMm message is received by the receiver / decoder 2020 and the data is transferred to a smart card which is inserted into the receiver / decoder and is treated here as part of the receiver / decoder. The EMM message is processed by the smart card microprocessor 100 in combination with various memories 104, 106 and 108. In the second step 3202, the subscriber bit map 3100 is checked against the given subscriber. If a "1" is present at a given bitmap location, the microprocessor 100 further processes the EMM message. If "0" appears at a given bitmap location, processing is terminated. In the third step 3204, the saved expiry date 3116 is compared with the inspection date 3110. If the date of the check is earlier than or equal to the saved expiry date, then processing will continue, otherwise it will be terminated. In the fourth and final step 3206, the stored expiration date 3116 is changed under microprocessor 100 to the date of newly issued expiration dates 3112. Then emitted ECM keys 3114 can be used.
Returning now to Figure 6, the description of the first preferred embodiment will continue with respect to three orders representing, for example, January, February and March 1998. EMM messages renewing groups are emitted at a certain number of times in a given month. For December 1997, the smart card EEPROM 108 has an expiration date of 31.1.98, so an ECM key for December can be used. For January, assuming that the January (next month) ECM key was issued with the December EMm message and the expiration date is 31.1.98, the subscriber will still have rights, even before the January EMM message is successfully received. After the first successful receipt of the January EMM message, if the control date 31.1.98 is no later than the saved expiry date 31.1.98, the saved expiry date is changed to the date of newly issued rights 28.2.98. Upon further receiving the January EMM message during January, steps 3200 to 3206 are performed, as shown in Figure 7, but no change is made to the stored expiration date.
In February, if on one hand subscriber # 3 left their radio codec 2020 turned on, the February EMM message will be received and sent to a smart card, but because in step 3202 of Fig. 7 the value of the corresponding place in the bit map is "0", no the change will not be made on the saved expiry date, which will remain 28.2.98. If, on the other hand, the radio decoder 2020 remains switched off, similarly no change will be made on the saved expiry date, although for slightly different reasons.
In March, regardless of whether the value of a given place in the subscriber's bitmap is now "1" or "0", the saved expiration date will remain unchanged because the 31.3.98 inspection date will be later than the saved 28.2.98 expiry date, and therefore the subscriber will not have an ECM key that he could use in March. His rights will be effectively canceled in this way. In fact, rights can only be re-granted by means of a special EMM reactivation message.
In the second embodiment, which may be regarded as being particularly closely associated with the first embodiment, the control date 3110 in the emitted EMM message is replaced by the ECM key of the previous month, and the saved expiry date is 3116
189 201 is replaced by the ECM key of the current month as opposed to the next month. Thus, the last month's ECM key is issued in the current month's message. The comparison is made either between the ECM keys themselves or the date associated with and issued with the ECM keys. In any case, the emitted ECM key is treated as representing redundant date information because the ECM key itself is associated with a specific month.
Thus, according to Fig. 5, before the first receipt of the January EMM message which contains the December ECM key as redundant date information, the smart card will have the December ECM key stored. The comparison between emitted and stored ECM keys will be positive, and therefore the December ECM key will be changed to the January ECM key.
If a dishonest subscriber disconnected the decoder in February, the last received rights will be January. When the EMM message arrives in March, the decoder will detect the absence of the February ECM key and take appropriate action, for example, alert the system supervisor about the problem, refusing to transfer March rights, etc.
The first two embodiments are particularly advantageous because they use, as information stored in the smart card, information that would normally be recorded in any event. This requires the efficient use of memory space in the smart card.
In the third embodiment, redundant date information is stored on the smart card for more than one previous month. For example, just like information recorded for the directly previous month, it can be saved for one or two previous months.
In the fourth embodiment, the inspection date 3110 may be replaced by any verification date 3110, such as a completely different, possibly random inspection date or other random number, and this could be stored on a smart card instead of the saved expiry date 3116. In this case, in addition to the 3112 expiration date, the other verification date may be the issue, and it may be the date instead of the 3112 expiration date, which can be saved in the smart card for the next month for comparison with the 3110 verification date.
In the fifth embodiment, no redundant date information is emitted, and instead the smart card or receiver / decoder records whether an EMM message has been received for each month. If the EMM message for the previous month has not been received, then, as in the first embodiment described above, further processing of the EMM message for the current month is interrupted. For example, the register could be in the form of a table which contains for each month an EMM message or an ECM key or part thereof.
However, if, for example, all subscribers have successfully paid their subscriptions, it may not be necessary to send the subscriber bitmap with the EMM message, because the message will consist entirely of positive values "1".
Figure 8 shows that for simplicity the bitmap can be sent only in the event of subscriber changes.
189 201
Fig.2.
χ-108
<img file="PL189201B1_D0001.tif" />
<img file="PL189201B1_D0002.tif" />
189 201
Figure 4.
THE RIGHT EMM 3062
3100-^ 3102-^
<td rowspan="2"> 1</td><td rowspan="2"> 1</td><td rowspan="2"> 1</td><td rowspan="2"> 1</td><td rowspan="2"></td><td>JANUARY</td><td rowspan="2">- JANUARY</td>
<td>RIGHTS GRANTED GROUP</td>
<td colspan="6">4 1-SUBSCRIBER # 3 3100- ^ 3102 ^</td><td></td>
<td rowspan="2"> 1</td><td rowspan="2"> 1</td><td rowspan="2"> 0</td><td rowspan="2"> 1</td><td rowspan="2"></td><td>FEBRUARY</td><td rowspan="2">- FEBRUARY</td>
<td>II</td>
<td colspan="6"> 3100--^ 3102-^</td><td></td>
<td rowspan="2"> 1</td><td rowspan="2"> 1</td><td rowspan="2"> 1</td><td rowspan="2"> 1</td><td rowspan="2"> • · · · ·</td><td>MARCH</td><td rowspan="2">- MARCH</td>
<td>II</td>
NEW SUBSCRIBER
<img file="PL189201B1_D0003.tif" />
Figure 5.
THE RIGHT EMM
3062 _AND_____
3100—^ 3102-^ ^.3104
<td rowspan="2"> 1</td><td rowspan="2"> 1</td><td rowspan="2"> 1</td><td rowspan="2"> 1</td><td rowspan="2"></td><td>JANUARY</td><td rowspan="2">GRU-</td>
<td>RIGHTS</td>
<td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>GRANTED GROUP</td><td>DAY</td>
SUBSCRIBER # 3
JANUARY
3100--^ 3102-^ ^3104
<td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>FEBRUARY</td><td></td>
<td> 1</td><td> 1</td><td> 0</td><td> 1</td><td> • · · · ·</td><td>II</td><td>sty JANU A R Y</td>
FEBRUARY ^ -3104
3100
3102-^
<td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>MARCH</td><td></td>
<td> 1</td><td> 1</td><td> 1</td><td> 1</td><td> • · « · ·</td><td> 11</td><td>LU- YOU</td>
- MARCH vol
INFORMATION
CONTROL
189 201
<img file="PL189201B1_D0004.tif" />
<img file="PL189201B1_D0005.tif" />
Figure 7.
<img file="PL189201B1_D0006.tif" />
189 201
Fig.8.
3102-^ ^-3104
<td>STYCZES</td><td></td>
<td>RIGHTS GRANTED GROUP</td><td>GRU- DZUfl</td>
3100—^ 3102—^-3104
<td></td><td colspan="2"></td><td></td><td></td><td colspan="2">FLIGHTS</td>
<td> 1</td><td> 1</td><td> 0</td><td> 1</td><td></td><td> 1 1</td><td>sty 2ZEf5</td>
FEBRUARY
3102-^ ^-3104
<td>MARCH</td><td></td>
<td rowspan="2"> 1 1</td><td>LU-</td>
<td>YOU</td>
_ MARCH
Fig.1.
<img file="PL189201B1_D0007.tif" />
UP Department of Publications. Circulation of 50 copies
Price PLN 4.00
Contents7
11 sheets
Sheet 1 Sheet 2 Sheet 3 Sheet 4 Sheet 5 Sheet 6 Sheet 7 Sheet 8 Sheet 9 Sheet 10 Sheet 11
517 members in 27 offices
Priority claims11
| Document | Office | Kind | Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| 97400650 | European Patent Office (EPO) | A | |
| 97400650 | European Patent Office (EPO) | A | |
| 9702106 | European Patent Office (EPO) | W | |
| 9702106 | European Patent Office (EPO) | W | |
| 97402959 | European Patent Office (EPO) | A | |
| 97402959 | European Patent Office (EPO) | A | |
| 9797402959 | – | – | – |
| 98EP9801606 | – | – | – |
| EP19970400650 | – | – | – |
| EP19970402959 | – | – | – |
| WO1997EP02106 | – | – | – |
Members517
| Document | Office | Kind | |
|---|---|---|---|
| ZA973612B | South Africa | B | |
| ZA973607B | South Africa | B | |
| ZA973603B | South Africa | B | |
| ZA973604B | South Africa | B | |
| ZA973608B | South Africa | B | |
| ZA973610B | South Africa | B | |
| ZA973611B | South Africa | B | |
| ZA973613B | South Africa | B | |
| ZA973614B | South Africa | B | |
| ZA973609B | South Africa | B | |
| ZA973606B | South Africa | B | |
| ZA973605B | South Africa | B | |
| EP0866611A1 | European Patent Office (EPO) | A1 | |
| EP0866613A1 | European Patent Office (EPO) | A1 | |
| EP0866616A1 | European Patent Office (EPO) | A1 | |
| ZA982384B | South Africa | B | |
| ZA982385B | South Africa | B | |
| CA2284011A1 | Canada | A1 | |
| CA2284014A1 | Canada | A1 | |
| CA2284016A1 | Canada | A1 | |
| CA2284018A1 | Canada | A1 | |
| CA2284022A1 | Canada | A1 | |
| CA2284023A1 | Canada | A1 | |
| CA2284036A1 | Canada | A1 | |
| CA2284038A1 | Canada | A1 | |
| CA2284044A1 | Canada | A1 | |
| CA2284145A1 | Canada | A1 | |
| CA2284146A1 | Canada | A1 | |
| CA2284147A1 | Canada | A1 | |
| CA2284153A1 | Canada | A1 | |
| CA2284154A1 | Canada | A1 | |
| CA2284681A1 | Canada | A1 | |
| CA2284867A1 | Canada | A1 | |
| CA2499904A1 | Canada | A1 | |
| WO9843162A1 | World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) | A1 | |
| WO9843165A1 | World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) | A1 | |
| WO9843167A1 | World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) | A1 | |
| WO9843172A2 | World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) | A2 | |
| WO9843248A1 | World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) | A1 | |
| WO9843415A1 | World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) | A1 | |
| WO9843421A1 | World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) | A1 | |
| WO9843425A1 | World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) | A1 | |
| WO9843426A1 | World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) | A1 | |
| WO9843427A1 | World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) | A1 | |
| WO9843428A1 | World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) | A1 | |
| WO9843430A1 | World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) | A1 | |
| WO9843431A1 | World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) | A1 | |
| WO9843432A1 | World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) | A1 | |
| WO9843433A1 | World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) | A1 | |
| WO9843437A1 | World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) | A1 | |
| ZA982386B | South Africa | B | |
| AU2638597A | Australia | A | |
| AU2701397A | Australia | A | |
| AU2770297A | Australia | A | |
| AU2770397A | Australia | A | |
| AU2770497A | Australia | A | |
| AU2770597A | Australia | A | |
| AU2770697A | Australia | A | |
| AU2770797A | Australia | A | |
| AU2770897A | Australia | A | |
| AU2770997A | Australia | A | |
| AU2771097A | Australia | A | |
| AU2888097A | Australia | A | |
| AU7038098A | Australia | A | |
| AU7038198A | Australia | A | |
| AU7038298A | Australia | A | |
| AU7208298A | Australia | A | |
| EP0872798A1 | European Patent Office (EPO) | A1 | |
| ZA982387B | South Africa | B | |
| NO994529D0 | Norway | D0 | |
| NO994530D0 | Norway | D0 | |
| NO994531D0 | Norway | D0 | |
| NO994532D0 | Norway | D0 | |
| NO994533D0 | Norway | D0 | |
| NO994534D0 | Norway | D0 | |
| NO994535D0 | Norway | D0 | |
| NO994536D0 | Norway | D0 | |
| NO994537D0 | Norway | D0 | |
| NO994538D0 | Norway | D0 | |
| NO994539D0 | Norway | D0 | |
| NO994540D0 | Norway | D0 | |
| NO994541D0 | Norway | D0 | |
| NO994542D0 | Norway | D0 | |
| NO994543D0 | Norway | D0 | |
| NO994544D0 | Norway | D0 | |
| NO994529L | Norway | L | |
| NO994530L | Norway | L | |
| NO994531L | Norway | L | |
| NO994532L | Norway | L | |
| NO994533L | Norway | L | |
| NO994534L | Norway | L | |
| NO994535L | Norway | L | |
| NO994536L | Norway | L | |
| NO994537L | Norway | L | |
| NO994538L | Norway | L | |
| NO994539L | Norway | L | |
| NO994540L | Norway | L | |
| NO994541L | Norway | L | |
| NO994542L | Norway | L | |
| NO994543L | Norway | L |
1 legal event, as the office reported them to INPADOC
Events
| Event | Code | |
|---|---|---|
| Decisions on the lapse of the protection rightsLapsedLAPS | LAPS |
Numbers
- Publication, DOCDB
- 189201
- Publication, EPODOC
- PL189201B
- Application
- 98335767
- Application, DOCDB
- 33576798
- Application, EPODOC
- PL19980335767
Titles2
- English
- METHOD OF AND APPARATUS FOR PREVENTING UNAUTHORISED ACCESS TO A CONDITIONALLY ACCESSIBLE SYSTEM
- Polish
- Sposób i układ zabezpieczenia przed nieuprawnionym odbiorem kodowanego sygnału telewizyjnego
Classification
- CPC, 27
- G06F11/10
- H04N21/4623
- G06F9/4843
- G06F11/1435
- G06Q20/04
- G06Q20/06
- G06Q20/1235
- G06Q20/341
- G06Q20/342
- G06Q20/4033
- G06Q20/40975
- G06T9/007
- G07F7/025
- G07F7/08
- G07F7/1008
- G07F17/0014
- G11C16/105
- H04N7/163
- H04N7/1675
- H04N17/004
- H04N21/4367
- H04N21/44236
- H04N21/4622
- H04N21/8355
- H04N21/4627
- H04N21/6334
- H04N21/426
- IPC, 55
- G06F9 445
- G06F9 06
- G06F9 46
- G06F9 48
- G06F11 00
- G06F11 08
- G06F11 10
- G06F11 14
- G06F11 26
- G06F11 28
- G06F12 00
- G06F12 02
- G06F13 00
- G06F13 10
- G06F21 10
- G06K17 00
- G06K19 00
- G06K19 07
- G06Q20 00
- G06T9 00
- G07F7 00
- G07F7 02
- G07F7 08
- G07F7 10
- G09C1 00
- G11C8 06
- G11C16 02
- H04B1 713
- H04H20 02
- H04H40 00
- H04L1 00
- H04L9 10
- H04L9 32
- H04L12 56
- H04L13 08
- H04L29 10
- H04N
- H04N5 00
- H04N5 222
- H04N5 44
- H04N5 455
- H04N7 14
- H04N7 16
- H04N7 167
- H04N7 173
- H04N7 66
- H04N17 00
- H04N17 04
- H04N21 4367
- H04N21 442
- H04N21 462
- H04N21 4623
- H04N21 4627
- H04N21 6334
- H04N21 8355
