Information processing device, information processing method and program storage medium
Abstract
Information processing system and method for detecting a revoke entity by using an effecting key block (EKB). On the basis of the effective key block (EKB) used in a key distribution construction of a tree structure, a device or service provider is judged as a revoke (reject) entity. In a public key certificate, an ID for identifying the position of a hierarchical key distribution tree is stored, and a tracing is executed using a tag of the effective key block (EKB) on the basis of the ID acquired from the public key certificate, to judge whether or not the ID is at the position where an EKB processing (decoding) is possible and thereby to judge whether or not the entity corresponding to the ID is revoked.
Term
No projected expiry on record.
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11 claims: 11 independent, 0 dependent
- 1each Leigh of the hierarchy Tree structure which matched the range 1. node of a claim, and the key peculiar to each of a leaf it is matched with Off -- leaf corresponding to the leaf of the self [ each ] of the above-mentioned hierarchy Tree structure Key, . information place which stored the key set consisting of the node key on the path which results in a higher rank layer It is Device. - 請求の範囲 1 . ノード及びリーフの各々に固有のキーを対応付けた階層ヅリー構造の各リー フに対応付けられ、 各々が前記階層ヅリー構造の自己のリーフに対応するリーフ キーと、 上位層に至るパス上のノードキーからなるキーセットを格納した.情報処 理装置であり、 、 - . The entity corresponding to the above-mentioned node or a leaf is as an entity for exclusion. Verification processing whether to be a Revoke entity, More of the above-mentioned hierarchy tree structure Encryption Kee de which enciphered new A 1 Do key by the low rank node key or the leaf key -- Validation key block containing the evening (E K B) it has the composition performed by the judgment of whether to be able to decode with the storing key ■ set of ^ Entity for verification -- the above-mentioned decoding Judgment of possibility, candidate for verification it is based on the identifier of Entity -- the above-mentioned validation key pro in A (E K B) This which has the composition performed by pursuit processing of an arrangement discernment tag Information processor by which it is characterized. 前記ノード又はリーフに対応するエンティティが排除対象エンティティとして のリボーク ·エンティティであるか否かの検証処理を、 前記階層ツリー構造の更 新ノ一ドキーを下位ノードキー又はリーフキーによって暗号化した暗号化キーデ —夕を含む有効化キーブロック (E K B ) を、 検証対象^ンティティの格納キー ■ セットにより復号可能であるか否かの判定により実行する構成を有し、 前記復号 可能性の判定は、 検証対象 ンティティの識別子に基づく、 前記有効化キープロ ック (E K B ) 中のキ 配置識別タグの追跡処理により実行する構成を有するこ とを特徴とする情報処理装置。
- 2Identifier of the above-mentioned entity for verification, The above-mentioned hierarchy tree style of the entity The position information on the corresponding node or leaf in Construction is included, The above-mentioned validation key block (E K B) Inner 1 arrangement discernment evening A, Validation keeping mouth A (E K B) Existence of cryptographic key data of a lower layer of each one inner encryption 1 De evening It is constituted as evening A to identify. The above-mentioned pursuit processing, It is contained in an identifier of the above-mentioned entity for verification, The Enti It is based on position information in the hierarchy A dragon 1 above-mentioned structure of a tee, Place which pursues the above-mentioned tag Range of a claim being the composition performed as Reason Information processing given in 1 paragraph Device. 2 . 前記検証対象エンティティの識別子は、 該エンティティの前記階層ツリー構 造における対応するノード又はリーフの位置情報を含み、 前記有効化キーブロック (E K B ) 中のキ一配置識別夕グは、 有効化キープ口 ック (E K B ) 中の各々の暗号化キ一デ一夕の下位層の暗号化キーデータの有無 を識別する夕グとして構成されており、 前記追跡処理は、 前記検証対象エンティティの識別子に含まれる、 該ェンティ ティの前記階層ヅリ一構造における位置情報に基づいて、 前記タグを追跡する処 理として実行する構成であることを特徴とする請求の範囲第 1項記載の情報処理 装置。
- 3Identifier of the above-mentioned entity for verification, The hierarchy A dragon 1 above-mentioned style of the entity The position information on corresponding A 1 Do or leaf in Construction is included, The above-mentioned validation key block (E K B) Inner 1 arrangement discernment tag, Validation keeping mouth Dug (E K B) Existence of cryptographic key data of a lower layer of each inner cryptographic key data It is constituted as evening A to identify. The above-mentioned information processor, The above-mentioned evening A based on the identifier of the above-mentioned Entity for verification Pursuit processing, about a node position where the above-mentioned entity for verification corresponds, or a leaf. Place -- a judgment of being Wear up -- and Indignation -- the price -- in a case where there is nothing It is updated. A judgment of the above-mentioned decoding possibility is performed by the judgment of whether to belong to a low rank of a node key which is not. Range of a claim having the composition to carry out Information processor given in 1 paragraph. 3 . 前記検証対象エンティティの識別子は、 該エンティティの前記階層ヅリ一構 造における対応するノ一ド又はリーフの位置情報を含み、 前記有効化キーブロック (E K B ) 中のキ一配置識別タグは、 有効化キープ口 ヅク (E K B ) 中の各々の暗号化キーデータの下位層の暗号化キーデータの有無 を識別する夕グとして構成されており、 前記情報処理装置は、 前記検証対象ェンティティの識別子に基づく前記夕グの 追跡処理により、 前記検証対象エンティティの対応するノード位置又はリーフ位 置に迪り着けるか否かの判定、 及び、 迪りつけない場合において、 更新されてい ないノードキーの下位に属するか否かの判定により前記復号可能性の判定を実行 する構成を有することを特徴とする請求の範囲第 1項記載の情報処理装置。
- 4Identifier of the above-mentioned entity for verification, It is a rank to a Public key certificate of the entity. - It is the Payment(ed) identifier. '. The above-mentioned information processor, It is public presentation of the entity about an identifier of an entity for verification. Range of a claim having the composition acquired from a key certificate Information processor given in 1 paragraph . 4 . 前記検証対象エンティティの識別子は、 該エンティティの公鬨鍵証明書に格- 納された識別子であり、' 前記情報処理装置は、 検証対象エンティティの識別子を該エンティティの公開 鍵証明書から取得する構成を有することを特徴とする請求の範囲第 1項.記載の情 報処理装置。
- 5An event . tee tee 'corresponding to A 1 Do or the leaf which constitutes the above-mentioned information processor and - .... and above-mentioned hierarchy A dragon 1 structure to . -- in decoding of . encryption contents provided ... 5 . 前記情報処理装置は、, · . . . . · 前記階層ヅリ一構造を構成するノ一ド又はリーフに対応するェン.ティティ'から. 提供される.暗号化コンテンツの復号において、 . . . The identifier of the entity is acquired from the public key certificate of the above-mentioned entity, This Take Pursuit processing by the tag of above-mentioned validation 1 Prozek based on the gained identifier (E K B) When it performs and judges whether the entities are Lipoku and an entity, - is, Contents encryption acquired from above-mentioned validation keeping Rodzuk (E K B) It has the composition which performs decoding processing of encryption contents based on 1K c 0 n. Information processor of the claim by which it is characterized given in Range 1 paragraph. 前記エンティティの公開鍵証明書から該エンティティの識別子を取得し、 該取 得した識別子に基づく前記有効化キ一プロヅク (E K B ) のタグによる追跡処理 を実行して該エンティティがリポーク ·エンティティであるか否かを判定すると - ともに、 前記有効化キープロヅク (E K B ) から取得されるコンテンツ暗号化キ 一 K c 0 nに基づく暗号化コンテンツの復号処理を実行する構成を有することを 特徴とする請求の範囲第 1項記載の情報処理装置。
- 6each Re 1 of the hierarchy Rie structure which matched the key peculiar to each of A 1 Do and Li 1 Off it is matched with Off -- leaf corresponding to the leaf of the self [ each ] of the hierarchy A dragon 1 above-mentioned structure Key, Information place which stored one set of which consist of a node key on the path which results in a higher rank layer It is an information processing method in Device, The entity corresponding to the above-mentioned node or a leaf is as an entity for exclusion. Verification processing whether to be Revoke and an entity, More of the hierarchy A dragon 1 above-mentioned structure Encryption Kee de which enciphered the new node key by low rank A 1 Doki 1 or a leaf key Validation key block containing one evening (E K B) storing key of the entity for verification it has the composition performed by the judgment of whether to be able to decode with a set -- the above-mentioned decoding Judgment of possibility, it is based on the identifier of the entity for verification -- the validation 1 above-mentioned pro Dug [ (E K B) ] -- performing by pursuit processing of an inner 1 arrangement discernment tag -- the feature and Information processing method. 6 . ノ一ド及びリ一フの各々に固有のキーを対応付けた階層ッリー構造の各リ一 フに対応付けられ、 各々が前記階層ヅリ一構造の自己のリーフに対応するリーフ キーと、 上位層に至るパス上のノードキーからなるキ一セットを格納した情報処 理装置における情報処理方法であり、 前記ノード又はリーフに対応するエンティティが排除対象エンティティとして のリボーク ·エンティティであるか否かの検証処理を、 前記階層ヅリ一構造の更 新ノードキーを下位ノ一ドキ一又はリーフキーによって暗号化した暗号化キーデ 一夕を含む有効化キーブロック (E K B ) を、 検証対象エンティティの格納キー セットにより復号可能であるか否かの判定により実行する構成を有し、 前記復号 可能性の判定は、 検証対象エンティティの識別子に基づく、 前記有効化キ一プロ ヅク (E K B ) 中のキ一配置識別タグの追跡処理により実行することを特徴とす る情報処理方法。
- 7Identifier of the above-mentioned entity for verification, The above-mentioned hierarchy tree style of the entity The position information on the corresponding node or leaf in Construction is included, The above-mentioned validation keeping Rodzuk (E K B) Inner 1 arrangement discernment evening A, Validation keeping mouth Dug (E K B) Existence of cryptographic key Data of a lower layer of each one inner encryption Kee de evening Composition is carried out with a tag to identify. ' - * The above-mentioned pursuit processing is . Above ^^. It is contained in the identifier of the entity for a proof, The A.The.:It is based on position information in the above-mentioned hierarchy tree structure of a tee, Place which pursues the above-mentioned tag Range of a claim being the composition performed as Reason Information processing given in 6 paragraphs A method. . 7 . 前記検証対象エンティティの識別子は、 該エンティティの前記階層ツリー構 造における対応するノード又はリーフの位置情報を含み、 前記有効化キープロヅク (E K B ) 中のキ一配置識別夕グは、 有効化キープ口 ヅク (E K B ) 中の各々の暗号化キーデ一夕の下位層の暗号化キーデーダの有無 を識別するタグとレて構成されており、 ' - • 前記追跡処理は、. 前記 ^^証対象エンティティの識別子に含まれる、 該ェ.ンティ.: ティの前記階層ツリー構造における位置情報に基づいて、 前記タグを追跡する処 理として実行する構成であることを特徴とする請求の範囲第 6項記載の情報処理 方法。 .
- 8Identifier of the above-mentioned verification Target engineer, The hierarchy A dragon 1 above-mentioned style of the Other city' Í The position information on the corresponding node or leaf in Construction is included. 1 block of the above-mentioned validation (E K B) Inner arrangement discernment tag, Validation keeping mouth Dug (E K B) Existence of one encryption Kee de evening of a lower layer of each inner cryptographic key data It is constituted as a tag to identify. - -' The above-mentioned information processing method is the Be based above-mentioned tag to . identifier of the entity for the . above-mentioned verification. Pursuit processing, about a no . Do position where the above-mentioned entity for verification corresponds, or a leaf. Place -- judgment of being Wear up, And Indignation -- the price -- in a case where there is nothing It is updated. A judgment of the above-mentioned decoding possibility is performed by the judgment of whether to belong to a low rank of a node key which is not. Information processing method of a claim carrying out given in the 6th paragraph of a range. 8 . 前記検証対象工ンティティの識別子は、 該ェシティテ'ィの前記階層ヅリ一構 造における対応するノード又はリーフの位置情報を含み 前記有効化キ一ブロック (E K B ) 中のキ 配置識別タグは、 有効化キープ口 ヅク (E K B ) 中の各々の暗号化キーデータの下位層の暗号化キーデ一夕の有無 を識別するタグとして構成されており、 · · ' 前記情報処理方法は、.前記検証対象エンティティの.識別子に基づぐ前記タグの 追跡処理により、 前記検証対象エンティティの対応するノー.ド位置又はリーフ位 置に迪り着けるか否かの判定、 及び、 迪りつけない場合において、 更新されてい ないノードキーの下位に属するか否かの判定により前記復号可能性の判定を実行 することを特徴とする請求の範囲第 6項記載の情報処理方法。
- 9Identifier of the above-mentioned entity for verification, It is a rank to a Public key certificate of the entity. It is the identifier by which Payment was carried out. The above-mentioned information processing method, An identifier of an entity for verification is acquired from a public key certificate of the entity. Range of a claim characterized by things Information processing method given in 6 paragraphs. 9 . 前記検証対象エンティティの識別子は、 該エンティティの公鬨鍵証明書に格 納された識別子であり、 前記情報処理方法は、 検証対象エンティティの識別子を該エンティティの公開鍵証明書から取得する ことを特徴とする請求の範囲第 6項記載の情報処理方法。
- 101 0 . From Entity corresponding to Node or Leaf Which Constitutes the Above-mentioned Information Processing Method and the Hierarchy A dragon 1 Above-mentioned Structure In Decoding of Encryption Contents Provided, The identifier of the entity is acquired from the public key certificate of the above-mentioned entity, This Take Pursuit processing by evening A of the above-mentioned validation key block based on the gained identifier (E K B) If it performs and judges whether the entities are Revoke and an entity Both, Contents encryption acquired from above-mentioned validation keeping Rodzuk (E K B) A claim performing decoding processing of encryption contents based on 1K c 0 n Information processing method of Request given in Range 6 paragraph. 1 0 . 前記情報処理方法は、 前記階層ヅリ一構造を構成するノード又はリーフに対応するエンティティから 提供される暗号化コンテンツの復号において、 前記エンティティの公開鍵証明書から該エンティティの識別子を取得し、 該取 得した識別子に基づく前記有効化キーブロック (E K B ) の夕グによる追跡処理 を実行して該エンティティがリボーク ·エンティティであるか否かを判定すると ともに、 前記有効化キープロヅク (E K B ) から取得されるコンテンツ暗号化キ 一 K c 0 nに基づく暗号化コンテンツの復号処理を実行することを特徴とする請 求の範囲第 6項記載の情報処理方法。
- 111 1 . Each Re of Hierarchy A dragon 1 Structure Which Matched Node and Key Peculiar to Each of Leaf . Li 1. corresponding to Leaf of Self [ Each / Stingy-with Correspondence Re, and ] of the Hierarchy A dragon 1 Above-mentioned Structure to 1 Fuky, Information which stored key Setsu which consists of a node key on the path which results in a higher rank layer Comb which makes the information processing in a processing unit perform on computer and a system One evening It is a program store medium which provides - program. 1 1 . ノード及びリーフの各々に固有のキーを対応付けた階層ヅリ一構造の各リ 一フに対応付けちれ、 各々が前記階層ヅリ一構造の自己のリーフに対応する.リ一. フキーと、 上位層に至るパス上のノードキーからなるキーセヅトを格納した情報 処理装置における情報処理をコンピュータ ·システム上で実行せしめるコンビュ 一夕 · プログラムを提供するプログラム記憶媒体であって、 . :The above-mentioned Cong When you evening' program is -. ... Although the entity corresponding to the above-mentioned node or a leaf is a Revoke' entity of . as an entity for exclusion, the verification processing step of no is included, updating Node tree 1 of the above-mentioned verification processing step and the above-mentioned hierarchy tree structure -- a low rank node key or leaf key encryption ^" which carried out Encryption . validation key block containing the De 1. evening (E KB) verification pair the judgment of whether to be able to decode by storing key Setsu of an elephant entity -- execution it has Step to carry out -- judgment step of the above-mentioned decoding possibility, it is based on the identifier of Entity for verification -- the above-mentioned validation keeping Rodzuk [ (E K B) ] -- pursuit processing of an inner 1 arrangement discernment tag -- execution Program store medium containing the step to carry out. : 前記コンどユー夕 ' プログラムは、 · . . . 前記ノード又はリーフに対応するエンティティが排除対象エンティティとして. のリボーク 'エンティティであるが否かの検証処理ステップを含み、 前記検証処理ステップは、 前記階層ツリー構造の更新ノードキ一を下位ノードキー又はリーフキーによつ て暗号化した暗号化キ^ "デ一.夕を含む.有効化キーブロック (E K.B ) を、 検証対 象エンティティの格納キーセヅトにより復号可能であるか否かの判定により実行 するステヅプを有し、 前記復号可能性の判定ステツプは、 検証対象ェンティティの識別子に基づく、 前記有効化キープロヅク (E K B ) 中のキ一配置識別タグの追跡処理により実行 するステップを含むことを特徴とするプログラム記憶媒体。
Independent claims11
131 paragraphs in 1 section, as filed
Specification An information processor, an information processing method, and program store medium Technical field Present invention, It is related with an information processor, an information processing method, and a program store medium, system Morning which distributes the scrambling key in the system accompanied by scrambling especially it is related with a method -- it is still more detailed -- the hierarchical key distribution method of a tree structure is used -- specific device Revoke (exclusion) It A to that which makes it possible to perform efficiently.
- Eye -- a view -- art The former, a game program, voice data, image data, etc., Various soft Wide One evening (the following and these are called Content (Content)) Circulation. Through the storage of Netto works, such as in evening 1 network, or D V D, C D, etc. which can be circulated prospers. P C (Pers onalComputer) which these circulation contents and a user own, a game machine machine -- wearing of data reception or a storage it is stored in the storage device in the record playback apparatus which is played by being carried out or is attached to P C etc., for example, a memory card, a hard disk, etc. -- new from a storing medium -- re--- It is used by the student.
In information machines and equipment, such as a video game instrument and P C, Is it a network about circulation contents? D V D in order to receive, C in evening face for accessing D etc. it has -- the control means which is further needed for reproduction of contents, a program, and data It has R A M, R O M, etc. which are used as a memory field.
Various contents, such as one music De evening, image data, or a program, reproduction The user directions from main parts of information machines and equipment, such as a game machine machine used as apparatus, and P C, and Burning is called from a storage by directions of the user through the connected input means -- being reproduced through the main part of information machines and equipment or the connected display, a speaker, etc. To.
Many a Age 1 Muro gram, music data, one picture De evenings, etc. and software and contes The right of distribution, etc. are held by Tennis and the general target at the maker and a vender. therefore, This distribution of the contents of Re and others is faced -- fixed use restrictions, i.e., a regular user, it only receives and licenses software -- reproduction without permission, etc. are not performed it carries out for obtaining -- that is, the composition in consideration of security is adopted.
The one technique of doing . realization of the use restrictions to a user is . Encryption place of distribution contents It is Reason. For example, voice data enciphered via the Internet etc. and picture De It is Distribute about various Content, such as one evening and a game program; delta, registered user as opposed to those who were checked when it was -- it is a means, i.e., the composition which gives a decoding key, to decode the distributed encryption contents. : .
Decoding De 1 which can use one encryption De evening by decryption processing in a . predetermined procedure Evening (Plaintext) It can return. an encryption key is used for encryption processing of such information -- the data encryption which uses double Encoding key for decryption processing, and a decoding method are well learned from the former ing.
Various kinds in the mode of data encryption and the decoding method using an encryption key and Recovery . Encoding key The method currently called what is called a common key encryptosystem-ized method as the one example although it is is Ah. To. decoding of a common key encryptosystem-ized method, the encryption key used for encryption processing of data, and data the common key which uses for these encryption processings and decryption the decryption key used for-izing at a user regular as a common thing is given -- data access by an inaccurate user without a key It eliminates. It is D E S (data code standard: De ta encryption standard) to the typical method of this method. It is.
The encryption key used for above-mentioned encryption processing and decryption, and decryption key, for example, a certain The, On the other hand based on Seward etc., the number of A A, etc. can be obtained with the application of a tropism function. To. Seki which becomes very difficult [ a tropism function ] for asking for an input conversely from the output on the other hand It is a number. For example, on the other hand, a tropism function is applied by considering as an input the password which the user decided. An encryption key and a decryption key are generated based on The and its output. It is such. Path which is the one original De evening conversely from the encryption key produced by carrying out, and a decryption key The substance top of asking for Word becomes impossible. It is used when decoding with processing with the encryption key used when enciphering. The method which made processing of a decryption key to carry out a different A cargo rhythm is what is called public-key-encryption-ization. It is a method called a method. Public-key-encryption-ized method, . with an unspecified usable user It is the method of using a public key. Encryption document to a specific individual, The specific individual Encryption processing is performed using published Public key. It is enciphered by Public key and is 'A document. It is decoding processing only by the secret key corresponding to the public key used for the encryption processing. It becomes possible. Secret key, . Only the individual who published Public key is the Duke. at . of . To possess and To. Only an individual with a secret key can decode the document enciphered with the key. In the typical thing of a public-key-encryption-ized method, it is R S A (Rivest-Shamir-Adleman). A code It is. regular [ in encryption Content . ] by using such a cipher system -- :U The system whose decoding is. Enabled only to 1 THE becomes possible. - .
It is above. Contents are enciphered in a Contents distribution system and it is to a user. Netsu It stores in recording media, such as Network or D V D, and C D, and they are offer and encryption Co. The composition which provides only a just user with the contents key which decodes Tent is Took mostly. for is carried out. Content key . 1 for preventing the unjust copy of the contents key itself, etc. is enciphered, and it provides for just ^ THE -- the decryption key which only a just user has -- business -- the composition which. is, decodes an encryption contents key and makes a contents key usable -- Offer The proposal is carried out.
The judgment of whether to be a just user, and general, for example, sender of contents between a certain content providers and user devices or contents -- Send and receive it sets between To user devices -- before distribution of contents or a contents key It carries out by performing attestation processing.
however, an inaccurate user device -- for example, -- self--- the secret key of the device of 3 is disclosure it carries out -- storing the secret key in a device, becoming a just device, and clearing up -- Co The situations, such as receiving Tent, may occur. such a situation -- an opposite -- in order to cope -- control center 1 of a key -- inaccurate person list (Blacklist) it is called -- the Ribo caseon list which List(ed) I D of the inaccurate device -- just device Distribute. a communication partner's I D is contained in a list with a Ribo caseon list or not -- checking is performed. I D of a Revoke 1 Chillon list and an inaccurate device is list-ized, the signature of a key issue center is added for the prevention from an alteration, and it is referred to as C R L (Certif icate Revocation List) -- it follows on generating of a new inaccurate device -- it is updated one by one -- just Debye It is distributed to A. However, it is Ribocase as an inaccurate device Add. I D of the inaccurate device recorded on Yong Risto, it will increase in monotone -- squirrel Size of ♪ (the amount of one De evenings) it becomes large -- the load of distribution of one Listte evening becomes large -- storing a list again in the just device which is a distribution place -- To save . To -- memory Space 1 It becomes a burden of A. the indication present invention of an invention, Processing load accompanying increase of data of the above Lipotech 1 Chillon lists, What [ was proposed in view of a problem of a memory space in list storing by a device ] it is . Inaccurate device. It is 1 distribution of hierarchy Rie structure, without using a I D list. Composition is used, Information processor which enabled detection of an inaccurate device, and 'exclusion, And information processing method, And it aims at providing a program store medium. a key with an information processor peculiar to each of a node and a leaf concerning the present invention -- with correspondence It is matched with each leaf of beam hierarchy Rie structure. each -- the above-mentioned hierarchy Tree structure -- self--- Leaf key corresponding to oneself's leaf, It consists of A 1 Doki 1 on a path which results in a higher rank layer. It is the information processor which stored a key set. Ente corresponding to a node or a leaf Witi is Revoke as an entity for exclusion. or not [ that it is - entity ] Verification processing, They are a low rank node key or a leaf key about updating A 1 Do key of hierarchy Tree structure. Validation keeping Rodzuk containing one enciphered encryption 1 De evening (E K B) To a judgment of whether to be able to decode by storing key Setsu of an entity for verification It has composition which carries out Execution. The judgment of decoding possibility, and identifier of the entity for verification To the based pursuit processing of the key arrangement discernment tag in validation key block (E K B) It has the composition which carries out Execution.
it sets to the information processor concerning the present invention -- the identifier of the entity for verification, The A Position information on the corresponding node or leaf in the above-mentioned hierarchy Tree structure of Entity It contains and is a 1 arrangement discernment tag in the above-mentioned validation key block (E K B), Validation One encryption Kee de evening of the lower layer of each encryption 1 data in 1 block (EK B) It is constituted as a tag which identifies existence. pursuit processing and Entite for verification it is contained in the identifier of Í -- it performs as processing which pursues basis * About and a tag to the position information in hierarchy A dragon 1 structure of the entity. .
it sets to the information processor concerning the present invention -- identifier of the entity for verification Is Corresponding A 1 Do or Li in hierarchy . A dragon 1 structure of the Entity Position of Off . Information is included and it is a key arrangement discernment tag in the above-mentioned validation key block (E K B), Effective Encryption Kee de of the lower layer of each cryptographic key data in-izing key block (E K B) It is constituted as a tag which identifies the existence of one evening, and is. This information processor is . and a candidate for verification. Pursuit processing of a tag based on the identifier of an entity, . of the entity for verification -- a corresponding node position or leaf position -- the judgment of being Wear up, and Indignation -- the price -- it * is and sets to a case -- or not [ belonging to the low rank of the node key which is not updated ] -- Discrimination . -- The judgment of Decoding possibility is performed.
Further, It sets to an information processor concerning the present invention, 'identifier of a An event . tee tee for verification It is the identifier stored in a public key certificate of the entity. Information processor, Style which acquires an identifier of an entity for verification from a Public key certificate of the entity . It has Formation.
the information processor concerning the present invention and the node which constitutes a hierarchy tree structure -- or -- In decoding of encryption Content provided from the entity corresponding to a leaf The identifier of the entity is acquired from the public key certificate of an entity, It this acquired. Pursuit processing by the tag of validation key block based on an identifier (E K B) is performed. While judging whether the entity is a Revoke entity, an owner -- contents cryptographic key K c 0 n acquired from effect-ized keeping Rodzuk (E K B) -- basis Decoding processing of To encryption Content is performed.
hierarchy A dragon which matched the present invention, the node, and the key peculiar to each of a leaf it is matched with each leaf of one structure -- each is correspondence to the self leaf of a hierarchy tree structure Leaf key to carry out, Key Setsu which consists of a node key on the path which results in a higher rank layer is stored. It is an information processing method in the information processor carried out, A corresponding to a node or a leaf or [ that Entity is a Lipoku' entity as an entity for exclusion ] -- un--- Verification processing, They are a low rank node key or a leaf about the updating node key of hierarchy A dragon 1 structure. Validation keeping mouth A containing the cryptographic key data enciphered by the key (E K B) judgment of whether to be able to decode with the storing key set of the entity for verification it has the composition to perform -- the judgment of decoding possibility -- discernment of the entity for verification it is based on a child -- validation keeping Rodzuk [ (E K B) ] -- pursuit processing of an inner key arrangement discernment tag
. Perform. . .- .■ --
it sets to the information processing method concerning the present invention -- identifier of the entity for verification Position of the corresponding node or leaf in hierarchy A dragon 1 structure of the entity
. They are an implication and . validation key block about information. (E K B) Inner key arrangement discernment tag, Validation -- Block (E K B) Cryptographic key data of a lower layer of each inner cryptographic key data It is constituted as a tag which identifies existence. Pursuit Treatment, Entite for verification It is contained in an identifier of Í, It is a basis to position information in hierarchy A dragon 1 structure of the entity. About, It performs as processing which pursues a tag.
it sets to the information processing method concerning the present invention -- the identifier of the entity for verification, and the A
: the position information on the corresponding node or leaf in Floor level . 1 structure of Entity -- Including seeing -- key arrangement discernment evening A in validation key block (E K B), Owner . effect-ized keeping mouth Tsu Existence of the cryptographic key data of the lower layer of each encryption 1 data in The (EK B) It is constituted as a tag to identify. This information processing method and Entite for verification Pursuit processing of a tag based on the identifier of Í, a Do [ A to which the entity for verification corresponds - ] position, or a leaf position -- the judgment of being Wear up, and Indignation -- the price -- the case where there is nothing -- it is -- decoding by the judgment of whether to belong to the low rank of the node key which is not updated is possible A sexual judgment is performed.
Further, It sets to an information processing method concerning the present invention, Identifier of an entity for verification It is the identifier stored in a Public key certificate of the entity. Method of this information processing. Method, It is Take from the entity public key certificate about an identifier of an entity for verification. It gains.
The information processing method concerning the present invention, the node which constitutes a hierarchy tree structure, or Li -- In decoding of encryption Content provided from the entity corresponding to Off, The identifier of the entity is acquired from the public key certificate of an entity, It this acquired. Pursuit processing by the tag of validation key block based on an identifier (E K B) is performed. While judging whether the entity is a Lipoku entity, an owner -- contents cryptographic key K c 0 n acquired from effect-ized keeping Rodzuk (E K B) -- basis Decoding processing of To encryption contents is performed.
story which matched According to the present invention, the node, and the key peculiar to each of a leaf again it is matched with each leaf of layer Tree structure -- each -- the above-mentioned hierarchy A tree Leaf key corresponding to . Li of self of structure - Off, . Kise which consists of A 1 Do key on the path which results in a higher rank layer the information processing in the information processor which stored Tutu -- a computer . system top -- real -- It is a program store medium which provides one Comb . evening and . program which carries out a line. ' -- computer and the program stored in this storage, It is a pair to a node or a leaf. The entity which carries out Response is a Revoke' entity as an entity for exclusion. The verification processing step of whether to be is included and it is a verification processing step, hierarchy Tree^" -- structure Cryptographic key which enciphered the updating node key by the low rank node key or the leaf key validation 'containing one De evening -- 1 block (E K B) It has Step . A performed by the judgment of whether to be able to decode with Storing of the entity for verification - a set. it is based on the judgment step of decoding possibility, and the identifier of Entity for verification -- validation Steps performed by pursuit processing of the key arrangement discernment tag in key block (E K B) A is included.
the present invention -- ' -- the program store medium to apply, for example, various program . Cau, as opposed to general purpose computer and the system which can perform Do -- one Comb evening . A program It is a medium which provides Beam in a computer-readable form.
Pair predetermined in a such program store medium and pair you evening' system top It is computer - in order to realize the function of one U evening and a program. A program and memory The collaboration relation on structure with a medium or a function is defined. if it puts in another way -- the -- passing a storage -- pair you evening and a program -- a computer system -- Ince By acting as Thor, a collaboration operation is demonstrated on computer and a system. To.
the object, the feature and advantage of further others of the present invention, and the example of the present invention mentioned below -- it attaches it becomes clear by detailed explanation rather than based on a drawing -- I will come out. Brief explanation of the drawings It is Show about the contents distribution system with which the information processor concerning Drawing 1 and the present invention was applied. It is a Su Proque figure.
Drawing 2, Plock which shows the recording and reproducing device with which the information processor concerning the present invention was applied It is a figure.
Drawing 3, Dark of the various keys performed in the information processor concerning the present invention, and data It is a Rie lineblock diagram explaining item-ized processing.
Drawing 4 Various keys to information processor concerning A and figure 4 B, and the present invention, and data It is a figure showing the example of 1 block of validation (EKB) used for distribution.
Drawing 5, Validation keeping mouth of a contents key to the information processor concerning the present invention Dug (EKB) It is a figure showing the example of distribution, and the example of decoding processing.
Drawing 6, Validation key block in the information processor concerning the present invention (EKB) It is a figure showing the example of a format.
Drawing 7 A, figure 7 B and figure 7 C, and composition of tag of validation keeping Rodzuk (EKB) It is a figure to explain.
Drawing 8 It is a figure showing the example of data composition which distributes A and figure 8 B, validation 1 Prozek (EKB) and Content key 1, and Content collectively.
Drawing 9 -- validation key block (EKB), Content key 1, and contents -- Simultaneously It is a figure showing the example of processing in the device at the time of carrying out To do it distribution.
Drawing 1 0, and validation 1 Prozek (EKB) and contents were stored in the recording medium. It is a figure explaining correspondence of a case.
Drawing 1 1, Revoke entity verification Si accompanying attestation processing by public-key crypto system It is a figure showing 1 Can.
Drawing 1 It is a figure showing 2 and the example of composition of a public key certificate.
Drawing 1 3 A and a figure -- 1 E KB pursuit processing for 3 B and a Revoke entity judging It is a figure showing a process. Drawing 1 4 A and a figure -- E KB pursuit processing for 14B and a Revoke entity judging It is a figure showing a process.
Drawing 1 Process which shows EKB pursuit processing process for 5 and Revoke entity judging It is a figure.
Drawing 1 It is To explain about the Content distribution processing using 6, EKB, and a public key certificate. It is a To figure.
Drawing 1 It is a figure explaining the example of a category classification of 7 and a hierarchy tree structure. The best form for inventing Contents distribution system which can apply the processing in the information processor concerning the present invention It is constituted as shown in Drawing 1.
the system shown in Drawing 1 -- setting -- distribution side of contents 1 0 and contents receiving side 2 as opposed to the apparatus which 0 has and in which various contents reproduction is possible -- contents or Content 1 is enciphered and it transmits. Receiving side 2 Dark received in the apparatus in 0 Item-ized contents or the encryption Content key first class is decoded, and it is contents Yes. Content key is acquired and they are reproduction of image data and voice data, or various A. Execution of log rum, etc. are performed. distribution side of contents 1 0 and contents receiving side 20 The data exchange of a between, and in Internet, such as Network is passed -- or it performs via the storage of DV D, C D, etc. which can be circulated.
Distribution side of contents 1 As the data distribution means of 0, Computer 1 1 and San Star broadcast 1 2 and telephone line 1 Media 1, such as 3 and DVDs CD, there is the 4th grade -- on the other hand -- as the device of Content receiving side 20 Personal computer (P C) 2 1 and portable device (PD) 22, mobile phone, Record reproducers 24, such as portable device 23 of PDA (Personal Digital Assis tants) etc., DVD, and a C D player, and game end Vessels 2 only for reproduction, such as an end There is the 5th grade. Each device side [ of these contents receiving sides 20 ], and contents distribution side 1 They are Communication means, such as a network, about the contents provided from 0. It acquires from Rude or media 30.
as an example of the information processor of contents receiving side 20 shown in Drawing 1 -- recording and reproducing device 1 the configuration block figure of 00 -- a figure -- it is shown in 2. Recording and reproducing device 1 00, Input and output IZF (I nterface) 1 20 MP E G (Moving) Picture Experts Group Code 1 30, A/D, and D/A Converter 141 Input-and-output I/F which it had (Interface) 140, code Processing means 1 50, ROM (Read Only Memory) 160, and CPU(Central Process ing Unit) 1 70 and memory 1 80 and recording medium 1 95 drives 1 It has 90, this , -- bus 1 It is mutually connected by 10.
input-and-output IZF 120 .. digital signals which constitute . contents in some numbers, such as a picture supplied from the outside, a sound, and plog rum ', are received -- bus 1 If it outputs on ten the digital signal on bus 110 is received -- it outputs outside. MP EG Kohde the data which is supplied via Dug 130 and bus 110 and by which MP E G coding was carried out . -- MP EG decoding is carried out . outputted to input-and-output I/F140, and input and output iota/and *<sup>1</sup>1 Do the Dizzy evening Le signal supplied from 40 MP E G Enoko 1, and it is bus 1. 1 It comes out on zero. Power is carried out. Input-and-output I/F-140, AZD, and DZ A converter 141 are built in. To. analog Trust as Content to which input-and-output I/F-140 is supplied from the outside an item is received -- AZD and D/A converter 141 -- (Analog Digital) A/D Convert It is To. output. As a digital signal, it is as if it carries out to MP E G Code .130. - MP E G Code 1 About the digital signal from 30, they are AZD, D, and A party '. It outputs outside as an analog signal by carrying out D/A (Digital Analog) conversion in one evening 141.
Scrambling means 1 It comprises 50 (Large Scale Integrated Curcuit), for example, 1-chip L S I, bus 1 Dizzy as contents supplied via 10 encryption of an evening Le signal, decoding processing, or attestation processing is performed -- code data and decoding De one evening etc. -- bus 1 It has the composition outputted on ten. Scrambling means 1 Composition with which 50 combined not only 1 Tip L S I but various kinds of software or hard W Realizing is also possible. As the processing means by soft W composition Composition is mentioned below.
ROM 1 It is To store about one plog Ramde evening processed by 60 and the recording and reproducing device. To. CPU 170 and ROM1 It is a fruit about the program memorized by 60 and memory 180. It is carrying out a line and is MP E G Code 1. 30 and scrambling means 150 grade are controlled. Memory 1 8 It is 0, for example, nonvolatile memory, and is C P U 1. 7 A program which 0 performs Mu and C P U 1 7 One required De evening and also a device perform on operation of 0. The key set used for scrambling is memorized. The latter part explains a key set. It carries out. Drive 1 9 Recording medium 1 which can record reproduce 0 and digital data 9 It is Drive about 5. Motion is carried out, Recording medium 1 9 They are read-out (reproducing) and bus 1 about 5 to one Digital de evening. 1 It is bus 1 while outputting on zero. 1 Digital de supplied via 0 About one evening, it is recording medium 1. 9 It is made to supply and record on 5. . .-. -.
recording medium 1 9 5, For example, optical discs, such as D V D and C D Magneto-optical disc Magnetic disk Magnetic tape or -- Digital de, such as semiconductor memory, such as R A M It is a medium which can memorize one evening. With this embodiment, Drive It is Removable. to 1 9 .0. Suppose that it is possible composition. . However, recording medium 1 9 It builds in 5 - and recording and reproducing device' 1 .* 0. It is good also as composition to carry out. ' '
scrambling means 1 shown in Drawing 2 5 as 0 and one one chip L S I -- composition '-- it may carry out -- the composition which combined software and hardware again -- real -- It is good also as composition which carries out present.
'side, next Content distribution side shown in figure .1 1 0 to Content receiving side 2 Possession style of the scrambling key in each device in the case of distributing code data to each Debye . A of 0 Formation and De evening distribution composition -- a figure -- it explains using 3.
Casual flirtation 0*1 shown in the lowest stage of Drawing 3 5 is contents receiving side 2. Each 0 devices It is. namely, a figure -- hierarchy tree shown in 3 (Thurs.) each leaf (leaf : leaf) of structure -- it It is equivalent to the device of that.
each Depice 0*1 the time of 5, manufacture, or shipment -- or -- setting after that a figure -- hierarchy tree shown in 3 (Thurs.) it can set in structure -- from its own leaf to a route Key assigned to the node (Node tree 1) And which consists of a leaf key of each leaf - Setsu is stored in a memory. K 0 shown in the lowest stage of Drawing 3 0 0 0*K 1 1 1 1 -- each -- Device 0*1 It is the leaf key which swerved to 5, and was swerved and assigned to it. K R (route key) of the highest rung from -- the lowest stage to 2nd paragraph (node) Indicated 1: K R *kappa 1 1 Let 1 be a node key.
the Tree composition shown in Drawing 3 -- setting -- for example, device 0 -- leaf key kappa*0 0 0 Node key: K000, K00, K0, and KR are owned. Device 5K0 10 1 and K 01 Os K 0 1, K 0, and KR are owned. Device 15 is K 1. 1 1 1, K i l l, K l l, K l, and KR are owned. in addition -- the tree of Drawing 3 -- a device -- 0*1 16 of 5 are indicated -- symmetry in which balance of four-step composition was also able to take Tree structure although shown as composition, much more devices are constituted in a tree -- A dragon 1 It is possible to have different number composition of stages in each part. .
each information processor contained in the Tree structure of Drawing 3 (device) To . -- various record intermediation Information processor various type which uses DV D and CD which were constituted by the body, for example, a device embedding type, or the device enabling free attachment and detachment, MD, a flash memory, etc. It is contained and is. . Various application services can live together and be. after such a different device and different application constitute [ coexistence ] -- a figure -- it is shown in 3 The hierarchy tree structure which is Content or key distribution composition is applied. ' . -- Sis with whom these various information processors (device) and application coexist it sets to Tem -- for example, a figure -- the portion enclosed with the dotted line of 3, i.e., device 0, 1, 2, and 3 are set up as one group using the same recording medium. For example, this dotted line As opposed to the device contained in the group [ surrounding ], They are 'and common Yunten collectively. Tsu is enciphered and it sends from a provider, sending each Content key 1 used [ device ] Or -- or each device to Provider Arui -- settlement-of-accounts organization etc. if it enciphers too and the payment data of a contents fee is outputted -- when -- Processing -- execution -- To be. A Content provider or a settlement processing organization, and one De evening with each device The organization which transmits and receives performs processing which bundles up the portion enclosed with the dotted line of Drawing 3, i.e., device 0, 1, 2, and 3 as one group, and sends one De evening. such are . guru 1 A -- a figure -- more than one exist in the tree of 3. a Content provider -- it is -- it is A settlement processing organization, etc. the organization which performs one De evening transmission and reception with each device, and Message de -- it functions as an evening distribution means.
It generalizes with a node key, a leaf key, and one existing key control center. Composition managed for every group by Mezzage data distribution means, such as a provider who may manage and performs various one De evening transmission and reception to each group, and a settlement-of-accounts organization It may carry out. In disclosure of a key, etc., these Node tree 1 and Leaf key 1 are More. New processing is performed and, for the key management Seng evening, a provider, a settlement-of-accounts organization, etc., this update process is a fruit. A line is carried out.
It is contained in like and one group [ that it is clear from Drawing 3 ] in this tree structure. 1K0 with device 0 of three To, 1, 2, and 3 [ common as a node key ] 0, K 0, and KR are held. By using this node key share composition, it is community. It becomes possible to provide only device 0, 1, 2, and 3 with Content key 1. for example, A 1 held in common -- Do key kappa 0 If 0 the very thing is set up as a contents key, only device 0, 1, 2, and 3 are common, without performing new key sending. Tension A setup of luck 1 is possible. It is a node key about new contents key K c 0 eta. kappa 0 Value E n c (kappa 0 0, K c o n) enciphered by 0 If Ah . Rude is stored in a recording medium via network . and it distributes to device 0, 1, 2, and 3', share node key which only device 0, '1, 2, and 3 hold in the device of its that solving code E n c (K 0.0, K c o n) using kappa*0 -- Maintenance 1 -- it becomes possible to obtain :K c o n. It is shown that E n c (K a, Kb) is the data which carried out code Y of K b by K a.
it sets to t at a certain time -- key which device 3 owns: kappa omicron. and omicron 1 1 and kappa 0 0'1 and kappa 0 0, kappa 0, and KR -- aggressor (X power 1) It having been analyzed and having exposed is revealed. It was case, it or subsequent ones and system (group of device 0, 1, 2, and 3) transmission and reception -- In order to protect To be data, it is necessary to separate device 3 from a system. the -- a sake -- node key: K 0 0 1 and kappa 0 0, kappa 0, and KR -- its it '-- new key kappa -- (t) 0 0 1 and K 0 0 and K (t) 0 and kappa -- (t) it updates to R -- device 0, 1, and 2 -- That It is necessary to tell an updating key. Here, it is K. (t) a a a is a generation of key K a a a. (Generation) : It is shown that it is an updating key of t.
distribution processing of an updating key -- it Explanation just. it is shown in renewal of a key, for example, figure 4 A, -- an owner -- One pro Udde evening called effect-ized key block (E KB : Enabling Key Block) Te 1 bull therefore constituted -- for example, Netto work, Or it stores in a recording medium. It performs by supplying device 0, 1, and 2. validation keeping mouth Dug [ (E KB) ] -- a figure -- it corresponds to each leaf which constitutes Tree structure as shown in 3 Are constituted by the cryptographic key for distributing the key newly updated by the device. To. Validation key block (EKB) may be called renewal block of a key (KRB : Key Renewa 1 Block).
Drawing 4 In validation 1block (EKB) shown in A, a node key needs to be updated. It is constituted as one pro Udde evening with one De evening composition which can update only a device. Drawing 4 the example of A -- a figure -- it sets to device 0 in the tree structure shown in 3, 1., and 2 -- it is one pro Udde evening formed for the purpose of distributing generation's t updating node key. clear from Drawing 3 Device 0 and a device .. obtaining -- one, ' It When updating A 1 Doki 1, and is K. (t) 00 and K (t) 0 and K (t) R is K as being required, device 2, and an updating node . key. (t) 00 1 and K (t) 00 and K (t) 0 and K (t) R is required and it is Ah. To o. .. ''
Drawing 4 . shown in E K B of A -- a plurality of cryptographic keys are contained in E K B like. the maximum -- The cryptographic key of the lower berth is E n c (K 00 1 0, K (t) 00 1). This is De. Leaf key K 001 which vice 2 has Updating node key K enciphered by 0
(t) 00 it is 1 -- the leaf key which device 2 and self have -- this encryption 1 can be decoded and K (7) 001 can be obtained. K obtained by decoding
(t) decoding becomes possible from under figure 4.A using 00.1 about the 2nd step of encryption 1E n c (K. (.. t) 0 0 1, K(t) 00) -- updating node key K (t) This which obtains 00 It can do. The 2nd step of cryptographic key E n c (K (t) 0 0, K (t) 0) is decoded from on figure 4 A one by one below, Updating node key K (t) From 0 and Drawing 4A to the 1st step Cryptographic key Enc (K (t) 0, K (t) R) is decoded, and it is K. (t) R is obtained. ' -- on the other hand -- device 0, 1, and A 1 -- Do key K 000 are not contained in the object to update -- one required as an updating node key -- K (7) 00 and K 0 and K (t) R -- is there. Device 0 and 1 decode the 3rd step of cryptographic key E n c (K 000, K (t) 00) from on figure 4 A, and are K. (t) 00 is acquired, hereinafter, the 2nd step of cryptographic key Enc (K (t) 00, K (t) 0) is decoded from on Drawing 4A -- updating Node tree 1K
(7) 0 and the 1st step from figure 4 alpha of cryptographic key E n c (kappa (t) 0, K (t) R) It decodes and is K. (t) R is obtained. Thus, device 0, 1, and 2 are updated. The keyK (t) R can be obtained. In Dezuks of Drawing 4A and a decryption key The actual address of the node key which use it by carrying out, and Li 1 Fukyu is shown. Node key of the higher rank stage of the tree structure shown in Drawing 3: K (t) 0 and K (t Renewal of R Being unnecessary and when the update process of only node key K 00 is required) To Drawing 4B By using shown validation keeping Rodzuk (EKB), it is updating A 1 Doki 1K. (t) 0 0 can be distributed to device 0, 1, and 2.
Drawing 4 E K B shown in B, for example, new conte shared in a specific group, It can use, when distributing Sticky. A shown in Drawing 3 by a dotted line as an example the recording medium with device 0in loop., .1., 2, and 3 is used -- new -- common Contents' key K (t) c 0 n presupposes that it is required. At this time K which updated common Node tree 1K00 of device 0, 1, 2, and 3 (t) 00 is used and it is new community. Updating contents key: One De evening En c (K (t), -kappa (t) c o ii) which enciphered K (7) c on Figure It distributes with EKB. shown in 4 B. : By this distribution, he is Desbats '. : In chair 4 etc. and the apparatus of other groups, the . Arrangement' cloth as one De evening which is not decoded of . becomes possible.
Namely, K obtained by device 0, 1, and 2 processing E KB (t) 00 is used. If the above-mentioned cryptogram is decoded, it will be Content keyK in 7 times. (t) c o n is obtained. It becomes possible.
Drawing 5 -- contents key K in t time (t) As the example of processing which obtains c 0 n K (t) 00 is used and it is new common Content keyK. (t) De which enciphered c o n -- It is record intermediation about E K B shown in evening Enc (K (t) 00, K (t) c on) and figure 4 B. Processing of device 0 received via the body is shown. Namely, encryption A me by EKB It is Content keyK about sage data. (t) It is the example set to c o n.
it is shown in Drawing 5 -- as -- generation stored in device 0 and the recording medium: having mentioned above using node key K 000 which E KB and the them at the t time store beforehand -- said -- him -- EKB processing generates Node tree 1K(7) 00. it decoded updating A 1 -- using Do key K 00 (7) -- updating contents key K (t) It is decoding about c on. it carries out -- it is encryption at leaf key K 0000 which he has in order to use it behind It stores by carrying out.
Device 0 is updating Maintenance 1K. (t) Hand of storing c o n safely If it has a stage, it is not necessary to encipher by leaf key K 0000. To Drawing 6, it is Fo 1 Matsu of validation keeve Rodzuk (EKB). The example of A is shown. Version 60 They are 1 and an identifier which shows the version of validation keeping Rodzuk (EKB). A version shows the correspondency of the function and contents which identify the newest E KB. It has a function. It is a pair to the device of a depth and the distribution place of validation key block (EKB). The number of hierarchies of the hierarchy tree to carry out is shown. Data pointer 603 is a validation key block. (E KB) Inner De It is a pointer in which a position of an evening part is shown. Evening Good point. 604 is Tha. A position of * A part, . signature pointer 605 is a pointer in which a position of a signature is shown.
It is To store about each cryptographic key about the updated node key as shows the data which enciphered one De evening part 606 and the node key which carries out metaphor Update to '5, for example, a figure, to storing. Carry out. To.
'. evening A part 607 and De: Enciphered Node tree^" which was stored in the one evening part, Leaf key<sup>:</sup>It is a tag in which Position relationship is shown. the grant rule of this tag -- a figure -- it explains. using 7. Figure Validation key block '(E KB) previously explained by figure 4 A as one De evening in 7 The example to send is shown. The data at this time comes to be shown in the table of figure 7 B. This It is a Topuno 1 door dress about Address of Topuno 1 Do contained in encryption 1 at the time. It carries out. In this case, updating key K of a route key (t) Since R is contained, a Tap node address serves as KR. Data E n c (K (t) 0, K (t) R) of this time, for example, the highest rung, is in the position shown in the hierarchy tree shown in figure 7 A. Here, The following data is Enc (K (t) 00, K()0). It is [ front ] on a tree. It is in a position at the lower left of data. The case where there is data, in a tag, when there is nothing, 1 is [ 0 and ] Establishment. Constant is carried out. Evening A is set up as {left (L) evening A and right (R) evening A}. the highest rung since there is one De evening in the left of one De evening Enc (K (7) 0, K (t) R) -- L tag 2 -- since there is no data in 0 and the right, it is set to R evening A = 1. Hereinafter, it is evening A to all data. It is set up and the data row and tag sequence which are shown in figure 7 C are constituted.
A tag and data Enc (Kxxx, K y y y) are located where of A dragon 1 structure. It is a key arrangement discernment tag set up in order to show whether it is. It is stored in a data division. To key data Enc (Kxxx, K y y y) ..., key enciphered simply Dark stored as one De evening with the tag mentioned above since it was only enumeration data Distinction of the position on A tree 1 of an item-ized key is enabled. not using the tag mentioned above a previous figure -- node and Ende to which encryption data was made to correspond like composition of that 4 explained A is used -- for example
0 : Enc (K (t) 0 , K (t) r o o t)
00 : E N C (K (7) 00, K (7) 0)
- E n c 000 (K (7) (000, K (T) 00)) :
. an one De evening style like .. although it is also possible to consider it as beta* -- such in Dezuku if it has composition using A, it will become one redundant De evening and data volume will increase -- Network^" -- The In the distribution etc. to pass, it is not desirable. On the other hand, it is a key position about the tag mentioned above. By using as one shown index De evening, distinction of a key position is possible at small data volume.
^ It becomes A. as the rule which specifies an order of a tag and A 1 Do -- for example, the same depth Set. from a left end to a right end is described in order -- A of the left end after that and under one step Do -- Transfer.' -- To'-- the technique of bredth first' can be used. . it returns to Drawing 6 -- EKB Fo 1 Matt is further explained. The EKB issue office which published signature (Signatur e) and 1 block of validation (EKB), for example, key management S, It is an electronic signature which The, Conten Tsu Robaida, a settlement-of-accounts organization, etc. perform. It is Acceptance about EKB. The possessed device is just validation keeping Rodzuk by signature verification. (EKB) Publisher It checks that it is published effective .-ized keeping Rodzuk (EKB).
The example which sends only Content key with EKB in an above-mentioned example is explained. Although carried out, Content enciphered by the contents key, and a route key and a node -- key Conte enciphered as the contents key enciphered by which code 1 by E K B The composition which sends a Sticky encryption key collectively is explained below.
This one De evening composition is shown in Drawing 8. Drawing 8 In composition shown in A, it is Enc (Kc on, c o nt ent) 80 1, Contents (Content) Contents key (K c o n) It is one enciphered De evening. Enc (Kr o o7 and Kc o n) 802, Content key 1. (Kc on) a roux -- crested ibis 1 (K r 0 0 t) enciphered data -- With and Enc (EKB, K r o o t) 803, It is validation about route key K r o o t. 1 block (EKB) It is shown that it is one enciphered De evening.
here -- a roux -- a crested ibis -- 1 K r 0 0 t may be Node tree1 (K 000 and K 00 ...) shown in Drawing 3. Drawing 8B -- a plurality of contents are recorded on media -- the example of composition when each uses the Enc (EKB, Kr o o t) 805 [ same ] is shown It is such. Also in composition, the same Enc (EKB, Kr o o t) as each data is added. It is each De about one De evening which shows the link place which there is nothing and it links to Enc (EKB, Kr o ot). It can have composition added to one evening.
The example of processing at the time of enciphering Content key .1K c 0 n using updating node key K (7) 00 which updated node key K 00 shown in Drawing 3 is shown in Drawing 9. in this case, a figure -- in the group enclosed with the dotted line frame of 3 -- device 3 -- for example, disclosure of a key -- Li Balk (exclusion) Noting that it is carried out as opposed to the member of other groups, i.e., device 0, 1, and 2 -- a figure -- validation keeping Rodzuk shown in 9 (E. KB) Content key 1 (K c o n) Updating node key K (t) Data enciphered by 00, Conte . A bottle which distributes one De evening which enciphered Tsu (content) by Maintenance 1 (Kco n) Device Facial and 1 2 can obtain contents. -
The decoding procedure [ in / in the right-hand side of Drawing 9 / device 0 ] is shown. It is business about device 0 and Li^Fukyu K 000 which self holds from received validation keeping Rodzuk first. By the required decoding processing, it is K. (t) 00 is acquired. next, K (t) contents key K c o n is acquired by decoding . by 0.0 -- further -- contents key Kc on Contents are decoded. By these processings, device 0 is a profit about contents. for becomes possible. device 1 and a respectively different processing procedure also in 2 -- E KB -- To process enables it to acquire encryption 1 of a contents key -- the same -- It becomes possible to use Content.
The leaf key which self holds also noting that device [ of other groups shown in Drawing 3 ] 4, 5, and 6 -- and this one same De evening (EK B) are received, and a node key are used, and it is K. (t) 00 is unacquirable. it Revoke(ed) similarly -- smelling device 3 the leaf key which The and self hold, and a node key -- K (t) This which acquires 00 it cannot do -- only the device which has a just right decodes and uses Content Things become possible.
thus -- if ffi Sending using E KB of a contents key is used -- data volume it lessens -- and encryption Content whose decoding only the just right holder enabled safely -- Arrangement It becomes possible to carry out Trust.
Validation key block (EKB), Maintenance 1, encryption contents, etc. Although it is the composition which can be safely distributed via a Netto work, Validation -- They are D VD, CD, etc. about Prozek (EKB), Content key 1, and encryption Content. It is also possible to store in a recording medium and to provide for a user. To in this case, a recording medium In decoding of stored encryption Content, validation stored in the same recording medium . which uses Content key 1 obtained by decoding of 1 Prozek (EKB). -- like -- style If Formation is carried out The leaf key which only a just right holder holds beforehand, and no Only * The is to Do key. Distribution processing of the encryption contents which can be used, i.e., the user device which can be used, The limited contents distribution becomes realizable . with simple composition. . , .
Drawing 1 It is [ 0 ] validation KEYBLO'Dug'(epsilonkappa beta) in encryption contents to a recording medium. The stored example of composition is shown. If it sets for the example shown in Drawing 10, he is Cong Teng to a recording medium. List C 1*'C 4 are stored, corresponding-to each storing contents validation keeping mouth the data which matched Dug (EKB) is stored -- further -- validation of version M 1 block (EKB -- M) is stored. for example, E KB -- 1 -- contents C -- it is used for generating contents key K c 0 n 1 which enciphered 1 -- for example, EK. B -- 2 -- contents C -- generating Encrypted Content Key K c 0 n 2 for 2 It is used. in this example, Ba 1 John's M validation keeping Rodzuk (EKB -- M) is stored in the recording medium -- since Content C 3 and C4 are matched with validation keeping Rodzuk (EK B_M) The contents key of Content C 3 and C 4 is acquirable by decoding of validation key block (EKB -- M). EKB -- 1, E KB -- Since 2 is not stored in the disk, a new providing means -- for example, -- Network distribution or distribution by a recording medium -- each contents E KB required in order to decode 1 -- 1 and EKB -- acquiring 2 -- necessity To.
Next, detection processing of Revoke entity (ex. inaccurate device) which uses validation key block (EKB) is explained. First, phase using a Public key code method About Mutual authentication method, it is Drawing 1. It explains using 1. Drawing 1 it sets to 1 -- A -- self secret key [Ap r i -- Ke y] , Public key [Apub -- Ke y] The signature of the certificate authority was made. Private seal which it has a Public key certificate [Ac e r t], and is a signature subject of a public key certificate further Public key of a proof office, it has a public key of the EKB issue office which is a signature subject of EKB -- B, Self secret key [Bp r i -- Ke y] A public key [B pub -- Ke y], office of a certificate authority Public key certificate [B c e r t] into which the name was made The public key of a certificate authority, the public of a E KB issue office It has Key.
Drawing 1 A. shown in 1, and B -- the composition of each public key certificate which it has -- a figure -- 1 using 2 . -- it explains. Public key certificate, Certificate authority in a public-key crypto system ( I A : C A : Ger-tif icat- e Authority or Issuer Authority) It is a certificate to publish. A user is self-. Oneself I D, a public key, etc. are submitted to a certificate authority, The certificate authority side is a certificate authority. I D Information, including the term of validity etc., is added, Proof which adds a signature by a certificate authority further and is created It is writing. - - Public key certificate 5 shown in Drawing 12 1, The version number of a certificate and a certificate authority are certificates. They are the consecutive numbers of a rate and Ri attachment Certificate to a user, the algorithm used for the electronic signature -- and -- The name of one Parame evening and a certificate authority, the term of validity of a certificate, certificate user I D, and certificate use The specification sage whole [ 52 ] containing a person's public key and electronic signature 53 of a certificate authority are included. ; Electronic signature .5.3, the Per John number of a certificate, and a certificate authority divide to a certificate user. Consecutive numbers of the certificate to attach, The algorithm used for the electronic signature and one Parame evening, and attestation Name of an office, The name of the term of validity of a certificate, and a certificate user, and a certificate user's Public key With the application of a hash function, a hash value is generated to the whole, and the hash value is received. It is the data generated using the secret key of Certificate Authority.
Certificate user I D of a public key certificate, the node of the above-mentioned key distribution Tree composition, Li -- Leaf .I D as threshold prices which show a Off position is contained. It is that by the Rie composition of Drawing 3. The and device 0 are [I D = 0000]. Device 1 is [I D = 000 1]. Desbats Chair 1 5 is [I D= 1 1 1 1] etc. It is based on such I D and is the De. Which position of Tree composition of entities, such as vice (a leaf or node) Ah It becomes identifiable whether it is To entity (ex. device).
Drawing 1 It is carried out using mutual recognition processing of 1, and an above-mentioned public key certificate. B generates public key certificate B c e r t and random number Rb of B first -- it transmits to A. This is received. Public key certificate of B (B. C e r t) is verified with the public key of A carried out and a certificate authority. since it will be judged with a public key certificate being invalid if verification is NG -- this time attestation processing is stopped by a point -- attestation -- it becomes abortive. It is To fade away about E KB held to the self-device by leaf I D of B in public key certificate of B (B. C e r t) when verification of public key certificate of B (B. C e r t) was OK next.
the figure explained previously -- the evening stored in E K B so that I might be understood from the explanation about 7 A shows the existence of the key data of the left of a self-node, and a right node by '0 and 1. It is sand. When there is Walk data, the case where there are not 0 and . data is set up as 1. It is based on the pursuit processing of E KB based on leaf I D, i.e., the method of M . Ri, and such a condition setup. It is carried out using a tag.
pursuit of E KB based on leaf I D (method of Indignation) about -- using Drawing 13 -- explain. Drawing 1 As shown in 3 A, it is leaf key K 1. 00 It is Revoke device about a device with 1. It is considered as a chair [1 00 1]. Encryption as shows EKB to figure 13 B this time It has the composition of 1 and a tag. Drawing 13 E KB shown in B is Drawing 1. In order to Revoke one device [1 00 1] of 3 A, it is KR, kappa 1, and kappa 1. It is set to E KB which updated 0 and kappa 100. . ., -
This . and . which process this E KB -- Revoke Debye' A [100.1] . -- Li [ of an except ] .1 roux . in which all Offs were updated -- crested ibis 1K (t) R is acquirable. namely, Node tree 1 -- the leaf which stands in a row in the low rank of K 0, and Node tree 1 which is not updated -- K 0 -- device This which decodes Enc (K 0, K (t) R) by K0 since it holds inside Updating Le 1 crested ibis 1K (t) It becomes acquirable [ R ]. One or less K l leaf K 1 which is not updated 1 is used and it is Enc (K 1 1, K (t) 1) K 1 1 It is updating Node tree 1K by carrying out intermediary decoding. (t) 1 is acquired, It is K about Enc (K (t) 1, K (t) R). (t) It is an updating route key by decoding by 1. It is acquirable. K 1 0 One decoding Step only increases also about the low rank leaf of 1. An updating route key is acquirable similarly.
Leaf key K 1 which is not Revoke(ed) Device [100 0] with 000, decoding Enc (K 1000, K (t) 100) by the leaf key of self The and K (t) decoding the node key of the 100 acquisition-back and a higher rank one by one -- an updating roux -- crested ibis 1 It is acquirable. the Revoke(ed) device [100 1] -- Updating Aon one step of a self leaf -Do keyK (t) 1 since 00 is unacquirable by E KB processing -- after all -- updating roux a crested ibis -- 1K (7) R is unacquirable.
the just device which is not Revoke(ed) -- Drawing 1 One De evening part shown in 3 B, and tag E KB which it has is distributed from a E KB issue office -- it is stored in the device. Lipoku device . shown for showing in figure 13 A in mutual recognition [I D = 100 and 1] -- for example, between a certain content providers -- a figure -- 1 Mutual private seal of the public key system shown in 1 Supposing it is performing a proof a content provider -- Revoke device of figure 13 A a Public key certificate is received from a chair [I D= 1 00 1] -- I D is acquired from the verification back of a public key certificate, and a public key certificate. This I D is [1 00 1], and is E KB distribution. The leaf position of tree composition is shown. ' --
I D [the Content provider who received 1 00 1] -- 00 Lee of 1 The device corresponding to Off is set up as an effective leaf device in E K B. It is verified whether it is ing. This verification [100 1], i.e., a leaf, was updated. Route key K (t) It performs as processing which judges whether R is acquirable. For example, renewal A of un-' 1 Doki 1 (K 0 in figure 13 A, K 1 1, etc.) It belongs to . low rank. If it is a leaf, Not Revoke(ing) is Ah at a clear and just device. That To and a judgment are possible and when it is a leaf belonging to the low rank of an updating node key, the -- Boil whether the encryption data which can acquire an updating node key is stored in E KB. A judgment whether an intermediary and its entity are Revoke(ed) is attained.
As an example of judgment processing, it is based on the tag stored in E K B, and is E K B pursuit processing. The example to perform is explained. From the route key of a higher rank to EKB pursuit processing and key distribution A tree 1 It is the processing which judges whether it is Drown. For example, it is [1 00 1] which is I D of the leaf [100 1] in figure 13 A, [1] [0], A lower bit is followed one by one from the most significant bit as 4 bits of [0] and [1], and it is To fade away about Tree. It is the right if a bit is 1. If it is a side and 0, it will go to the left.
Drawing 13 the route of A to I D the top A bit of [100 1] is 1 -- right-hand side It progresses. E evening A of the beginning in KB -- 0 : it is {0 and 0} -- it has one De evening on both branches things being judged and going to right-hand side -- K 1 -- Wear up. next, it progresses to the node of the low rank of K 1 I D the 2nd bit of [1 00 1] is 0 -- it goes to left-hand side. K day of the low rank of 1 evening A which shows evening existence -- figure 13 A and a figure -- 1 2 shown in 3 B : it is {0 and 0} -- both branches it is judged with having data -- going to left-hand side -- K 1 0 -- Wear up. I D the 3rd A bit of [1 00 1] is 0 -- it goes to left-hand side. K 1 Data of the low rank of 0 the tag in which existence is shown -- Drawing 1 3 A and a figure -- 1 3 shown in 3 B : it is {0 and 0} -- both branches it is judged with having data -- going to left-hand side -- K 100 -- Wear up. 'I D.
the lowest A bit of [1 00 1] A is 1. -- it goes to right-hand side. K one De evening of the low rank of 10 Q the tag in which existence is shown -- Drawing 1 5 shown in 3 A and figure 13 B : it is {0 and 1} -- right-hand side It does not have data. therefore -- a node [1 001] -- Indignation -- the price -- there is nothing -- a judgment -- Re and I D the updating roux according [ the device of [1.00 1] ] to E KB -- crested ibis It is unacquirable. Device, i.e., Ribo, It is judged with it being Device. .
for example, device I D which has leaf key K 1000 of figure 13 A is [1000] -- the EKB pursuit processing based on the tag in the same E KB as Above, i.e., a tree, If To fade away processing is performed With the just device which can acquire the updating route key by E K B since Ritsu Ritsu Lycium chinense grows in a node [1000] and which is not Revoke(ed) It is judged with it being.
moreover -- for example, the node key which is not updated -- for example, -- kappa omicron and kappa 1 Low ranks, such as 1 Although there is no Get angry in the leaf itself, it is not updated in this case by the leaf, either. Ritsu Ritsu Lycium chinense is possible to an end node. Li 1 of the low rank of the node which is not updated Off and the node key which is not updated are used. That processing of epsilonkappabeta is possible, and updating Le -- Since crested ibis 1 is acquirable, it is a just device. Node key which is not updated It becomes possible whether to be and or not to judge with the tag corresponding to the node. Node key which is not updated kappa 0 and kappa 1 1 and kappa 1 0 Evening A corresponding to 1 is 1. : {1 and 1} 4 : {1, 1}, and 6 These are [ {1, 1}, and ] a low rank node or Li further. -- It is although Off exists, E not having one encryption key De evening in KB is shown -- effective just device by which the device of the leaf of the low rank of these is not Revoke(ed) It is judged with it being.
Drawing 1 although it is an example shown in 3, and a Revoke mode only about one device -- a figure -- all the leaf devices which are under a certain node as shown in 14 are put in block -- Ribo It is also possible for - The to carry out. One De evening of EKB in this case (cryptographic key), and tag It becomes as it is shown in Drawing 14B.
For example, leaf corresponding to K 1000 by which the content provider was Revoke(ed) A Public key certificate is received from a device and it is I D. Supposing it acquires [1 000], This I D Based on [1 000], To fade away processing is performed for Rie based on evening A of E KB. It carries out. . '
Drawing 14 Le of A A to I D The top A bit of [1000] A is 1 -- right-hand side It progresses. tag 0 of the beginning in EKB : it is {* and 0} -- having one De evening on both branches it is judged -- going to right-hand side -- K 1 -- Wear up. Next, it progresses to the node of the low rank of K 1. I D [2nd c A bit of 1 000] is 0 -- go to left-hand side. K the De 1' evening of the low rank of 1 the tag in which existence is shown -- a figure -- 1 3 and Drawing 1 2 shown in 3 : it is {1 and 0} -- left-hand side It does not have one De evening. therefore -- A 1 Do [100.0] -- Indignation -- there is no price. this time evening A corresponding to end node K 1 are {1 and 0} -- one low-ranking De evening . -- it does not have [ ] -{1 : It is not 1}.
a tag {1 and 0} can be decoded only in the right-hand side low-ranking node or leaf of K 1 Updated Noh K l being stored in one encryption key De evening^EKB for acquiring (t) . ing -- things are shown. - based on that it is such and leaf I D, the Get angry last point is a node -- the case where the correspondence tag of the last node has values other than {1 and 1} -- further -- low-ranking dark Having item-ized key data in EKB is shown. In this case, it is Possession about that ID. A One leaf device acquires the route key updated by processing of .E KB. Since it cannot do, it is judged with it being the Revoke(ed) device.
Thus, it stores in the public key certificate acquired from the communication partner in attestation processing. This which judges whether the communication partner is Revoke(ed) based on leaf I D carried out It becomes possible.
Drawing 1 it returns to 1 -- continue the explanation about an attestation processing sequence. From A and B Based on leaf I D of B taken out from the received public key certificate, To fade away processing is performed for the tree based on the tag of above E KB, I The leaf position which D shows judges whether it is a position which can acquire an updating route key by E KB processing, and E KB processing is possible. It is To judge that it is a legitimate device which is not Revoke(ed) the case where it is a position which is ability. To. E inaccurate Desbats Revoke(ed) the case where it was a leaf position in which KB processing is impossible it judges with it being a chair -- attestation -- processing is stopped as abortive.
I Sign random number R b received from B when judged with it being a device which can be E KB processed based on D with the secret key of A, and it is S i g. -- A (R b) is generated and also random number R a is generated. A is self Desbats to these S i g_A (R b) and 'R a. . transmission of .E KB and public key certificate A. C e r t which were stored in the chair is done at B. -
public key certificate of A (A. C e r t.) is verified with the public key of B and a certificate authority -- if it verification O K becomes, Public key received E KB of a E KB distribution organization will be verified. E Mention KB above. For like and the prevention from an alteration which were carried out, the signature is made with the secret key of the E KB distribution organization, and B performs verification processing using Public key of E KB. verification -- : [ OK ] -- Milk and public key certificate of A leaf I D of A in Written statement (A. C e r .t) is acquired -- the figure mentioned above -- 1 3 and 1 4 -- business being based on leaf I D like the required explanation -- E KB -- To fade away. . it is judged with A being the The(ed) device Ribo 1 the case where there is no - Longing -- attestation -- stop subsequent processing as abortive. Not only a device but Cong Teng A,: It may be Provider and Sir Bisp . mouth . Bayda, and is Drawing 1. 3 and Drawing 1 A dragon shown in 4 Even if it is a node which has 1 of a node on the way which is not a leaf of the lowest stage of 1 composition It is and is .. For example, Drawing 1 3 and Drawing 1 K 1 shown in 4 With the node corresponding to the A 1 Do key position of 0 In a certain case I D of the content provider or a service provider is set to [1 0], and is I D. It is a fruit about To fade away processing in EKB which used evening A of E KB based on [1 0]. A line is carried out and it is judged whether it Revoke or not.
E Data S i g which received KB from A the Drowning case by To fade away processing -- A (R b) is verified by public key A. P ub- K e y in public key certificate of A (A. C e r t). It carries out. If verification is OK, R a will be signed by B .pri-.Key (secret key of B), and it is S i g_B. It generates (R a) and transmits generated S i g_B (R a) to A.
S From public key certificate (B .C e r t) of A which received i g_B (R a), and B to Public key of gained B is used and it is S i g. -- B (R a) is verified. If verification is OK, it will judge with attestation having been materialized.
1 Process flow about Lipoku device judging processing which used E KB for 5 It is shown. Each Step of a flow is explained. Step S 10 In 1, he is a connoisseur. Recipient (attestation partner) I D is acquired from a public key certificate. step S 1 02 -- it is -- the leaf which I D shows based on the tag of Mu E KB using acquired I D, or Li Pursuit processing aiming at 1 Do is performed.
pursuit processing and the above-mentioned figure -- 1 3 and a figure -- it performs in the procedure explained using 14. pursuit processing a result -- I D. -- being shown -- a leaf -- or -- a node -- Indignation arrival Lycium chinense -- it was able to do -- or Indignation -- the price -- there is nothing Is E KB processing possible in the leaf or node I Facial also indicates Buddy . The to be by a case? no, i.e., an updating roux, -- a crested ibis -- or not [ that acquisition of . 1 is possible ] -- half-I" -- (S 103) which carries out a law. :
E If judged with it being I D in the position in which KB processing is possible, it will be Step S 1. With the just device which progresses to 04 and by which the device corresponding to I D is not carried out as for . Revoke It judges with it being. . It is judged with it being I D which is in the position in which EKB processing is impossible on the other hand. Leave and step S 1 Device . corresponding to progress and I D is Revoke(ed) by 05. It judges with it being an inaccurate device. -
next, Revoke device which uses validation key block (EKB) (inaccurate Desbats chair) Judgment ^! the example of contents use processing accompanied by Reason -- explanation '-- it carries out. Drawing 1 It is shown in 6. As for an example, . and provider A encipher Content to device (I D= 00xx), and Arrangement . Trust is an example to carry out.
As opposed to content provider A and a device [00 X X], public key proof of A Writing [A. Ce r t] Data [S i g -- (K c on) A'] which signed the contents key with the self secret key , Validation keeping mouth Dug [EKB] It is updating Le about a contents key. Data [Enc enciphered by one crested ibis 1 (K (t) r o o7 and K c on), Further One De evening [Enc (K c on, C o n t ent) which enciphered contents by the contents key is transmitted.
The device [00 X X] which received these data, and public presentation of A received first A key certificate [A. C e r t] is verified with the public key of a certificate authority. If verification is OK, the public key of A and I D of A will be acquired from the Public key certificate [A. C e r t] of A.
Next, the public key of A which extracted the data [S i g -- A] (Kc o n) which signed Maintenance 1 with the secret key of A from the public key certificate [A. Ce r t] of A is used. It verifies. If verification is OK, it is Take from a public key certificate [A. C e r t] further. EKB pursuit processing mentioned above based on I D of A which carried out Outflow is performed, and it is Show of I D of A. In a To leaf or a node position, it is judged whether E K B processing is possible.
E It does not correspond to the node or leaf in which A was Revoke(ed) by pursuit processing of KB. When things are judged, a device [00 X X] is, received validation key block , -- self -- the decoding processing using Leaf key 1 to hold and a node key -- updating route Key K (t) f o o t is acquired. Next, updating route key kappa and (7) r 0 0 7 Contents key K c 0 eta is further acquired by Decode. Cong who acquired Contents are decoded by ten Tsu key K c 0 eta. By these processings, use of contents of a device [00 X X] is attained.
On . which acquired the public key certificate of the distribution person of contents in the above-mentioned processing, public key verification of a certificate is performed -- a contents distribution person's public key, and after acquiring I D, . Since processing of epsilon KB and decoding of 'contents are performed, a Content distribution person's specification prevents contents with an ambiguous distribution person from that it is possible and circulating based on I D. It becomes possible.
Example shown in figure 1 &, Provider A is a device. (I D = 00xx) Cong It is an example which enciphers and distributes Tengu. It is pro by about the signature to Content key. Da A performs and it sets to a device, Provider Signature verification processing by the public key of A Although it is an example to perform, Thus, device of distribution Content from other providers. Record, In reproduction processing, there is nothing then, For example, A user generated or it acquires. When contents carried out are recorded on a recording medium of a device A device's own secret key It signs by using and may make it record on a recording medium., Thus, record intermediation It is To execute about the signature of the contents key as a cryptographic key of the storing contents to the body. If it is considered as Configuration, At the time of Content reproduction, it is a device about signature verification of Content key. Performing using a public key is exclusion of storing reproduction of an indispensable next door and inaccurate Content. It becomes possible.
making an encryption key into the hierarchy tree structure of Drawing 3, such as a route key, Node tree 1, and a leaf key Composed of is carried out -- Content key etc. -- validation key block [ (EKB) ] -- code Although it turned and the composition to distribute has been explained Hierarchy which defines the node key etc. Tree structure is classified for every category of each device, and an efficient key update process is performed. The composition to carry out is explained below.
Drawing 1 An example of the classification of the category of hierarchy Rie structure to 7 is shown. Drawing 1 it sets to 7 -- the highest rung of hierarchy A dragon 1 structure -- Le 1 crested ibis -->>K r 0 0t2 3 0 1 is set up -- the following the middle stage -- A 1 Doki 1 -- 2 3 0 2 is set up -- the lowest stage -- leaf key 2 3 0 3 is set up. A series of node keys which * Result in the leaf key, and a leaf key or a Chi route key of each [ device / each ] Rudoki 1 is held.
Here, it is category node 2 about the node which has a The M stage . eye from the highest rung as an example. - 3 0 It sets up as 4. That is, it is a device of a specific category about each of the node of eye the The M stage. It is considered as a setting node. One node of the Mth step is made into the peak, and it is following and M+. One or less step of A - Do and a leaf are the power Te. ; . Consider it as the node and leaf about the device contained in i Li. ' --. .-
For example, Drawing 1 One A 1 Do 2 of eye the The M stage of 7 3 0 A category [memo Liste (trademark)] is set as 5, The node which stands in a row below in this node, and a leaf are memories. The node or leaf only for a category containing various devices which use Stike It is set up by carrying out. namely, node 2 3 0 a set and 'of the related node of the device defined as category of a memory stick, and Li or less in five, and a leaf . which give a definition by carrying out.
It is subcategory node 2 about the low-ranking stage by several steps from M stage. 3 0 It is referred to as 6 and is To set up. To is made. For example, as shown in a figure, it is category [memo List] Sord 2. 3 0 It is * to the category of the device which uses memo List for the node under two steps of 5. As the subcategory node contained, The node of [the vessel only for reproduction] is set up. To et al. Node 2 of the vessel only for reproduction which is subCategory no. 1 Do 3 0 Six or less Vessel only for playback Node 2 of the telephone with a music regenerative function included in a category 3 0 7 is set up, To et al. [P H S] node 2 contained in the low rank at the category of a telephone with a music regenerative function 3 0 8 and [mobile phone] node 2 3 0 9 can be set up.
Not only the kind of a category, a subcategory, and device For example, it is. The node which a maker, a Content provider, a settlement-of-accounts organization, etc. manage uniquely, and That is A Processing unit, a jurisdiction unit or an offer service unit, and arbitrary units (these are [ total ] called and it is hereafter called an entity) It is possible to set up. For example, one Peak A only for game machine machine X Y Z to which game machine machine Me 1 car sells a category node If it sets up as - Do, It is the peak node to game machine machine X Y Z which maker 1 sells. Node key of the following lower berths, It becomes possible to store and sell a leaf key, and is distribution of after that and encryption contents, or distribution of various keys and an update process -- the top Validation keeping mouth constituted by the node key below a point node key, and the leaf key Dug (E K B) is generated and distributed -- as opposed to the device below a peak node -- use The distribution of one possible De evening is attained.
Following it makes one A . Do into the peak and makes it this Remarks, it is that peak node about a node. The defined category or composition set up as a related node of a subcategory It carries out, It is a pipe about one peak node of the category stage or the subcategory stage. Validation 1 to which maker 1 who does Reason, a content provider, etc. make the A~. Do the peak Block (E K B) is generated uniquely, it is distribution to the device belonging to below a peak node De belonging to the node of other categories which the composition of to carry out is attained and do not belong to . peak node 'vice -- completely -- influence . -- Not -- 1 -- updating can be performed'. .
Thus, renewal of a key by E K B in a category unit, With a category unit or specific Groov Revoke which carried out Batch is also possible and it is [ Especially a Revoke judging is effective. ] Riboke'of 'and many. Li -- When Off or :Revoke and a node are contained, it is based on the E.K B pursuit processing mentioned above. Because, it is a question of the storing use region of a list the case where the list which recorded all I D of all the Revoke device is distributed to each device. From intermediary Cause in which the load spent on collation processing of I D is also heavy while a title occurs It is. Above It is based on I D. Pursuit processing based on a tag in E K B in E K B pursuit processing It is. The processing load is very light, Discrimination is [ whether it Revoke and or not ] immediately. Execution becomes possible.
It mentioned above. A signature of a E K B issue organization is made by E K B. Chi of an alteration. Eck is possible, It is just. Verifying by signature verification that it is E K B A possible and positive Revoke judging is realized.
As mentioned above, it is the present invention although the present invention was explained, referring to some examples. Correction and substitution of an example which the person skilled in the art mentioned above in the range which does not deviate from the gist can be accomplished. To is obvious. namely, the example mentioned above and the form of illustration -- the present invention it has indicated -- it should not be interpreted restrictively. The gist of the present invention is judged. In order to carry out, the statement of the range of a claim should be taken into consideration. Industrial applicability An information processor and a method concerning the present invention, It is applied to distribution of the Content key first class. It is based on 1 block of validation 'using hierarchical key distribution Tree (E. K B), Ribo -- The (exclusion) a device, a service provider, etc. as an entity -- Judge 1 Sho which stored ID of the Revoke entity since To was made possible A list is distributed to a device -- it becomes unnecessary for each device to store a list An information processor and a method concerning the present invention, a public key certificate -- hierarchical key distribution Tsu Lee's position -- identifiable . -- storing I D I. .D acquired from a public key certificate -- Based on since it had composition which performs pursuit processing using the tag of Activate keeping A log (E K-B), I D C reliability is guaranteed in a public key certificate -- positive Revokenti Tee (device) A judgment becomes possible.
Every citation, both waysCites: the store holds 4 of 5
| Document | Relation | Office | Category | Cited during |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| US8208899B2 | Cited by | United States of America | – | Search report |
| US5949877A | Cites | United States of America | A | International search |
| US6049878A | Cites | United States of America | A | International search |
| JPH11187013A | Cites | Japan | A | International search |
| JPH11205305A | Cites | Japan | A | International search |
15 members in 9 offices
Priority claims4
| Document | Office | Kind | Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2000341431 | Japan | A | |
| 2000341431 | Japan | A | |
| 2000341431 | – | – | – |
| JP20000341431 | – | – | – |
Members15
| Document | Office | Kind | |
|---|---|---|---|
| CA2396481A1 | Canada | A1 | |
| WO0239655A1This record | World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) | A1 | |
| AU1427002A | Australia | A | |
| JP2002152187A | Japan | A | |
| EP1235381A1 | European Patent Office (EPO) | A1 | |
| KR20020081246A | Republic of Korea | A | |
| CN1411642A | China | A | |
| US2003105956A1 | United States of America | A1 | |
| HK1056454A1 | Hong Kong, China | A1 | |
| AU778592B2 | Australia | B2 | |
| EP1235381A4 | European Patent Office (EPO) | A4 | |
| US7224804B2 | United States of America | B2 | |
| KR100846262B1 | Republic of Korea | B1 | |
| CN100413246C | China | C | |
| JP4622087B2 | Japan | B2 |
11 legal events, as the office reported them to INPADOC
Over the term
Point at a mark for the eventEvents
| Event | Code | |
|---|---|---|
| Wipo information: grant in national officeWWG | WWG | |
| Wipo information: published in national officeWWP | WWP | |
| Wipo information: entry into national phaseWWE | WWE | |
| Wipo information: entry into national phaseWWE | WWE | |
| Wipo information: published in national officeWWP | WWP | |
| Wipo information: entry into national phaseWWE | WWE | |
| Wipo information: entry into national phaseWWE | WWE | |
| Wipo information: entry into national phaseWWE | WWE | |
| Wipo information: entry into national phaseWWE | WWE | |
| Designated statesAK | AK | |
| Designated countries for regional patentsAL | AL |
Numbers
- Publication
- 02/39655
- Publication, DOCDB
- 0239655
- Publication, EPODOC
- WO0239655
- Application
- 109841
- Application, DOCDB
- 0109841
- Application, EPODOC
- WO2001JP09841
Titles2
- English
- INFORMATION PROCESSING DEVICE, INFORMATION PROCESSING METHOD AND PROGRAM STORAGE MEDIUM
- French
- DISPOSITIF DE TRAITEMENT D'INFORMATIONS, PROCEDE DE TRAITEMENT D'INFORMATIONS ET SUPPORT DE PROGRAMME
Classification
- CPC, 14
- H04L9/0822
- H04L9/08
- G06F21/10
- G06F21/80
- G06F2221/2135
- G11B20/00086
- G11B20/00166
- G11B20/00188
- G11B20/0021
- G11B20/00253
- G11B20/00536
- H04L9/0836
- H04L9/0891
- H04L2209/60
- IPC, 4
- G06F21 00
- G11B20 00
- H04L9 08
- H04L9 32
Designated states25
- Regional, 20
- European Patent Office (EPO)
- Austria
- Belgium
- Switzerland
- Cyprus
- Germany
- Denmark
- Spain
- Finland
- France
- United Kingdom
- Greece
- Ireland
- Italy
- Luxembourg
- Monaco
- Netherlands (Kingdom of the)
- Portugal
- Sweden
- Türkiye
- National, 5
- Australia
- Canada
- China
- Republic of Korea
- United States of America