USRE40791E

Method and system for verifying the authenticity of a first communication participants in a communications network

Claim Score by NHIP

Abstract

In the method and the arrangement for checking the authenticity of a first communication subscriber in a communications network, a first fault information item is formed in the first communication subscriber using a fault detection data item of the first communication subscriber and an information item relating to a random data item. In a second communication subscriber in the communications network, a second fault information item is formed using a fault detection data item of the second communication subscriber and the information relating to the random data item. The authenticity of the first communication subscriber is checked using the first fault information and the second fault information.

USRE40791E, drawing sheet 1 — Sheet 1 of 5

Term

Term ended

Expired 31 May 2020, 6.3 years ago.

20 claims: 3 independent, 17 dependent

1
A method for checking the authenticity of a first communication subscriber in a communications network, comprising:forming a first fault information item in the first communication subscriber using a fault detection data item of the first communication subscriber and an information item relating to a random data item which has been transmitted to the first communication subscriber by a second communication subscriber in the communications network;transmitting the first fault information to the second communication subscriber by the first communication subscriber, forming a second fault information item in the second communication subscriber using a fault detection data item of the second communication subscriber and the information item relating to the random data item;checking the authenticity of the first communication subscriber in the second communication subscriber using the first fault information item and the second fault information item.
7
Broadest claimClaim Score 59, broad(NHIP)A system for checking authenticity in a communications network, comprising:a first communication subscriber to form a first fault information using a fault detection data item of the first communication subscriber and an information item relating to a random data item which has been transmitted to the first communication subscriber, and to transmit the first fault information;a second communication subscriber to transmit the information relating to the random data item to the first communication subscriber, to receive the first fault information from the first communication subscriber, to form a second fault information using a fault detection data item of the second communication subscriber and the information relating to the random data item, and to check the authenticity of the first communication subscriber using the first fault information and the second fault information.
20
A method for a second communication subscriber to confirm the authenticity of a first communication subscriber in a communications network, comprising:transmitting an information item relating to a random data item to the first communication subscriber;receiving a first fault information item from the first communication subscriber, the first fault information item being formed using a fault detection data item of the first communication subscriber and the information item relating to the random data item;forming a second fault information item in the second communication subscriber using a fault detection data item of the second communication subscriber and the information item relating to the random data item;and checking the authenticity of the first communication subscriber in the second communication subscriber using the first fault information item and the second fault information item.

Independent claims3

77 paragraphs in 5 sections, as filed

This application is based on and hereby claims priority to German Application No. 19927 271.9 filed on Jun. 15, 1999 in Germany, and PCT Application No. PCT/DE00/01788 filed on May 31, 2000, the contents of which are hereby incorporated by reference. This application is a reissue of 10/009/975, patent 6,980,796.

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION

The invention relates to a method and an arrangement for checking the authenticity of a first communication subscriber in a communications network.

In a communications network, data is generally transmitted between communication subscribers, for example a service provider and a service user. In order to protect a communications network against penetration of an unauthorized communication subscriber into the communications network, the authenticity of each communication subscriber is generally checked.

3G TS 33.102 Version 3.0.0 Draft Standard, 3rd Generation Partnership Project, Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects, 3G Security, Security Architecture, 05/1999 (“the 3G reference”) discloses a method and an arrangement for checking the authenticity of a communication subscriber, in particular of a service provider or of a service user in a communications network.

The method known from the 3G reference and the corresponding arrangement are based on what is referred to as 3G TS 33.102 Version 3.0.0 Draft Standard, which describes a security architecture of a mobile phone system.

In <figref idref="DRAWINGS">FIG. 4</figref>, the procedure during the checking of the authenticity of a communication subscriber, such as is known from the 3G reference is illustrated symbolically and parts thereof will be explained below briefly.

A transmission of data is illustrated in <figref idref="DRAWINGS">FIG. 4</figref> by an arrow in each case. A direction of an arrow characterizes a transmission direction during a data transmission.

<figref idref="DRAWINGS">FIG. 4</figref> shows a mobile phone system 400, comprising a user 401 of a communication service, for example a mobile phone, and a provider 402 of a communication service. The provider 402 comprises a dial-in network 403 with a dial-in network operator from which the user 401 locally requests a communication service, and a home network 404 with a home network operator with which the user 401 is signed on and registered.

In addition, the user 401, the dial-in network 403 and the home network 404 each have a central processing unit with a memory, for example a server (central computing unit), with which processing unit the procedure described below is monitored and controlled and on which memory data is stored.

The dial-in network 403 and the home network 404 are connected to one another via a data line over which digital data can be transmitted. The user 401 and the dial-in network 403 are connected to one another via any desired transmission medium for the transmission of digital data.

During a communication, the user 401 dials 410 into the dial-in network 403. At the start of the communication, checking of both the authenticity of the user 401 and the authenticity of the provider 402 is carried out.

To do this, the dial-in network 403 requests 411 what is referred to as authentication data from the home network 404, with which data the authenticity of the user 401 and of the provider 402 can be checked.

The authentication data which is obtained from the home network 404 comprises a random number and a sequential number of the provider 402. The sequential number of the provider 402 is obtained in such a way that a counter of the provider 402 increases the sequential number of the provider 402 by the value 1 at each attempt at communication between the user 401 and the provider 402.

It is to be noted that the random number and the sequential number of the provider 402 only constitute part of the authentication data and are not to be understood as comprehensive. Further authentication data is known from the 3G reference.

The home network 404 transmits 412 the requested authentication data to the dial-in network 403. The dial-in network 403 processes the received authentication data in a suitable way 413, and transmits the processed authentication data to the user 401.

The user 401 checks 415 the authenticity of the provider 402 using a dedicated sequential number, which is handled in a way corresponding to the sequential number of the provider 402, and using the sequential number of the provider 402.

The procedure during the checking of the authenticity of the provider 402 is described in the 3G reference.

A result of the checking of the authenticity of provider 402, “authenticity of provider satisfactory” 416, “authenticity of provider satisfactory but sequential fault has occurred” 417 or “authenticity of provider not satisfactory” 418, is transmitted 419 from the user 401 to the provider 402.

In the case of the result “authenticity of provider satisfactory” 416, the dial-in network 403 checks 420 the authenticity of the user 401 as described in the 3G reference.

In the case of the result “authenticity of provider not satisfactory” 418, the communication is interrupted and/or restarted 421.

In the case of the result “authenticity of provider satisfactory but a sequential fault has occurred” 417, resynchronization takes place in such a way that the home network 404 transmits 422 a resynchronization request to the user 401. The user responds with a resynchronization response in which resynchronization data is transmitted 423 to the home network 404. The sequential number of the provider 402 is changed 424 as a function of the resynchronization response. The authenticity of the user 401 is then checked, as is known from the 3G reference.

The procedure described has the disadvantage that during checking of the authenticity of a communication subscriber, in particular during the checking of the authenticity of a service provider, a large amount of data has to be transmitted between the communication subscribers.

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

One aspect of the invention is thus based on simplifying and improving the known method and the known arrangement, to yield a simplified and improved arrangement for checking the authenticity of a communication subscriber in a communications network.

In the method for checking the authenticity of a first communication subscriber in a communications network, a first fault information item is formed in the first communication subscriber using a fault detection data item of the first communication subscriber and an information item relating to a random data item. In a second communication subscriber in the communications network, a second fault information item is formed using a fault detection data item of the first communications subscriber and the information relating to the random data item.

The authenticity of the first communication subscriber is checked using the first fault information item and the second fault information item.

In the arrangement for checking the authenticity of a first communication subscriber in a communications network, the first communication subscriber is set up in such a way that a first fault information item can be formed using a fault detection data item of the first communication subscriber and an information item relating to a random data item. In addition, the arrangement has a second communication subscriber in the communications network which is set up in such a way that a second fault information item can be formed using a fault detection data item of the second communication subscriber and the information relating to the random data item. The authenticity of the first communication subscriber can be checked using the first fault information item and the second fault information item.

The checking of the authenticity of a communication subscriber in a communications network is to be understood as meaning method steps which are carried out in the wider sense with checking of the authorization of a communication subscriber for access to a communications network or participation in communication in a communication network.

This thus encompasses both method steps which are carried out within the scope of the checking of the authorization of a communication subscriber for access to a communications network and such method steps which are carried out within the scope of the processing or the administration of data which is used in the checking.

The developments described below relate to the method and to the arrangement.

The development described below can be implemented either using software or hardware, for example using a specific electrical circuit.

In one refinement, the first communication subscriber is a service provider and/or the second communication subscriber is a service user in the communications network.

A sequential number is preferably used as the fault detection data item.

In one refinement, the information relating to the random data item is a random number.

In one development, the checking of the authenticity is simplified by determining a difference between the fault detection data item of the first communication subscriber and the fault detection data item of the second communication subscriber.

In one refinement, the checking of the authenticity is further improved with respect to the security of the communications network by limiting the difference.

One development is preferably used within the scope of a mobile phone system. In the mobile phone system, the service user is implemented as a mobile phone and/or the service provider is implemented as a mobile phone network operator.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

These and other objects and advantages of the present invention will become more apparent and more readily appreciated from the following description of the preferred embodiments, taken in conjunction with the accompanying drawings of which:

<figref idref="DRAWINGS">FIG. 1</figref> shows a mobile phone system;

<figref idref="DRAWINGS">FIG. 2</figref> shows an outline in which checking of the authenticity of a communication subscriber is illustrated symbolically;

<figref idref="DRAWINGS">FIG. 3</figref> shows a flowchart in which individual method steps are illustrated during checking of the authenticity of a service provider in a communications network; and

<figref idref="DRAWINGS">FIG. 4</figref> shows an outline in which checking of the authenticity of a communication subscriber in accordance with the 3G TS 33.102 Version 3.0.0 Standard is illustrated symbolically.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENT

Reference will now be made in detail to the preferred embodiments of the present invention, examples of which are illustrated in the accompanying drawings, wherein like reference numerals refer to like elements throughout.

Exemplary Embodiment: Mobile Phone System

A mobile phone system 100 is illustrated in FIG. 1. The mobile phone system 100 comprises a mobile phone 101, a local dial-in network 102 with a dial-in network operator 103 and a home network 104 with a home network operator 105.

The mobile phone 101 is signed on and registered in the home network 104.

In addition, the mobile phone 101, the dial-in network 102 and the home network 104 each have a central processing unit 106, 107, 108 with a memory 109, 110, 111, with which processing units 106, 107, 108 the procedure described below is monitored and controlled, and on which memories 109, 110, 111 data is stored.

The dial-in network 102 and the home network 104 are connected to one another via a data line 112 via which digital data can be transmitted. The mobile phone 101 and the dial-in network 102 are connected to one another via any desired transmission medium 113 for transmitting digital data.

The procedure during the checking of the authenticity of the mobile phone 101 and the procedure during the checking of the authenticity of the home network 104 and/or of the home network operator 105 are illustrated symbolically in <figref idref="DRAWINGS">FIG. 2</figref>, and parts thereof will be explained below briefly.

The transmission of data in <figref idref="DRAWINGS">FIG. 2</figref> is illustrated in each case by an arrow. A direction of an arrow characterizes a transmission direction during a data transmission.

The procedure which is described below and illustrated symbolically in <figref idref="DRAWINGS">FIG. 2</figref> is based on what is referred to as a 3G TS 33.102 Version 3.0.0 Standard, which describes a security architecture of a mobile phone system and is described in the 3G reference.

During a communication, the mobile phone 201 dials 210 into the dial-in network 203. At the start of the communication, checking both of the authenticity of the mobile phone 201 and of the authenticity of the home network 204 and/or of the home network operator takes place.

To do this, the dial-in network 203 requests 211 authentication data from the home network 204, with which authentication data the authenticity of the user 201 and of the home network 204 and/or of the home network operator can be checked.

The authentication data which is determined by the home network 204 comprises a random number and a sequential number of the home network 204 (cf. <figref idref="DRAWINGS">FIG. 3</figref> step 310). The sequential number of the home network 204 is determined in such a way that a counter of the home network 204 increases the sequential number of the home network 204 by the value 1 at each attempt at communication between the mobile phone 201 and the home network 204.

It is to be noted that the random number and the sequential number of the home network 204 only constitute part of the authentication data and are not to be understood as comprehensive. Further authentication data is specified in the 3G reference.

The home network 204 transmits 212 the requested authentication data to the dial-in network 203. The dial-in network 203 processes the received authentication data in a suitable way 213 and transmits the processed authentication data to the mobile phone 201.

The mobile phone 201 checks 215 the authenticity of the home network 204 using a dedicated sequential number which is handled in a way corresponding to the sequential number of the home network 204, and using the sequential number of the home network 204. In a way corresponding to the home network 204, the mobile phone 201 also has a counter.

The procedure during the checking of the authenticity of the home network 204 is described in the 3G reference. Method steps which differ therefrom are described below.

What is referred to as overflow checking of the counter of the mobile phone 201 is carried out within the scope of the checking of the authenticity of the home network 203. This overflow checking prevents overflowing of an acceptable numerical range of the counter of the mobile phone 201.

In the overflow checking, the following conditions are tested: <ul id="ul0001" list-style="none"><li id="ul0001-0001" num="0000"><ul id="ul0002" list-style="none"><li id="ul0002-0001" num="0059">1) sequential number of the home network 204>sequential number of the mobile phone 201;</li><li id="ul0002-0002" num="0060">2) sequential number of the home network 204−sequential number of the mobile phone 201<−predefinable deviation (1,000,000);</li><li id="ul0002-0003" num="0061">the following applying for the predefined deviation: <ul id="ul0003" list-style="none"><li id="ul0003-0001" num="0062">predefinable deviation is sufficiently large in order to ensure, during normal or fault-free communications operation:</li><li id="ul0003-0002" num="0063">that the sequential number of the home network 204—sequential number of the mobile phone 201 is not>predefinable deviation; <ul id="ul0004" list-style="none"><li id="ul0004-0001" num="0064">the maximum permissible sequential number of the mobile phone 201/predefinable deviation is sufficiently large in order to ensure that the maximum permissible sequential number of the mobile phone 201 is not reached during operation.</li></ul></li></ul></li></ul></li></ul>

The result of the checking of the authenticity of the home network 204, “authenticity satisfactory” 216, “authenticity satisfactory but a sequential fault has occurred” 217 or “authenticity not satisfactory” 218 is transmitted 219 to the home network 204 from the mobile phone 201.

In the case of the result “authenticity satisfactory” 216, the dial-in network 203 checks 220 the authenticity of the mobile phone 201, as described in 3G reference.

In the case of the result “authenticity not satisfactory” 218, the communication is interrupted or restarted 221.

In the case of the result “authenticity satisfactory but a sequential fault has occurred” 217, resynchronization 222 takes place. Resynchronization is to be understood as a change of the sequential number of the home network 204.

For this purpose, the mobile phone 201 transmits 222 resynchronization data to the dial-in network 203.

The resynchronization data comprises the same random number which was transmitted within the scope of the authentication data, and the sequential number of the mobile phone 201 (cf. <figref idref="DRAWINGS">FIG. 3</figref> step 320).

The dial-in network 203 processes the resynchronization data in a suitable way and transmits the processed resynchronization data to the home network 204.

The home network 204 checks the sequential number of the mobile phone 201 and the sequential number of the home network 204 using the processed resynchronization data, and if appropriate changes 223 the sequential number of the home network 204 (cf. <figref idref="DRAWINGS">FIG. 3</figref> step 330).

The home network 204 sequentially transmits new authentication data, which if appropriate comprises the changed sequential number of the home network 204, to the dial-in network 203.

In order to illustrate the described procedure, important steps 300 of the procedure are illustrated in FIG. 3.

<figref idref="DRAWINGS">FIG. 3</figref> shows a first step 310 within the scope of which the authentication data (first fault information) is determined.

The resynchronization data (second fault information) is determined within the scope of a second step 320.

The sequential number of the mobile phone and the sequential number of the home network are checked within the scope of a third step 330, using the resynchronization data.

An alternative of the first exemplary embodiment is described below.

In the alternative exemplary embodiment, a method is implemented in which the home network is made more reliable with respect to a data in the event of a system crash.

For this purpose, the current sequential number of the home network is stored in the memory of the home network, in each case at a predefinable time interval. A sequential number of the home network which has been lost during a system crash of the home network is restored in such a way that a predefinable additional value is added to the value of the stored sequential number. The predefinable additional value is dimensional in such a way that exceeding of the sum of the sequential number of the mobile phone and the predefinable deviation is not exceeded.

In the alternative exemplary embodiment, the predefinable additional value is determined in such a way that an average number of authentication attempts on one day by the home network, which number is determined during operation of the communications network, is multiplied by a factor with the value 10.

The invention has been described in detail with particular reference to preferred embodiments thereof and examples, but it will be understood that variations and modifications can be effected within the spirit and scope of the invention.

Contents5

Every citation, both waysCites: the store holds 36 of 37

Citations
Document	Relation	Office	Cited during
DE19524021A1	Cites	Germany	Search report
US4519068A	Cites	United States of America	Applicant
US5239294A	Cites	United States of America	Search report
US5241598A	Cites	United States of America	Search report
US5282250A	Cites	United States of America	Search report
US5557654A	Cites	United States of America	Search report
US5572193A	Cites	United States of America	Search report
US5642401A	Cites	United States of America	Search report
US5689563A	Cites	United States of America	Search report
US5794139A	Cites	United States of America	Search report
US5799084A	Cites	United States of America	Search report
US5953652A	Cites	United States of America	Search report
US5991623A	Cites	United States of America	Applicant
US6016349A	Cites	United States of America	Search report
US6035039A	Cites	United States of America	Search report
US6078807A	Cites	United States of America	Search report
US6091945A	Cites	United States of America	Search report
US6108424A	Cites	United States of America	Search report
US6118993A	Cites	United States of America	Search report
US6466780B1	Cites	United States of America	Applicant
US6618584B1	Cites	United States of America	Search report
US6665530B1	Cites	United States of America	Search report
US6741852B1	Cites	United States of America	Search report
US6839553B2	Cites	United States of America	Search report
US6980796B1	Cites	United States of America	Applicant
WO9101067A2	Cites	World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)	Applicant
WO9202103A1	Cites	World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)	Applicant
JPH05508274A	Cites	Japan	Applicant
JPH08242488A	Cites	Japan	Applicant
JPH0984124A	Cites	Japan	Applicant
DE19524021	Cites	Germany	Search report
JP5508274	Cites	Japan	Third party observation
JP8242488	Cites	Japan	Third party observation
JP984124	Cites	Japan	Third party observation
WO9101067	Cites	World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)	Third party observation
WO9202103	Cites	World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)	Third party observation
3G TS 33.102 version 3.0.0-Draft Standard, 3rd Generation Partnership Project, Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects, 3G Security Architecture (May 1999).	Non-patent	–	Search report
Patent Abstract of Germany-DE 197 18 827 A1-Mohrs, Nov. 19, 1998.	Non-patent	–	Search report
3G TS 33.102 version 3.9.0-Draft Standard, 3rdGeneration Partnership Project, Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects, 3G Security Architecture (Jun. 2001) (Release 1999).	Non-patent	–	Search report
3G TS 33.102 version 3.4.2-Draft Standard 3rd Generation Partnership Project, Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects, 3G Security Architecture (Sep. 2001) (Release 4).	Non-patent	–	Search report
The GSM System, Mobility and Security Management, pp. 433-498 XP-000860007.	Non-patent	–	Search report
Patent Abstract of Japanese Publication No. JP-5-503816 published Jun. 17, 1993.	Non-patent	–	Applicant
Patent Abstract of Japanese Publication No. JP-4-24954 published Sep. 4, 1992.	Non-patent	–	Applicant
3rd Generation Partnership Project, Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects, 3G Security, Security Architecture, Release 4, 3GPP TS 33.102 V4.4.0 (Jun. 2002).	Non-patent	–	Applicant
Patent Abstract of Japanese Publication No. JP-5-503816 published Jun. 17, 1993.	Non-patent	–	Third party observation
Patent Abstract of Japanese Publication No. JP-4-24954 published Sep. 4, 1992.	Non-patent	–	Third party observation
3<sup>rd </sup>Generation Partnership Project, Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects, 3G Security, Security Architecture, Release 4, 3GPP TS 33.102 V4.4.0 (Jun. 2002).	Non-patent	–	Third party observation
3G TS 33.102 version 3.0.0—Draft Standard, 3<sup>rd </sup>Generation Partnership Project, Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects, 3G Security Architecture (May 1999).	Non-patent	–	Search report
Patent Abstract of Germany-DE 197 18 827 A1—Mohrs, Nov. 19, 1998.	Non-patent	–	Search report
3G TS 33.102 version 3.9.0-Draft Standard, 3<sup>rd</sup>Generation Partnership Project, Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects, 3G Security Architecture (Jun. 2001) (Release 1999).	Non-patent	–	Search report
3G TS 33.102 version 3.4.2-Draft Standard 3<sup>rd </sup>Generation Partnership Project, Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects, 3G Security Architecture (Sep. 2001) (Release 4).	Non-patent	–	Search report
The GSM System, Mobility and Security Management, pp. 433-498 XP-000860007.	Non-patent	–	Search report

50 members in 10 offices

This recordMember, by publication datePriority claim

Priority claims10

Priority claims
Document	Office	Kind	Date
19927271	Germany	–	1999-06-15
19927271	Germany	A	1999-06-15
19927271	Germany	A	1999-06-15
0001788	Germany	W	2000-05-31
0001788	Germany	W	2000-05-31
10009975	–	–	–
19927271	–	–	–
DE1999127271	–	–	–
PCTDE0001788	–	–	–
WO2000DE01788	–	–	–

Members50

Family members, oldest first
Document	Office	Kind
WO0078078A1	World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)	A1	2000-12-21
AU5805100A	Australia	A	2001-01-02
KR20020019087A	Republic of Korea	A	2002-03-09
EP1186193A1	European Patent Office (EPO)	A1	2002-03-13
BR0011703A	Brazil	A	2002-03-26
CN1369183A	China	A	2002-09-11
JP2003501979A	Japan	A	2003-01-14
AU760714B2	Australia	B2	2003-05-22
EP1326469A2	European Patent Office (EPO)	A2	2003-07-09
EP1326470A2	European Patent Office (EPO)	A2	2003-07-09
KR20030059824A	Republic of Korea	A	2003-07-10
KR20030062415A	Republic of Korea	A	2003-07-25
CN1130099C	China	C	2003-12-03
US2003229784A1	United States of America	A1	2003-12-11
EP1326469A3	European Patent Office (EPO)	A3	2004-01-07
EP1326470A3	European Patent Office (EPO)	A3	2004-01-07
JP2004007690A	Japan	A	2004-01-08
US2004006714A1	United States of America	A1	2004-01-08
JP2004032730A	Japan	A	2004-01-29
CN1516494A	China	A	2004-07-28
CN1516495A	China	A	2004-07-28
EP1186193B1	European Patent Office (EPO)	B1	2005-08-10
EP1326470B1	European Patent Office (EPO)	B1	2005-08-10
DE50010928D1	Germany	D1	2005-09-15
DE50010940D1	Germany	D1	2005-09-15
ES2244451T3	Spain	T3	2005-12-16
ES2244843T3	Spain	T3	2005-12-16
US6980796B1	United States of America	B1	2005-12-27
KR100576956B1	Republic of Korea	B1	2006-05-10
KR100576957B1	Republic of Korea	B1	2006-05-10
KR100578685B1	Republic of Korea	B1	2006-05-12
EP1326469B1	European Patent Office (EPO)	B1	2006-10-04
DE50013577D1	Germany	D1	2006-11-16
US7139550B2	United States of America	B2	2006-11-21
ES2272824T3	Spain	T3	2007-05-01
CN1314277C	China	C	2007-05-02
CN1316834C	China	C	2007-05-16
JP3924465B2	Japan	B2	2007-06-06
JP4272920B2	Japan	B2	2009-06-03
USRE40791EThis record	United States of America	E	2009-06-23
JP4650994B2	Japan	B2	2011-03-16
US8565429B2	United States of America	B2	2013-10-22
BR0017414B1	Brazil	B1	2013-12-03
BRPI0017414B1	Brazil	B1	2013-12-03
BR0017415B1	Brazil	B1	2014-01-21
BRPI0017415B1	Brazil	B1	2014-01-21
BR0011703B1	Brazil	B1	2014-02-11
BRPI0011703B1	Brazil	B1	2014-02-11
BRPI0017415B8	Brazil	B8	2015-12-22
BRPI0017414B8	Brazil	B8	2018-08-14

27 transactions on the USPTO file

Allowed without a rejection on record.

Non-final rejections: 0
Final rejections: 0
RCEs: 0
Appeals: 0

Over time

Point at a mark for the transaction

Transactions

Prosecution transactions, newest first
	Event	Code
2018-01-22	Expire PatentEXP.	EXP.
2009-09-14	Post Issue Communication - Certificate of CorrectionN423	N423
2009-06-23	Recordation of Patent Grant MailedPGM/	PGM/
2009-06-03	Issue Notification MailedAllowedWPIR	WPIR
2009-05-19	Receipt into PubsR1021	R1021
2009-05-18	Dispatch to FDCD1935	D1935
2009-03-26	Dispatch to FDCD1935	D1935
2009-03-26	Application Is Considered Ready for IssuePILS	PILS
2009-03-16	Issue Fee Payment VerifiedN084	N084
2009-03-16	Issue Fee Payment VerifiedN084	N084
2009-03-16	Issue Fee Payment ReceivedIFEE	IFEE
2008-12-15	Mail Notice of AllowanceAllowedMN/=.	MN/=.
2008-06-13	IFW TSS Processing by Tech Center CompleteTSSCOMP	TSSCOMP
2008-06-13	Notice of Allowance Data Verification CompletedAllowedN/=.	N/=.
2008-05-13	Case Docketed to Examiner in GAUDOCK	DOCK
2008-04-25	Filing Receipt - ReplacementFLRCPT.R	FLRCPT.R
2008-04-01	Notice of Reissue Published in Official GazetteNRE.	NRE.
2008-03-11	Application Dispatched from OIPEOIPE	OIPE
2008-03-11	Filing ReceiptFLRCPT.O	FLRCPT.O
2008-03-11	Application Is Now CompleteCOMP	COMP
2008-01-23	Cleared by L&R (LARS)L128	L128
2008-01-15	Referred to Level 2 (LARS) by OIPE CSRL198	L198
2008-01-15	Cleared by OIPE CSRL194	L194
2008-01-11	IFW Scan & PACR Auto Security ReviewSCAN	SCAN
2007-12-21	Information Disclosure Statement consideredIDSC	IDSC
2007-12-21	Information Disclosure Statement (IDS) FiledWIDS	WIDS
2007-12-21	Initial Exam Team nnIEXX	IEXX

8 legal events, as the office reported them to INPADOC

Over the term

Point at a mark for the event

Events

Legal events, newest first
	Event	Code
2018-01-22	Lapse for failure to pay maintenance feesLapsedPATENT EXPIRED FOR FAILURE TO PAY MAINTENANCE FEES (ORIGINAL EVENT CODE: EXP.)LAPS	LAPS
2017-08-04	Maintenance fee reminder mailedREMI	REMI
2017-01-11	AssignmentAS	AS
2017-01-11	AssignmentAS	AS
2016-12-12	AssignmentAS	AS
2016-06-15	AssignmentAS	AS
2013-03-07	Fee paymentFPAY	FPAY
2009-10-06	Certificate of correctionCC	CC

Method and system for verifying the authenticity of a first communication participants in a communications network

Claim Score by NHIP

Abstract