Gaming software authentication

FIELD OF THE INVENTION

[0001] The present invention relates generally to gaming machines and, more particularly, to software authentication in a gaming machine.

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION

[0002] As a regulatory requirement in virtually all jurisdictions that allow gaming, it is necessary to have a technique to authenticate that the software installed in a gaming machine is tested and approved. In the past, gaming manufacturers have generally used EPROM-based hardware platforms to store program code. As a result, a number of software authentication techniques have been accepted as standards throughout the gaming industry. Depending upon the preferences of the local regulatory agency, these techniques generally include either a Kobetron signature or a hash function based on the data stored in the EPROM device.

[0003] Authentication of software programs basically occurs using two different methods in the field, again determined by the local regulatory agency. In one method, each EPROM is authenticated by a gaming agent prior to being installed in a gaming machine that is to be brought up for play. The EPROMs may be shipped directly to the gaming agency for authentication prior to the install date of the machine, or may be authenticated on the casino floor as the software is being installed in the machine. In another method, authentication is conducted on a spot-check basis. A gaming agent periodically visits a casino and picks machines selectively or at random to remove the software components for authentication.

[0004] Due to advances in technology that have been made in recent years, EPROM-based hardware platforms are becoming obsolete and newer technologies are being introduced into the gaming industry. These advanced technologies utilize storage devices that have been classified as “high capacity storage devices.” High capacity storage devices may, for example, include CD-ROMs, hard disk drives, and flash devices. Thus far, there is no industry standard method for authenticating these types of devices.

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

[0005] The present invention provides a method of preparing memory contents of a gaming machine for subsequent authentication and a method of authenticating the prepared memory contents. A first memory stores a game data set and a first authentication code generated from the game data set. The game data set includes game data files and second authentication codes generated from the respective data files. A second memory stores an authentication program for authenticating the first memory's contents, as well as a third authentication code generated from the second memory's contents. The first memory is preferably a high capacity storage device, while the second memory is preferably a boot read-only memory. To authenticate the memory contents, the second memory's contents are first authenticated and, if deemed authentic, the game data set as a whole and each data file in the first memory are authenticated. The authentication process involves generating fresh authentication codes using the authentication program and comparing the fresh codes with appropriate ones of the stored authentication codes.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

P-0006[0006] The foregoing and other advantages of the invention will become apparent upon reading the following detailed description and upon reference to the drawings.

P-0007[0007]FIG. 1 is an isometric view of a gaming machine operable to conduct a wagering game.

P-0008[0008]FIG. 2 is a block diagram of computer-readable storage contained in the gaming machine.

P-0009[0009]FIG. 3 is a flow diagram of a method of generating digital signatures from contents of the computer-readable storage for subsequent authentication.

P-0010[0010]FIG. 4 is a flow diagram of a method of authenticating the digital signatures.

P-0011[0011]FIGS. 5<i>a </i>and <b>5</b><i>b </i>are a flow diagram of a multi-stage authentication procedure executed external to the gaming machine and then internal to the gaming machine during a system boot process.

P-0012[0012]FIG. 6 is a flow diagram of a continuous run-time authentication procedure executed by the gaming machine after a main software application is launched from system RAM.

P-0013[0013] While the invention is susceptible to various modifications and alternative forms, specific embodiments have been shown by way of example in the drawings and will be described in detail herein. It should be understood, however, that the invention is not intended to be limited to the particular forms disclosed. Rather, the invention is to cover all modifications, equivalents, and alternatives falling within the spirit and scope of the invention as defined by the appended claims.

DESCRIPTION OF ILLUSTRATIVE EMBODIMENTS

P-0014[0014] Turning now to the drawings and referring initially to FIG. 1, a gaming machine <b>10</b> is operable to conduct a wagering game such as mechanical or video slots, poker, keno, bingo, or blackjack. If based in video, the gaming machine <b>10</b> includes a video display <b>12</b> such as a cathode ray tube (CRT), liquid crystal display (LCD), plasma, or other type of video display known in the art. A touch screen preferably overlies the display <b>12</b>. In the illustrated embodiment, the gaming machine <b>10</b> is an “upright” version in which the display <b>12</b> is oriented vertically relative to a player. Alternatively, the gaming machine may be a “slant-top” version in which the display <b>12</b> is slanted at about a thirty-degree angle toward the player.

P-0015[0015] The gaming machine <b>10</b> includes a plurality of possible credit receiving mechanisms <b>14</b> for receiving credits to be used for placing wagers in the game. The credit receiving mechanisms <b>14</b> may, for example, include a coin acceptor, a bill acceptor, a ticket reader, and a card reader. The bill acceptor and the ticket reader may be combined into a single unit. The card reader may, for example, accept magnetic cards and smart (chip) cards coded with money or designating an account containing money.

P-0016[0016] The gaming machine <b>10</b> includes a user interface comprising a plurality of push-buttons <b>16</b>, the above-noted touch screen, and other possible devices. The plurality of push-buttons <b>16</b> may, for example, include one or more “bet” buttons for wagering, a “play” button for commencing play, a “collect” button for cashing out, a “help” button for viewing a help screen, a “pay table” button for viewing the pay table(s), and a “call attendant” button for calling an attendant. Additional game-specific buttons may be provided to facilitate play of the specific game executed on the machine. The touch screen may define touch keys for implementing many of the same functions as the push-buttons. Other possible user interface devices include a keyboard and a pointing device such as a mouse or trackball.

P-0017[0017] A central processing unit (CPU) controls operation of the gaming machine <b>10</b>. In response to receiving a wager and a command to initiate play, the CPU randomly selects a game outcome from a plurality of possible outcomes and causes the display <b>12</b> to depict indicia representative of the selected game outcome. In the case of slots, for example, mechanical or simulated slot reels are rotated and stopped to place symbols on the reels in visual association with one or more pay lines. If the selected outcome is one of the winning outcomes defined by a pay table, the CPU awards the player with a number of credits associated with the winning outcome.

P-0018[0018] The CPU includes a microprocessor and computer-readable storage. Referring to FIG. 2, in a preferred embodiment, the computer-readable storage includes a boot memory <b>20</b>, a high capacity storage memory <b>22</b>, and a serial read-write memory <b>24</b>. The boot memory <b>20</b> is preferably a read-only memory such as a one megabit EPROM. The high capacity storage memory <b>22</b> is preferably a compact flash card. The serial memory <b>24</b> is preferably an EEPROM such as a 512 byte SPI EEPROM. Depending upon the preferences of the local regulatory agency, all three memories may be authenticated both outside of the CPU and then when installed in the CPU at power up. The diagram in FIG. 2 displays the contents stored in each of the memories and authenticated prior to use in the gaming machine.

P-0019[0019] The boot memory <b>20</b> stores boot code, an authentication program, a RAM loader, a decompression utility <b>120</b>, and a digital signature <b>30</b>. The authentication program includes a hash function <b>42</b>, a digital signature algorithm (DSA) verify operation <b>44</b><i>a</i>, and a public key <b>46</b><i>a</i>. The hash function <b>42</b> may, for example, be an SHA-1 hash algorithm that reduces a data set to a unique 160 bit message digest. The digital signature <b>30</b> is generated from the boot memory's contents as a whole.

P-0020[0020] The high capacity storage memory <b>22</b> stores game and operating system executable program files, sound operating system files, sound bank files, graphics files, a manifest file, and a digital signature <b>32</b>. The above files, taken together, constitute a “game data sef” as that term is used herein, and the various files constitute “data files” as that term is used herein. Thus, the game data set includes a plurality of data files. For each data file on the high capacity storage memory <b>22</b>, the manifest file contains a file name, a file type, a load address, and a digital signature <b>34</b>. The digital signature <b>32</b> is generated from the game data set as a whole, while each digital signature <b>34</b> is generated from the associated data file listed in the manifest file.

P-0021[0021] The serial memory <b>24</b> stores information specific to the jurisdiction where the CPU is to be installed. This information may, for example, include a lottery terminal identification (ID), a part number, a jurisdiction ID, a jurisdiction name, jurisdiction bit code options, jurisdiction max bet, jurisdiction max win, and a digital signature <b>36</b>. The digital signature <b>36</b> is generated from the serial memory's contents as a whole.

P-0022[0022] The digital signatures <b>30</b>, <b>32</b>, <b>34</b>, and <b>36</b> in the various memories are preferably generated and authenticated using the Digital Signature Standard as adopted by the U.S. Department of Commerce/National Institute of Standards and Technology and published in FIPS PUB 186-2 on Jan. 27, 2000.

P-0023[0023]FIG. 3 illustrates a method of generating the digital signatures <b>30</b>, <b>32</b>, <b>34</b>, and <b>36</b> for subsequent authentication. The method is performed outside of the gaming machine during an engineering release process. Specifically, each digital signature is generated from associated memory contents <b>40</b> by reducing the contents <b>40</b> to a message digest <b>48</b> using the hash function <b>42</b> and then inputting the message digest <b>48</b> and a private key <b>46</b><i>b </i>into a DSA generation operation <b>44</b><i>b. </i>

P-0024[0024] The associated contents <b>40</b> from which each digital signature is generated varies as described above in connection with FIG. 2. Specifically, the digital signature <b>30</b> is generated from the contents of the boot memory <b>20</b> as a whole. The digital signature <b>32</b> is generated from the game data set in the high capacity storage memory <b>22</b> as a whole, while the digital signatures <b>34</b> are generated from the respective data files (except the manifest file) making up the game data set. Some of the data files, such as the sound and graphics files, may be compressed. A compressed data file(s) may itself include a plurality of uncompressed data files. A digital signature <b>34</b> may be generated from the compressed data file, and either a digital signature <b>34</b> or a message digest <b>48</b> may be generated from the data file prior to compression (i.e., the uncompressed data file). The digital signature <b>34</b> or message digest <b>48</b> generated from an uncompressed data file may be appended to the compressed data file. The digital signature <b>36</b> is generated from the contents of the serial memory <b>24</b> as a whole. The hash function <b>42</b> used in the signature generation method is the same as the hash function <b>42</b> stored in the boot memory <b>20</b>. The aforementioned public key <b>46</b><i>a </i>stored in the boot memory <b>20</b> and the private key <b>46</b><i>b </i>form an associated pair in accordance with the Digital Signature Standard. The same public key/private key pair <b>46</b><i>a</i>-<i>b </i>is preferably used to generate and authenticate all digital signatures. Alternatively, different public key/private key pairs may be used to generate and authenticate one or more of the digital signatures.

P-0025[0025]FIG. 4 illustrates a method of authenticating the digital signatures <b>30</b>, <b>32</b>, <b>34</b>, and <b>36</b> already stored in the memories. The timing of this method is described below in connection with FIG. 5 and depends upon the digital signature being authenticated. The method employs the boot memory's authentication program, which includes the hash function <b>42</b>, the DSA verify operation <b>44</b><i>a</i>, and the public key <b>46</b><i>a</i>. In the authentication method, a fresh digital signature <b>50</b> is generated from previously signed memory contents <b>40</b> by reducing the contents <b>40</b> to a message digest <b>48</b> using the hash function <b>42</b> and then inputting the message digest <b>48</b> and the public key <b>46</b><i>a </i>into the DSA verify operation <b>44</b><i>a</i>. The message digest <b>48</b> is also stored in a nonvolatile random access memory (RAM) for later use during continuous run-time authentication. The fresh digital signature <b>50</b> is then mathematically complemented at step <b>52</b> to yield a complement <b>54</b> of the fresh signature <b>50</b>. The signature complement <b>54</b> is summed with the stored digital signature (i.e., digital signature <b>30</b>, <b>32</b>, <b>34</b>, or <b>36</b>) generated from the same memory contents <b>40</b>. If the mathematic sum <b>56</b> is zero (i.e., the fresh signature <b>50</b> matches the stored signature), authentication is deemed a success at step <b>58</b>. If, however, the mathematic sum <b>56</b> is not zero, authentication is deemed a failure at step <b>60</b>.

P-0026[0026] Referring to FIGS. 5<i>a </i>and <b>5</b><i>b</i>, the procedure for authenticating the contents of the memories <b>20</b>, <b>22</b>, and <b>24</b> is implemented in the following distinct stages: external component authentication, internal boot component authentication, file authentication and loading, and continuous run-time authentication (see FIG. 6). This authentication procedure guarantees the integrity and security of the CPU software. A failure detected in any one of the stages is considered a critical failure that must be corrected prior to any further play of the gaming machine. The machine displays the critical failure, if detected, at step <b>96</b>.

P-0027[0027] External component authentication verifies the contents of the memories prior to placement in the gaming machine. Alternatively, if permitted by the local gaming agency, the memory contents may be verified using a dedicated serial port after the memories have been installed in the CPU. External component authentication of the boot memory <b>20</b> may be accomplished using industry standard techniques, such as a Kobetron MT-2000 signature or a hash algorithm for generating a unique signature (step <b>70</b>). External component authentication of the high capacity storage memory <b>22</b> may be accomplished using tools commercially available from such companies as Kobetron Inc. of Navarre, Fla., Gaming Laboratories International Inc. (GLI) of Toms River, N.J., and Dataman Programmer Ltd. of Orange City, Fla. (step <b>72</b>). External component authentication of the serial memory <b>24</b>, which requires a serial communications interface to read from and write to the memory, may be accomplished using tools commercially available from one or more of the aforementioned companies (step <b>74</b>).

P-0028[0028] Internal boot component authentication occurs immediately following power up of the machine and entails authentication of the contents of each installed memory as a whole and does not look at individual files stored in the memory. Authentication of individual files occurs during a later stage. After powering up (booting) the machine at step <b>76</b>, a Power On Self Test (POST) is immediately initiated at step <b>78</b> to initialize the CPU hardware and run a few basic tests to verify that the hardware is functioning correctly. After the POST, the three memories are authenticated as a whole using the method in FIG. 4 and in the following sequence: (1) authenticate digital signature <b>30</b> of boot memory <b>20</b> at step <b>80</b>, (2) authenticate digital signature <b>36</b> of serial memory <b>24</b> at step <b>82</b>, and (3) authenticate digital signature <b>32</b> of high capacity storage memory <b>22</b> at step <b>86</b>. The boot memory <b>20</b> is authenticated first because the other two memories rely upon the contents of the boot memory <b>20</b> to complete their own authentication processes. Prior to authenticating the high capacity storage memory <b>22</b> at step <b>86</b>, that memory's drivers and file system are initialized at step <b>84</b>. If all three memories have been determined to be both present and authentic, the authentication procedure proceeds to the next stage—file authentication and loading.

P-0029[0029] File authentication and loading sequentially authenticates the executable data files (except for the manifest file) stored in the high capacity storage memory <b>22</b> and loads each authenticated data file into the CPU component (e.g., system RAM) where the data file will reside and execute from during normal machine operation. The data files are loaded and processed in the order listed in the manifest file stored in the high capacity storage device <b>22</b>. The manifest file itself is not loaded into the system, but rather is used during the system boot process to guide the file loading process. The order in which the data files are loaded does not have an effect on system operation.

P-0030[0030] The digital signature <b>34</b> of a data file in the high capacity storage memory <b>22</b> is authenticated at step <b>88</b> using the method in FIG. 4. If the data file is compressed, the digital signature <b>34</b> generated from the compressed data file is authenticated at step <b>88</b>. If the digital signature <b>34</b> is authenticated, a check is made at step <b>89</b> as to whether or not the data file is compressed. If the data file is not compressed, the data file is loaded to an associated CPU component at step <b>90</b>. The associated CPU component is identified in the manifest file. If, however, the data file is compressed, the compressed data file is decompressed using the decompression utility <b>120</b> stored in the boot memory <b>20</b> at step <b>91</b>. The decompressed data file may be authenticated prior to being loaded to the associated CPU component at step <b>93</b>. The message digest <b>48</b> calculated during such authentication is stored in the non-volatile random access memory (RAM) for later use during continuous run-time authentication. A check is then made at step <b>92</b> as to whether or not the loaded data file was the last file listed in the manifest file. If not, the file authentication and loading steps are repeated for the next data file listed in the manifest file. After authenticating and loading the last file and performing a RAM clear check (not shown), the main software application is launched from system RAM at step <b>94</b> to complete the system boot process. The authentication procedure then proceeds to the final stage—continuous run-time authentication.

P-0031[0031]FIG. 6 illustrates a basic method of continuous run-time authentication as it will take place following the completion of the system boot process. There are two main cycles of events that occur during continuous run-time authentication. The first cycle repeatedly verifies the presence of the high capacity storage memory <b>22</b> in the CPU board, and calculates and verifies the message digest <b>48</b> (see FIG. 4) for the memory <b>22</b> as a whole at steps <b>100</b>, <b>102</b>, and <b>104</b>. The high capacity storage memory <b>22</b> is accessed at short time intervals such as every <b>15</b> milliseconds. Any unsuccessful read of the high capacity storage memory <b>22</b> at step <b>100</b> or any unsuccessful authentication at step <b>104</b> halts the machine and causes it to display a critical error at step <b>96</b>. The continuous run-time authentication of the high capacity storage memory <b>22</b> is limited to the memory as a whole and does not look at individual files stored on the memory.

P-0032[0032] The second cycle involves repetitive authentication of the serial memory <b>24</b> at step <b>106</b>, the boot memory <b>20</b> at step <b>108</b>, and the files that are executing from system RAM at steps <b>110</b> and <b>112</b>. All authentications are preferably accomplished using the message digest <b>48</b> of the corresponding memory or file, instead of the DSA verify operation in FIG. 4. Message digests <b>48</b> of the various memories and files (including the decompressed data files) were previously stored in non-volatile RAM, and it is against these stored message digests <b>48</b> that newly calculated message digests are compared. The DSA verify operation is not necessary at this point because the memories and files were proven to be authentic during the system boot process. The purpose of continuous run-time authentication is to ensure that the information that was loaded to system RAM during the boot process has not been altered and that the memories have not been changed. A message digest <b>48</b> is sufficient for this purpose. It should be understood, however, that the DSA verify operation may instead be performed during this second cycle of continuous run-time authentication.

P-0033[0033] Following the successful authentication of all files in system RAM, the nonvolatile RAM is verified using a standard “CRC” or other similar check at step <b>114</b>. Main and auxiliary copies of the non-volatile RAM are also compared to each other at step <b>114</b> to ensure the integrity of the non-volatile RAM. In accordance with step <b>116</b>, all of the above functions of the second cycle continue for as long as the machine is powered on. If the machine is powered off, the authentication procedure will start again at the boot component authentication stage in FIG. 5 when the machine is powered up.

P-0034[0034] While the present invention has been described with reference to one or more particular embodiments, those skilled in the art will recognize that many changes may be made thereto without departing from the spirit and scope of the present invention.

P-0035[0035] For example, as noted above, numerous techniques may be used to prepare and authenticate a compressed data set. The compressed data set may include one or more files in the high capacity storage memory <b>22</b>. In the illustrated embodiment, to prepare a compressed data set for subsequent authentication, the performed steps include compressing an uncompressed game data set; generating a first authentication code from the compressed data set; and storing the compressed data set and the first authentication code in the high capacity storage memory <b>22</b>. The compressed data set may include sound files, graphics files, and even executable game code. The first authentication code may be a message digest <b>48</b> or a digital signature <b>34</b> (see FIG. 3). The manifest file in the high capacity storage memory <b>22</b> lists the compressed data set and its associated first authentication code.

P-0036[0036] Prior to compressing an uncompressed data set, a second authentication code may be generated from the uncompressed data set and appended to the compressed data set. The second authentication code may be a message digest <b>48</b> or a digital signature <b>34</b> (see FIG. 3). The manifest file in the high capacity storage memory <b>22</b> lists the compressed data set and the first and second authentication codes generated from the respective compressed and uncompressed data sets.

P-0037[0037] To authenticate a data set that has been prepared in the above manner, the performed steps include authenticating the compressed data set; decompressing the compressed data set using a decompression utility stored in the boot memory; and authenticating the decompressed data set. Both the compressed data set and the decompressed data set may be authenticated during the file authentication and loading stage shown in FIG. 5<i>b </i>by generating fresh authentication codes that are compared to the respective stored first and second authentication codes. If a stored authentication code is a message digest <b>48</b> (see FIG. 3), then the fresh authentication code against which it is compared is also a message digest (see FIG. 4). If, however, the stored authentication code is a digital signature <b>34</b> (see FIG. 3), then the fresh authentication code against which it is compared is a digital signature <b>50</b> (see FIG. 4). After the decompressed data set is loaded into its associated CPU component (e.g., system RAM), the decompressed data set may again be authenticated during continuous runtime authentication shown in FIG. 6 by generating a fresh authentication code that is compared to the stored second authentication code of the same type (i.e., message digest or digital signature).

P-0038[0038] The compressed data set may include a plurality of uncompressed data files. When preparing the compressed data set for subsequent authentication, a respective authentication code may be generated for each of these uncompressed files and stored in the manifest file. These authentication codes are then later authenticated after decompressing the compressed data set.

P-0039[0039] Depending upon the level of authentication needed to comply with a regulatory gaming body, the authentication method may be modified to authenticate the compressed data set only prior to decompression or only after decompression.

P-0040[0040] Each of these embodiments and obvious variations thereof is contemplated as falling within the spirit and scope of the claimed invention, which is set forth in the following claims: