System for binding secrets to a computer system having tolerance for hardware changes

SYSTEM FOR BINDING SECRETS TO A COMPUTER SYSTEM

HAVING TOLERANCE FOR HARDWARE CHANGES

FIELD OF THE INVENTION

The present invention relates to systems and methods for binding a secret to a given computer system. The present invention also relates to systems and methods for generating a strong hardware identification for a given computer system, wherein a component of the strong hardware identification is coupled to a bound secret. The resulting strong hardware identification may be used to control the use of software on the given computer system depending on the degree of hardware changes to the computer system.

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION

There has been considerable effort in recent years to prevent or minimize the unlawful use of computer software. Due to its reproducibility and ease of distribution, piracy of computer software and illegal use of computer software beyond the scope of a license agreement are common occurrences, which significantly hurt software manufacturers.

Methods have been developed in an effort to reduce the occurrences of computer software piracy and illegal use of computer software beyond the scope of a license agreement. However, such methods often cause problems for legitimate software purchasers and users in the form of consumer inconvenience. For instance, a user who has upgraded his/her computer should be able to legitimately reinstall the software product on the upgraded machine. However, presently available methods may either (i) not allow the software to be installed, or (ii) force the user (who is now disgruntled) to call the software manufacturer for assistance.

Accordingly, there remains a need for improved technology solutions to piracy and illicit use, but which also recognize and accommodate the needs and practices of a legitimate software purchaser and user.

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

The present invention addresses some of the difficulties and problems discussed above by the discovery of a method for binding a secret to a given computer system, and an improved hardware identification coupled to the secret. The hardware identification of the present invention provides a method of minimizing or preventing software piracy and the illegal use of computer software beyond the scope of a license agreement, while allowing for machine upgrades by legitimate software users.

The hardware identification of the present invention, referred to herein as a strong hardware identification (SHWID), comprises two separate components: (1) a hardware identification component, and (2) a partial secret component. By combining (1) a hardware identification component together with (2) a partial secret component, a more secure and reliable strong hardware identification (SHWID) for a given computer system is generated.

The strong hardware identification (SHWID) may be used to identify a given hardware configuration when loading a software product onto the computer. The strong hardware identification (SHWID) may be stored for future use, such as (i) when the same software product is launched on the same computer or a variation of the same computer, or (ii) when the same software product is reloaded onto a variation of the same computer or a completely different computer. For example, when the same software product is launched on the same computer or a variation of the same computer, a determination is made as to whether the secret, coupled to the original strong hardware identification (SHWID), can be produced. If the secret can be produced, the method of the present invention allows the software product to be launched. However, if the secret cannot be produced, the method of the present invention will not allow the software product to be launched due to changes to the original hardware system beyond a desired threshold.

Accordingly, the present invention is directed to a method for binding a secret to a given computer system, and a strong hardware identification (SHWID) coupled to the secret. The present invention is further directed to a method for preventing the use of software on a computer system if the secret coupled to the original strong hardware identification (SHWID) cannot be retrieved on the computer system.

These and other features and advantages of the present invention will become apparent after a review of the following detailed description of the disclosed embodiments and the appended claims.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE FIGURES

FIG. 1 is a flow diagram of some of the primary components of an exemplary operating environment for implementation of the present invention;

FIG. 2 is a flow diagram showing exemplary steps in determining a hardware identification component of the strong hardware identification (SHWID);

FIGS. 3-4 is a flow diagram showing exemplary steps in determining a partial secret component of the strong hardware identification (SHWID);

FIG. 5 is a flow diagram showing exemplary steps of combining the hardware identification component and the partial secret component of the strong hardware identification (SHWID); and

FIGS. 6-7 is a flow diagram showing exemplary steps in determining whether a software product can be used on a computer hardware system using the retrieval of a bound secret as the software product enabling factor.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION

To promote an understanding of the principles of the present invention, descriptions of specific embodiments of the invention follow and specific language is used to describe the specific embodiments. It will nevertheless be understood that no limitation of the scope of the invention is intended by the use of specific language. Alterations, further modifications, and such further applications of the principles of the present invention discussed are contemplated as would normally occur to one ordinarily skilled in the art to which the invention pertains.

The present invention is directed to a method for binding a secret to a given computer system, and a strong hardware identification (SHWID) coupled to the secret. The secret typically comprises a randomly selected whole number. The secret desirably has the following characteristics:

(1) Secret, 5, is computable on hardware configuration H;

(2) Secret, S, is computable on hardware configuration H„ which is hardware configuration H after an amount of component change up to a desired threshold amount of component change; and (3) Secret, S, is virtually impossible to compute on any other hardware configuration H₂.

The secret may be used to generate a strong hardware identification (SHWID) for a given computer system comprising a variety of hardware components. An exemplary computer system may comprise a number of hardware component classes including, but not limited to, hard disk drives, optical disk drives such as CD-ROM drives, network cards, display adapters, read only memory (ROM), random access memory (RAM), and a basic input/output system (BIOS). An exemplary computer system and exemplary operating environment for practicing the present invention is described below.

Exemplary Operating Environment

Exemplary embodiments of the present invention will hereinafter be described with reference to the drawings, in which like numerals represent like elements throughout the several figures. FIG. 1 illustrates an exemplary operating environment for implementation of the present invention. The exemplary operating environment includes a generalpurpose computing device in the form of a conventional personal computer 20. Generally, a personal computer 20 includes a processing unit 21, a system memory 22, and a system bus 23 that couples various system components including the system memory 22 to processing unit 21. System bus 23 may be any of several types of bus structures including a memory bus or memory controller, a peripheral bus. and a local bus using any of a variety of bus architectures. The system memory includes a read only memory (ROM) 24 and random access memory (RAM) 25. A basic input/output system (BIOS) 26, containing the basic routines that help to transfer information between elements within personal computer 20, such as during start-up, is stored in ROM 24.

Personal computer 20 further includes a hard disk drive 27 for reading from and writing to a hard disk, not shown, a magnetic disk drive 28 for reading from or writing to a removable magnetic disk 29, and an optical disk drive 30 for reading from or writing to a removable optical disk 31 such as a CD-ROM or other optical media. Hard disk drive 27, magnetic disk drive 28, and optical disk drive 30 are connected to system bus 23 by a hard disk drive interface 32, a magnetic disk drive interface 33, and an optical disk drive interface 34, respectively. Although the exemplary environment described herein employs hard disk 27, removable magnetic disk 29, and removable optical disk 31, it should be appreciated by those skilled in the art that other types of computer readable media, which can store data that is accessible by a computer, such as magnetic cassettes, flash memory cards, digital video disks, Bernoulli cartridges, RAMs, ROMs, and the like, may also be used in the exemplary operating environment. The drives and their associated computer readable media provide nonvolatile storage of computer-executable instructions, data structures, program modules, and other data for personal computer 20. For example, one or more data files 60 (not shown) may be stored in the RAM 25 and/or hard drive 27 of the personal computer 20.

A number of program modules may be stored on hard disk 27, magnetic disk 29, optical disk 31, ROM 24, or RAM 25, including an operating system 35, an application program module 36, other program modules 37, and program data 38. Program modules include, but are not limited to, routines, sub-routines, programs, objects, components, data structures, etc., which perform particular tasks or implement particular abstract data types. Aspects of the present invention may be implemented as an integral part of an application program module 36 or as a part of another program module 37.

A user may enter commands and information into personal computer 20 through input devices, such as a keyboard 40 and a pointing device 42. Other input devices (not shown) may include a microphone, joystick, game pad, satellite dish, scanner, or the like. These and other input devices are often connected to processing unit 22 through a serial port interface 46 that is coupled to the system bus 23, but may be connected by other interfaces, such as a parallel port, game port, a universal serial bus (USB), or the like. A monitor 47 or other type of display device may also be connected to system bus 23 via an interface, such as a video adapter 48. In addition to the monitor, personal computers typically include other peripheral output devices (not shown), such as speakers and printers.

Personal computer 20 may operate in a networked environment using logical connections to one or more remote computers 49. Remote computer 49 may be another personal computer, a server, a client, a router, a network PC, a peer device, or other common network node. While a remote computer 49 typically includes many or all of the elements described above relative to personal computer 20, only a memory storage device 50 has been illustrated in FIG. 1. The logical connections depicted in FIG. 1 include a local area network (LAN) 51 and a wide area network (WAN) 52. Such networking environments are commonplace in offices, enterprise-wide computer networks, intranets, and the Internet.

When used in a LAN networking environment, personal computer 20 is connected to local area network 51 through a network interface or adapter 53. When used in a WAN networking environment, personal computer 20 typically includes a modem 54 or other means for establishing communications over WAN 52, such as the Internet. Modem 54, which may be internal or external, is connected to system bus 23 via serial port interface 46. In a networked environment, program modules depicted relative to personal computer 20, or portions thereof, may be stored in the remote memory storage device 50. It will be appreciated that the network connections shown are exemplary and other means of establishing a communications link between the computers may be used.

Moreover, those skilled in the art will appreciate that the present invention may be implemented in other computer system configurations, including hand-held devices, multiprocessor systems, microprocessor based or programmable consumer electronics, network person computers, minicomputers, mainframe computers, and the like. The present invention may also be practiced in distributed computing environments, where tasks are performed by remote processing devices that are linked through a communications network. In a distributed computing environment, program modules may be located in both local and remote memory storage devices.

Implementation of Exemplary Embodiments of the Present Invention

As described above, a computer system typically comprises multiple classes of hardware components. Further, the computer system may comprise multiple components (e.g., two disk hard drives) within each class of hardware components.

The strong hardware identification (SHWID) of the present invention takes into account each component (also referred to herein as each “instance”) within each class of hardware components. The strong hardware identification (SHWID) of the present invention also takes into account the secret, S, which is bound to a given computer hardware system.

An exemplary method of generating a strong hardware identification (SHWID) of the present invention is given below. Further a method of using the strong hardware identification (SHWID) as an antipirating tool is also described below.

I. Generating A Strong Hardware Identification (SHWID) For A Computer System

The strong hardware identification (SHWID) of a given computer system comprises two distinct components: (1) a hardware component, and (2) a partial secret component. Exemplary methods of determining each of these components are described below. The steps of the exemplary methods may be performed by software code within a software product on a customer's computer, similar to computer 20 described above with reference to FIG. 1.

A. Determining The Hardware Component of the SHWID

The SHWID of the present invention comprises a class product for each class of hardware components. The hardware component of the SHWID may be determined as shown in FIG. 2.

As shown in FIG. 2, an exemplary determination of the hardware component of the SHWID begins with step 201, wherein a number of component classes, n, is chosen to identify a given computer system. As discussed above, a given computer system may include a variety of hardware components and classes of hardware components. Exemplary hardware component classes include, but are not limited to, hard disk drives, optical disk drives, network cards, sound cards, display adapters, read only memory (ROM), random access memory (RAM), and a BIOS system. Desirably, n, the number of hardware component classes, is a whole number ranging from about 2 to about 16. In general, it is desirable for n to be as large as possible in order to (i) more precisely identify a given computer system, (ii) more accurately measure the degree of tolerance of a given computer system, and (iii) to enable a higher level of security for secret, S',

After choosing the number of component classes, «, in step 201, each component class is identified in step 202. The component classes may include any of the above-described component classes such as the class of hard disk drives. An exemplary list of component classes is given below in Table 1.

Table 1. Exemplary List of Hardware Component Classes

<td> Component Class No.</td><td> Class Description</td><td> Class Identifier</td>

<td> 1</td><td> CdRom</td><td> CdRom device identifier</td>

<td> 2</td><td> Hard Disk Drive</td><td> Drive partition serial number</td>

<td> 3</td><td> Network Card</td><td> MAC address</td>

<td> 4</td><td> Display adapter device</td><td> ~~ Identifier</td>

As shown in Table 1, in this example, n equals 4, and the identified hardware component classes are: (1) a CdRom class; (2) a hard disk drive class; (3) a network card class; and (4) a display adapter device class.

After each component class is identified in step 202, all instances within each hardware component class are identified in step 203. Desirably, each instance within a particular component class is represented by the most unique identification string associated with the instance. For example, the hardware configuration may contain a CdRom drive manufactured by NEC Corporation and having an identification string of “NEC CDRW24 SI5. Any available method for determining the most unique identification string of a given instance, including device queries and operating system API function calls, may be used in the present invention. An example of a computer hardware configuration and the instances within each hardware component class is shown in Table 2 below.

Table 2. Exemplary Component Instances for Each Component Class

<td> Component Class No.</td><td> Class Description</td><td> Class Component Instances</td>

<td> 1</td><td> CdRom</td><td> {“NEC CDRW24S15’, “TOSHIBA DVDR ASK-1425”}</td>

<td> 2</td><td> Hard Disk Drive</td><td> {lbcdtH922, 7da90024}</td>

<td> 3</td><td> Network Card</td><td> — {00b0c31b5923} ~</td>

<td> 4</td><td> Display adapter device</td><td> {“NVidia GeForce2 DDR”}</td>

As shown in Table 2 above, class 1, the CdRom class, contains two component instances; class 2, the disk hard drive class, contains two component instances; class 3, the network card class, contains one instance; and class 4, the display adapter device class, contains one instance.

In step 205, an instance prime is generated for each component instance using a prime number-generating function fix). Desirably, function fix) possesses the following characteristics:

(a) the result of/x) is a positive prime number;

(b) x can be any data of with length of up to about 65,000 characters; and (c) fix) &gt; 2*, wherein t is a whole number desirably greater than about 32. Desirably, t is equal to or greater than about 64. However, there is no limitation on the value of t.

(d) the result of/χ) is deterministic based on the value of x.

Any prime number-generating function /x) may be used in the present invention to generate a prime number for each component instance. As discussed above, the prime number-generating function fix) desirably possesses the above characteristics. Suitable prime numbergenerating functions fix) include, but are not limited to, prime numbergenerating functions /x) based on the Rabin-Miller algorithm disclosed in Applied Cryptography, Second Edition by Bruce Schneier, pages 259-260, the disclosure of which is incorporated herein by reference in its entirety.

Table 3 below provides a list of instance primes, z_pq, for component instances of an exemplary hardware configuration.

Table 3. Exemplary Instance Primes for Component Instances

<td> Component Class No,</td><td> ' Class Description</td><td> Instance Primes For Component Instances</td>

<td> 1</td><td> CdRom</td><td> {/(“NEC CDRW24 SI 5”) = z, „ “ /“TOSHIBA DVDR ASB-1425”) - zjj</td>

<td> 2</td><td> Hard Disk Drive</td><td> {/(1 bcdtt 1922) = z,,, /(7da90024) = Z₂₂}</td>

<td> 3</td><td> Network Card</td><td> {/(00b0c31b5923) - z'₃₁}</td>

<td> 4</td><td> Display adapter device</td><td> /“NVidia GeForce2 DDR”) - z_4J}</td>

As used herein, instance prime z is used to designate the instance prime for a given component instance, q, within a given class p. For example, instance prime z, ₂ is used to identify the instance prime for the component instance in component class 1 (e.g., p - 1) and more particularly, the second component instance within component class 1 and within the computer hardware configuration (e.g., q ^_ 2).

In one embodiment of the present invention, a “salt value” may be added to the component instance identifier prior to generating the instance prime for a given component instance. In this embodiment, adding a salt value enables the production of different SHWIDs based on the same computer hardware configuration. Salt values derived from the application code or user identity enable different SHWIDs for different applications or users running on the same hardware configuration, which may be beneficial when securing data for consumption by a particular application or user only.

Once instance primes are generated for each component instance, a class product, c_p, is generated for each component class in step 206. Class product, c_p, is produced by multiplying the instance primes within a given class with one another. Exemplary class products c, to c., are given in Table 4 below.

Table 4. Exemplary Class Products For Each Component Class

<td> Component Class No,</td><td> Class Description</td><td> Class Products For Each Component Class</td>

<td> 1</td><td> CdRom</td><td> C&gt; = (ri.i ) ^x (' 1.2)</td>

<td> 2 ”</td><td> Hard Disk Drive</td><td>^c2 “ (i 2,1) ^x U 2.2)</td>

<td> -3</td><td> Network Card</td><td></td>

<td> 4</td><td> Display adapter device</td><td>^C4 ~ ύ,ι</td>

As shown in Table 4, the class product c, for hardware component class CdRom is equal to the product of two instances, i, , and i, ₂. It should be noted that class products resulting from a single instance prime, such as class product c₃, may be multiplied by additional non-instance primes to increase the difficulty of factoring a given class product. This is particularly useful for class products composed of a single instance prime, such as class product c₃ or class product c₄, shown in Table 4 above. When additional non-instance primes are used to increase the class product value, it is desirable for the additional non-instance prime numbers to be in the range of greater than 2 but less than 2’, wherein t is an arbitrary whole number as described above. This mitigates the risk of unintended collision with instance primes from a different hardware configuration.

In step 207, each class product, c_p, is stored for input into the strong class identification, C_p, for each component class as described below. Further, as described below, the combination of each strong class identification, C_p, for each class is used to produce the strong hardware identification (SHWID) for a given computer hardware system. The class products c_p represent the hardware component of the strong hardware identification (SHWID) for a given computer hardware system.

B. Determining the Partial Secret Component of the SHWID

The strong hardware identification (SHWID) of the present invention also comprises a partial secret component for each class of hardware components. An exemplary method of determining the partial secret component of the SHWID is shown in FIGS. 3-4. The steps of the exemplary method may be performed by software code within a software product on a customer's computer, similar to computer 20 described above with reference to FIG. 1.

In step 301 shown in FIG. 3, a random number, r_p, is generated for each component class using a random number generator. Any conventional random number generator may be used to generate random number r_p. Suitable random number generators include, but are not limited to, random number generators disclosed in Prime Numbers by Crandell and Pomerance, Chapter 8, the disclosure of which is incorporated herein by reference in its entirety. Desirably, the random number r_p ranges from equal to or greater than 0 up to but less than 2, wherein u is less than t described above. Typically, u is approximately equal to t divided by 3.

Using the random number r_p for each hardware component class generated in step 301, class primes p_p are generated in step 302 using a prime number-gene rating function, g(r_p). Desirably, the prime numbergenerating function g(r_p) has the following characteristics:

(a) the result of g(r_p) is a positive prime number;

(b) g(r_p) i^s &lt; wherein v is a whole number greater than u; and (c) u + v -1.

(d) the result of g(r_p) is deterministic based on the value of r_p.

As with prime number-generating function /(x) described above, any prime number-generating function g(x) may be used in the present invention to generate a prime number for each component class random number r_p. As discussed above, the prime number-generating function g(x) desirably possesses the above characteristics. Suitable prime number-generating functions g(x) include, but are not limited to, prime number-generating functions g(x) disclosed in Applied Cryptography, Second Edition by Bruce Schneier, pages 259-260, the disclosure of which is incorporated herein by reference in its entirety.

One example of the relationship between g(r_p), t, u and v is given below.

t ~ 64 u = 20 v = 44 &lt; r_p &lt; 2^U (2²⁰ - 1,048,576)

2&lt;g(r_p)&lt;2^v

An exemplary list of class primes p_p for each of the n classes (e.g., n = 4) of an exemplary computer system is shown in Table 5 below.

Table 5. Exemplary Class Primes for Each Component Class

<td> Component Class No.</td><td> Class Description</td><td> Class Primes For Each Component Class</td>

<td></td><td> CdRom</td><td> ρ,=5(Γ,):υ&lt;Γ,&lt;2</td>

<td> 2</td><td> Hard Disk Drive</td><td></td>

<td> 3“ ~</td><td> Network Card</td><td> P3^g(^3):fi^&lt;^3^&lt;2¹'</td>

<td> 4</td><td> Display adapter device</td><td> P&lt; = g(r₄): 0 &lt;r, &lt; 2</td>

A sample output displaying the relationship between class primes for a given hardware configuration may be given as:

&lt; p₂ &lt; p₃ &lt; Pi &lt; P₄ &lt; 2^V

In step 303, the number of required component class matches, m, is chosen depending on the degree of tolerance desired for hardware configuration component changes. The number of required component class matches, m, may be as great as n, the total number of component classes, or may be as small as one. As m increases, the degree of tolerance to computer hardware configuration changes decreases. For example, if the total number of component classes n is equal to 4 and m is equal to 3, 3 out of 4 total component classes must match at least one component instance in order for secret S to be retrieved, which enables the loading or running of a software product. If the number of component class matches is less than 3, secret S will not be retrieved, and the software product will not run or be loaded onto the computer hardware configuration.

The number of required component class matches, m, may be predetermined by a software manufacturer and encoded into the SHWID generation method of the present invention. Once m is selected, additional parameters are determined as shown in steps 304 and 305.

In step 304, parameter N is determined, wherein N equals the product of the m smallest class primes p_p. For example, in the sample class prime output described above, the two smallest class primes are p₂ and p₃. If m is equal to 2, N is equal to (p₂) x (p₃).

In step 305, parameter M is determined, wherein M equals the product of the (m-l) largest class primes p_p. For example, in the sample class primes output given above, p₄ is the largest class prime. If m equals 2, then Af is equal to the product of the single largest class prime. p₄ (i.e., (Af 1) = 1). It should be noted that Af must be less than N to ensure that a given set of class primes has a threshold m. This is an implementation of a threshold-based secret sharing scheme as described in The Mathematics of Ciphers by S.C. Coutinho, Chapter 7, the disclosure of which is incorporated herein by reference in its entirety.

Once parameters N and Af have been determined, secret S is selected in step 306. Secret S is greater than Af but less than N. Further, secret .S’ is any random number between Af and N.

In step 307, class remainders &lt;7_p are calculated using the following equation:

^s mod p_p

An exemplary set of class remainders is shown below in

Table 6.

Table 6. Exemplary Class Remainders For Each Component Class

<td> L-omponent Class No.</td><td> Class Description</td><td> Class Remainders For Each Component Class</td>

<td> 1</td><td> CdRom</td><td> d_} = S mod p₍</td>

<td> 2</td><td> Hard Disk Drive</td><td> d₂ = S mod p₂</td>

<td> 3</td><td> Network Card</td><td> d₃ - S mod p₃</td>

<td> 4</td><td> Display adapter device</td><td> d^ - S mod p₄</td>

In step 308 as shown in Fig. 4, class primes p_p for each component class are encoded into first binary values for each component class. Each of the first binary values has u bits. It should be noted that each class prime p_p may be represented by u bits due to the following relationships:

Pp = gO-p). where 0 &lt; - r_p &lt; 2 p_p may be represented by r_p if g(r_p) is available at retrieval time r_p can be represented in u bits p_p may be represented by r_p if g(r_p) is available at retrieval time if the prime number-generating function g() is known for the following reason. When p_p is equal to g(r_p) and the prime number-generating function g() is known, then knowing r_p is sufficient to regenerate p_p by executing g() with the parameter r . Encoding r_p requires u bits (or 20 bits in the above example), while p_p requires v bits (or 44 bits in the above example). A savings in the required number of bits is realized by representing p_pas r_p.

In step 309, each of the class remainders d_p are encoded into second binary values for each component class. The second binary values may be represented by v bits. It should be noted that class remainders d_p may be represented by v bits as a result of the following relationships:

d„ = S mod p_p0&lt;p_p&lt;2'

Therefore, d_p &lt; 2^V

In step 310, the first binary value generated in step 308 is concatenated with the second binary value from step 309 to form an encoded component class partial secret, P_p, having a total of t bits (i.e., t - u + v). A component class partial secret P_p is generated for each component class.

It should be noted that the class partial secret P_p for a given component class may contain unused bits, z, due to the second binary value having less than v bits. In this case, the unused bits, z, may be populated with random noise to prevent an attacker, who knows the qualities of g(r_p), to evaluate the encoded class partial secret P_p in an attempt to determine a class partial secret, P_p. For example, when p_p is in the range 2-2^v, dp is always &lt; pp. If ppis significantly less than 2^{II. * * V}, then dp will require significantly less than v bits to encode. An attacker could make guesses about the size of pp based on the values of d_p. Adding random noise to fill the unused [v - (size of (d_p))] bits of dp helps conceal the size of p_p.

C. The SHWID For A Computer System

The strong hardware identification (SHWID) may now be configured using the class products, c_p, obtained in step 207 and the class partial secret, P_p, obtained in step 310. As shown in step 401 in FIG. 5, class strong identifications (IDs), C_p, are created for each component class, wherein C_p = c_p + P_p. In step 402, all of the class strong IDs, C_p, for the component classes are combined to form the strong hardware identification (SHWID). The resulting SHWID is stored for future retrieval. The SHWID may be stored locally (e.g., in the registry, file system, or secure store) or in an accessible remote location (e.g., a database).

It should be noted that increased security may be obtained by increasing the value of t in order to produce a class partial secret having a greater number of bits.

II. Retrieving A Secret From A Computer System Using The Strong Hardware Identification (SHWID)

The present invention is further directed to a method of retrieving or attempting to retrieve a bound secret S from a given computer hardware configuration. In one embodiment of the present invention, the method of attempting to retrieve bound secret S from a given computer hardware configuration is initiated (i) during installation of a software product, (ii) during loading of a software application already existing on a component of the hardware configuration, or (iii) both. An exemplary method for retrieving bound secret S from a hardware configuration is described in FIGS. 6-7. The steps of the exemplary method may be performed by software code within a software product on a customer's computer, similar to computer 20 described above with reference to FIG. 1.

In step 501 as shown in FIG. 6, the strong class IDs, C_p, of the strong hardware identification (SHWID) are identified for a given computer hardware configuration. For purposes of illustrating the present invention, the method of retrieving bound secret S from three separate hardware configurations, H, Hj and H₂, will be described using a previously stored strong hardware identification (SHWID) determined from hardware configuration, H. The three distinct hardware configurations comprise (i) the exact hardware configuration H to which the SHWID was issued; (ii) a hardware configuration H,, which comprises hardware configuration H having one or more component changes within an acceptable tolerance level; and (iii) hardware configuration H₂, which represents hardware configuration H having enough component changes such that hardware configuration H₂ is out of tolerance compared to hardware configuration H.

An exemplary set of strong class IDs for hardware configurations H, H_1? and H₂ is given below in Table 7.

Table 7. Exemplary Strong Class IDs For A Hardware Configuration

<td> Component Class No.</td><td> Class Description</td><td> Strong Class IDs</td>

<td> ' ι</td><td> CdRom ”</td><td> C|</td>

<td> . ~.....T ........’</td><td> Hard Disk Drive</td><td> C2</td>

<td> 3</td><td> Network Card</td><td> C3</td>

<td> 4</td><td> Display adapter device</td><td> c₄</td>

In step 502, all instances within each component class of a given hardware configuration are identified. As described above, any conventional method may be used to identify each component instance. Typically, a component instance is identified by the most unique identification string for the component. Exemplary identification strings for each component instance within sample configurations Η, H, and H₂ are shown below in Tables 8-10.

Table 8. Exemplary Component Instances For Hardware Configuration H

<td colspan="3"> Configuration H</td>

<td> Component Class No.</td><td> Class Description</td><td> Component Instances</td>

<td> 1</td><td> CdRom</td><td> {NEC CDRW24S15,” TOSHIBA DVDR ASB-1425”}</td>

<td> 2</td><td> Hard Disk Drive</td><td> {lbcdffl9, 7da90024}</td>

<td> 3</td><td> Network Card</td><td> {00b0c31b5923}</td>

<td> 4</td><td> Display adapter device</td><td> {“NVidia GeForce2 DDR”}</td>

Table 9. Exemplary Component Instances For Hardware Configurations H,

<td colspan="3"> Configuration H,</td>

<td> Component Class No.</td><td> Class Description</td><td> Component Instances</td>

<td> I</td><td> CdRom</td><td> {“NEC CORW24 S15, “SONY DVD 1221”}</td>

<td> 2</td><td> Hard Disk Drive</td><td> {8146af92}</td>

<td> 3</td><td> Network Card</td><td> {OOcOc21b5933}</td>

<td> 4</td><td> Display adapter device</td><td> {“NVidia GeForce2 DDR”}</td>

Table 10. Exemplary Component Instances For Hardware Configuration H₂

<td colspan="3"> Configuration H₂</td>

<td> Component Class No.</td><td> Class Description</td><td> Component Instances</td>

<td> 1</td><td> CdRom</td><td> {“SONY DVD 1221”}-</td>

<td> 2</td><td> Hard Disk Drive</td><td> {8146af92}</td>

<td> 3</td><td> Network Card</td><td> {00c0c21b5933}</td>

<td> 4</td><td> Display adapter device</td><td> {“NVidia GeForce2 DDR”}</td>

Once all instances within each component class of a given 5 hardware configuration are identified, the most unique identification string for each instance is retrieved as shown in step 503. The identification strings for each instance are used to generate instance primes for each component instance using a prime number-generating function /(component instance identifier), as shown in step 504. Prime number-generating function, /(component instance identifier) may be any prime number-generating function known to those of ordinary skill in the art as described above. Tables 11-13 below provides exemplary instance primes for each of the component instances within sample hardware configurations Η, H, and H₂.

Table 11. Exemplary Instance Primes, z_pq, For Sample

Hardware Configuration H

<td colspan="3"> Configuration H</td>

<td> Component Class No.</td><td> Class Description</td><td> Instance Primes</td>

<td> I</td><td> CdRom</td><td> {/(“NEC CDRW24 S15”) “ z, „ /(“TOSHIBA DVDR ASB-1425”) -</td>

<td> 2</td><td> Hard Disk Drive</td><td> {/(1 bcdffl 9) - z₂7 /(7da90024) = z₂J</td>

<td>₃</td><td> Network Card</td><td> {/(00b0c31 b5923) = }</td>

<td> 4</td><td> Display adapter device</td><td> {/(“NVidia GeForce2 DDR”) = z₄,}</td>

Table 12. Exemplary Instance Primes, Z_pq, For Sample Hardware Configuration H,

<td colspan="3"> Configuration</td>

<td> Component Class No.</td><td> Class Description</td><td> Instance Primes</td>

<td> 1</td><td> CdRom</td><td> {/(“NEC CDRW24 S15”) = j, „ /(“SONY DVD 1221”) = /,.,}</td>

<td> 2</td><td> Hard Disk Drive</td><td> (/(8146af92) - Z_{2 3}}</td>

<td> 3</td><td> Network Card</td><td> (/(00c0c2lb5933) = Z₃,}</td>

<td> 4</td><td> Display adapter ” device</td><td> (/(“NVidia GeForce2 DDR”) = Z_4J}</td>

Table 13. Exemplary Instance Primes, z_pq, For Sample Hardware Configuration H₂

<td colspan="3"> Configuration H₂</td>

<td> Component Class No.</td><td> Class Description</td><td> Instance Primes</td>

<td> I</td><td>^—’ CdRom</td><td> (/(“SONY DVD 1221”) = /,-,}</td>

<td> 2</td><td> Hard Disk Drive</td><td> {/(8146_a&lt;92) = /„}</td>

<td> 3</td><td> Network Card</td><td> {/(U0c0c21b5y33) = /₃₂}</td>

<td> 4</td><td> Display adapter device</td><td> (/(“NVidia GeForce2 DDR”) = Z_4J}</td>

It should be noted that component instance (/('‘SONY DVD 1221”} is designated zj -, given that this type of CdRom is the third type of CdRom considered in the above hardware configurations (i.e., H, H[ and H₂).

In step 505, all of the possible class partial secrets P_pq are determined, wherein P_pq equals C_p mod Z_pq. As described above, the strong class ID, C_p, for each component class results from the sum of the class product c_p plus the class partial secret P_p for each class. If the strong class ID, C_p, is divided by an instance prime Z_pq that was present in the original hardware configuration H on which the strong hardware ID (SHWID) was based, the remainder following a (mod) operation provides a possible class partial secret P . Exemplary possible class partial secrets P_pq for sample hardware configurations H, H, and H₂ are given below in Tables 14-16.

Table 14. Exemplary Possible Class Partial Secrets P For Each Component Instance In Sample Hardware Configuration H

<td colspan="3"> Configuration H</td>

<td> Component Class No.</td><td> Class Description</td><td> Possible Class Partial Secrets</td>

<td> Ί</td><td> “ CdRom .......</td><td> P,, = C, mod /, ,. P, ₂ = C, mod /, ₂</td>

<td> ' '^1</td><td> Hard Disk Drive</td><td> P₂, - C₂ mod /_2J, P_{2 2} = C₂ mod /₂₂</td>

<td> ~~ 3</td><td> Network Card</td><td> P₃, C₃ mod i₃₃</td>

<td> 4</td><td> Display adapter device</td><td> P₄, - C₄ mod i₄,</td>

Table 15. Exemplary Possible Class Partial Secrets P_pq For Each Component

Instance In Sample Hardware Configuration H,

<td colspan="3"> Configuration H,</td>

<td> Component Class No.</td><td> Class Description</td><td> Possible Class Partial Secrets</td>

<td> 1</td><td> CdRom</td><td> P,, C, mod /,,, P, ₃ = C, mod /, ₃</td>

<td> 2</td><td> Hard Disk Drive</td><td> P_{2 3} = C₂ mod i_{2 y}</td>

<td> ~ 3</td><td> Network Card</td><td> Pv ⁼ C₃ mod f ₂</td>

<td> 4</td><td> Display adapter device</td><td> P₄, = C₄ mod /₄,</td>

Ciphers by S.C. Coutinho, Chapter 7, the disclosure of which is incorporated herein by reference in its entirety.

It is impossible to determine which, if any, possible class primes and remainders match the desired hardware configuration ahead of time, so it is necessary to generate possible secrets for each permutation of possible class primes and class remainders by solving the discrete set of congruences presented by each permutation in step 507. As shown in step 508, the resultant possible secrets can be tested using ciphertext created for verification purposes. Such a process is described below.

In the present invention, known plaintext is encoded using secret S as a key to form ciphertext. Typically, an encrypted message (i.e., ciphertext) is accompanied by a verification token that lets a decipherer know that the message has been decrypted successfully. This is usually either a hash of the plaintext of the message or some chosen plaintext. In the present invention, chosen plaintext is desirably used for simplicity. So when the SHWID is generated, chosen plaintext (e.g. “This is the chosen plaintext”) is encrypted using S (i.e., as the key) to produce ciphertext. The decoder knows both the chosen plaintext and the ciphertext.

In the above situation, the validity of a candidate for S (i.e., each of the resultant possible secrets) can be verified by deciphering the ciphertext using the candidate for S' (i.e., each of the resultant possible secrets) as the key. If the resultant plaintext matches the chosen plaintext, then the candidate for S (i.e., one of the resultant possible secrets) is. in fact, S. If the resultant plaintext does not match the chosen plaintext, then the candidate for S (i.e., one of the resultant possible secrets) is not S.

As shown in FIG. 7, if the known plaintext is revealed by decoding the ciphertext using the possible secret, then the secret S has been found and the method proceeds to step 510, wherein the program allows a given software product to be loaded or installed on the given computer hardware configuration. Otherwise, the method proceeds to step 509. If more permutations exist that have not been tested, the method returns to step 507. Otherwise, the SHWID does not match and the method proceeds to step 511, which prevents the loading or installation of the software product.

Exemplary results for sample configurations Η, H, and H₂ are given below in Tables 20-22.

Table 20. Exemplary Results Showing The Number of Matches Between

Possible Secret S_{p q} and Actual Secret S' For Sample

Hardware Configuration H

<td colspan="3"> Configuration H</td>

<td> Component Class No.</td><td> Class Description</td><td> Possible Matches Between Possible Secret S' and Actual Secret S</td>

<td> 1</td><td> CdRom</td><td> S' = ¢/, , (mod p,,) OR S = i/_{i 2} (mod p, ₂)</td>

<td> 2</td><td> Hard Disk Drive</td><td> S- Y, (mod p_2&gt;1) OR S = ^2,2 (^m°d P2.2)</td>

<td> ..... 3</td><td> Network Card</td><td> -S’= ^j (^mod P3.1)</td>

<td> 4</td><td> Display adapter device</td><td> 5 = ^.i (mod p_4J)</td>

<td colspan="3"> Result - Single solution, 4 of 4 match - S</td>

5--—“

Table 21. Exemplary Results Showing The Number of Matches Between Possible Secret S_{p q} and Actual Secret S' For Sample

Hardware Configuration H,

<td colspan="3"> Configuration Hj</td>

<td> Component Class No.</td><td> Class Description</td><td> Possible Matches Between Possible Secret S_{p q} and Actual Secret S'</td>

<td> 1</td><td> CdRom</td><td> S’ - d_} j (mod pj,) OR S - (mod p, ₃)</td>

<td> 2</td><td> Hard Disk Drive^H</td><td> S' = d_{2 3} (mod p₂₃)</td>

<td> 3</td><td> Network Card</td><td> S' = di ₂ (mod p_u)</td>

<td> 4</td><td> Display adapter device</td><td> (mod p_4J)</td>

<td colspan="3"> Result - Two possible solutions depending on use of dpi (2 of 4 match, findS) or di 3 (1 of 4 match, find Zfi</td>

Table 22. Exemplary Results Showing Tbe Number of Matches Between

Possible Secret S_pq and Actual Secret S For Sample

Hardware Configuration H,

<td colspan="3"> Configuration H₂</td>

<td> Component Class No.</td><td> Class Description</td><td> Possible Matches Between Possible Secret S_{p q} and Actual Secret 5</td>

<td> ” Γ “</td><td> CdRom</td><td> S ⁼ d_L3 (mod p_L3)</td>

<td> 2</td><td> Hard Disk Drive</td><td> 5’ = (mod p_{2 3})</td>

<td> 3</td><td> Network Card</td><td> 5=¾ (mod P3.2)</td>

<td> 4</td><td> Display adapter device</td><td> 5=¾ (mod p_{4 l})</td>

<td colspan="3"> Result - Single solution, I oj 4 match, jind Zj</td>

As shown in Table 20 above, original hardware configuration H results in four out of four matches between possible secrets S and actual secret S'. As shown in Table 21 above, hardware configuration H, has a maximum of two matches out of four possible matches depending on which class remainder J_pq is used to determine possible secret S. In this sample hardware configuration, if tn is equal to 2, the program allows bound secret S to be retrieved, and a software product to be loaded or installed on hardware configuration H,. However, in hardware configuration H₂ as shown in Table 22 above, only one out of four possible matches occur. If m is equal to 2, false non-secrets Z, are produced, and the method prevents a particular software product from being loaded or installed on hardware configuration H₂.

The method steps described above and illustrated in FIGS. 2, 3-4, 5, and 6-7 may be performed locally or at a remote location. Typically, a customer purchases a software product that can run on a given computer, such as computer 20 shown in FIG. 1. The software product may be a shrink-wrap product having a software program stored on a transportable computer-readable medium, such as a CD-ROM or floppy diskette. Alternatively, the software product may be delivered electronically over a network, such as a local area network (LAN) 51 or a wide area network (WAN) 52. The customer loads the software product onto the computer 20 as a program stored in system memory 22.

During a software product installation, the customer is typically prompted to enter a portion of the software product identification (PID) for the software product into computer 20. The PID may be, for example, a CD key printed on a label of the shrink-wrap package. The customer enters the PID, which is associated with a software program of the software product. The PID is stored locally on computer 20 and/or remotely at an accessible location, either on a local area network (LAN) 51 or a wide area network (WAN) 52 with a third party, such as an activation authority.

As described above, during installation of the software product, a strong hardware identification (SHWID) is also generated using code within the software product or triggered by the installation of the software product. The strong hardware identification (SHWID) generated by the method of the present invention is associated with the software product identification (PID) and stored along with the software product identification (PID) locally on computer 20 and/or remotely at an accessible location, either on a local area network (LAN) 51 or a wide area network (WAN) 52, such as with a third party activation authority.

As part of the installation process, the customer may be required to activate the software product with an activation authority. This authority might be, for example, the product manufacturer or an authorized third party. The activation process is intended to force the customer to activate the software product (i) for installation and use on a specific computer or (ii) for installation and use according to terms of a product licensing agreement. Such an activation process is described in detail in U.S. Patent No. 6,243,468, assigned to Microsoft Corporation (Redmond, WA), the contents of which are hereby incorporated in its entirety by reference.

The strong hardware identification (SHWID) generated by the method of the present invention and the software product identification (PID) may be stored locally on computer 20 and/or remotely at an accessible location, either on a local area network (LAN) 51 or a wide area network (WAN) 52 with an activation authority. Desirably, the software product automatically displays a graphical user interface (Ul) dialog window when it is first launched, which prompt the user to initiate a connection with the activation server to activate itself. The activation server maintains a database to store received strong hardware identifications (SHWIDs) and their associated software product identifications (PIDs).

The strong hardware identification (SHWID) and associated software product identification (PID) for a given software product may be stored for an indefinite period of time until the software product is reinstalled onto another computer or launched on the first computer (i.e., the computer used during the initial installation). When the same software product is re-installed onto another computer or launched on the first computer, code on the software product initiates a method of determining whether a software product can be used on a computer system according to the present invention. The software product retrieves the previously stored strong hardware identification (SHWID) associated with the software product identification (PID) of the software product either from local computer 20 or from a remote location via a local area network (LAN) 51 or a wide area network (WAN) 52. A determination is made using the previously stored strong hardware identification (SHWID) as to whether the software product can be used on a computer hardware configuration as described above.

When the use of a software product is denied due to significant changes in the hardware configuration of a first computer (i.e., the computer used during the initial installation), a dialog box may be provided to the customer indicating that the use of the software product is being denied, and that further information regarding future use of the software product may be obtained from a given source.

III. Other Uses of A Strong Hardware Identification (SHWID)

In addition to the uses described above, the strong hardware identification (SHWID) of the present invention may be used to encrypt/decrypt data for use only on a specific hardware configuration.

While the specification has been described in detail with respect to specific embodiments thereof, it will be appreciated that those skilled in the art, upon attaining an understanding of the foregoing, may readily conceive of alterations to, variations of, and equivalents to these embodiments. Accordingly, the scope of the present invention should be assessed as that of the appended claims and any equivalents thereto.