Untitled record
Abstract
A key and lock device comprising a key (10) having a first electronic device (14) and a lock (20) having a second electronic device (24). The key and lock store secret information, some of which is unique to each device. The key and lock exchange random numbers via interfaces (15,25) and perform a calculation in each electronic device based on the random number and the secret information. The electronic control device (40) is in an unobstructed state if a comparison of the calculations in the electrical circuits gives the desired result.

Term
Term ended
Expired 1 November 2021, 4.9 years ago.
- Priority
- Filed
- Granted
- Expired
- Today
18 claims: 1 independent, 17 dependent
- 1Kröfur 1. Lykla- og lásbúnaður sem er með lykil og lás, og samanstendur af:- fjölda fyrsta búnaðar (10) sem tilheyrir flokki fyrsta búnaðar, þar sem hver einstakur fyrsti búnaður (10) er með - fyrsta rafræna gjörva (16), - fyrsta minni (17,18) sem tengist áðurnefnda fyrsta rafræna gjörvanum, og - fyrsta tengi (15) sem tengist áðurnefnda fýrsta rafræna gjörvanum, - annan búnað (20) sem er með - annan rafrænan gjörva (26), - annað minni (27,28) sem tengist viö áðurnefnda aðra rafeindarás, og - annað tengi (25) sem tengist áðurnefndum öðrum rafræna gjörvanum og breytt hefur verið til að geta unníð vélrænt með áðumefnda fyrsta tenginu (15) þegar áðurnefndum lykli er stungiö i lásinn til þess að flytja upplýsingar milli áðurnefnds lykils og láss, og - orkugjafa (13), - rafrænan stöðvunarbúnaö (40) sem breytt hefur verið til aö hindra notkun lássins þegar heimildarlausum lykli er stungið í lásinn, - þar sem fyrsta minni (17, 18) hefur verið breytt til að geyma opið auðkenni (PKID;PLID) og leynilegt auðkenni (SKID;SLID), sem einkennist af því að - lykla- og lásbúnaður geyma vélrænan stöðvunarbúnað, - fyrsta minninu hefur veriö breytt til þess að geyma eitt leynilegt auðkenni, - leynilega auðkennið er hið sama fyrir fyrsta búnað sem tilheyra flokki fyrsta búnaðar, - annað minnið (27, 28) hefur verið breytt til þess að geyma opna auðkennið (PKID_1 ;PLID_1) og leynilega auðkennið (SKID_1;SLID_1) 15 fyrir leyfðan fyrsta búnað, - fyrsti rafræni gjörvinn (16) er skípulagður þanníg að hann auðkennir sjálfan sig gagnvart öðrum rafræna gjörva (26) með almenna auðkenninu (PKID;PLID), og - fyrsti og annar rafræni gjörvinn (16, 26) eru skipulagðir þannig að þeir skiptast á handahófstölu (RND), og eru skipulagðir til að reikna viðkomandi dulkóðuð orö (KÓÐI_LYKILL, KÓÐI_LÁS) og nota til þess aö minnsta kosti hluta af leyniauðkenninu (SKID;SLID) og að minnsta kosti hluta af handahófstölunni (RND), - þar sem rafræni stöövunarbúnaðurinn (40) er færður í stöðu sem hindrar ekki notkun ef dulkóðuðu orðin sem reiknuð voru Í annars vegar fyrstu rafeindarás og hins vegar annarri rafeindarás, (16, 26) eru nákvæmlega eins.
- 2Lykla- og lásbúnaðurinn samkvæmt kröfu 1, þar sem fyrsti búnaður (10) eru lyklar og annar búnaður (20) er lás.
- 3Lykla- og lásbúnaðurinn samkvæmt kröfu 1, þarsem fyrsti búnaður (10) eru lásar og annar búnaður (20) er lykill.
- 4Lykla- og lásbúnaður samkvæmt kröfu 1, þar sem fyrstu (16) og aðrir (26) rafraenu gjörvarnir eru skipulagðir þannig að þeir dulrita dulkóðaða orðið (KÓÐI_LYKILL,KÓÐI_LÁS) áðuren þær upplýsingar eru sendar áfram.
- 5Lykla- og lásbúnaðurinn samkvæmt kröfu 4, þar sem dulkóðaða orðið (KÓÐI_LYKILL, KÓÐI_LÁS) er dulritað með notkun að minnsta kosti hluta DES dulritunar iykils (Kdes
- 6)6. Lykla- og lásbúnaðurinn samkvæmt kröfu 4, þar sem dulkóðaða orðið (KÓÐI_LYKILL, KÓÐI_LÁS) er dulritað með að minnsta kosti hluta leynilegs auðkennis (SKID, SLID).
- 7Lykla- og lásbúnaðurinn samkvæmt kröfu 4, þar sem dulkóðaða orðið (KÓÐI_LYKILL, KÓÐI_LÁS) er dulritað með að minnsta kosti hluta handahófsnúmers (RND).
- 8Lykla- og lásbúnaður samkvæmt kröfu 4, þar sem engin aðgerð er fyrir aflestur leynilegra upplýsinga (Koes)·
- 9Lykla- og lásbúnaður samkvæmt kröfu 1, þar sem fyrsti og annar rafræni gjörvinn (16,26) eru nákvæmlega eins að því er varðar hönnun á vélbúnaði þeirra.
- 10Lykla- og lásbúnaður samkvæmt kröfu 1, sem geymir að minnsta kosti eitt fölsunarvarið minni (18,28).
- 11Lykla- og lásbúnaður samkvæmt kröfu 10, þar sem leynilegt auðkenni (SKID, SLID) er geymt í fölsunarvörðu minni (18,28).
- 12Lykla- og lásbúnaður samkvæmt kröfu 2, þar sem fyrsta tengi (15) er staðsett á enda lykilskeggsins (12) á lyklinum.
- 13Lykla- og lásbúnaðurinn samkvæmt kröfu 2, þar sem fyrsta (15) tengi er staðsett á brún g riphluta (11) lykils til að samverka með tengli á ytra yfirborði láss.
- 14Lykla- og lásbúnaður samkvæmt kröfu 1, þar sem lykillinn virkar endurtekið sjaldnar þegar þörf er að skipta um orkugjafa (13).
- 15Lykla- og lásbúnaður samkvæmt kröfu 1, þar sem innsigli eða op með háu öryggisstigi er notað fyrir orkugjafann (13).
- 16Lykla- og lásbúnaður samkvæmt kröfu 1, þar sem orkugjafinn (13), t.d rafhlaða, er settur í lykilinn.
- 17Lykla- og lásbúnaður samkvæmt kröfu 1, þar sem orkugjafinn (13), t.d. rafhlaða, er settur í lásinn.
- 18Lykla- og lásbúnaður samkvæmt kröfu 1, þar sem fyrsta (15) og ööru (25) tengi hefur verið breytt til þess að flytja raforku.
Independent claims18
96 paragraphs in 2 sections, as filed
Description
SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION The invention generally relates to key and locking devices, and in particular to electro-mechanical key and locking devices and to key equipment.
BACKGROUND
0002] Various types of locking devices that use electrical equipment are already known to enhance the safety of the lock and to provide effective management, handling and supervision of keys and employees. Nevertheless, demand for high-security locking systems is increasingly increasing and easy to operate.
German Patent Application OE196 00 556 A1, corresponding to the United Kingdom Patent Application GB 2 309 046, discloses a lock that sends a random key to a key that uses cryptographic algorithm on the random number and sends encrypted words back to the lock. In the lock, the encrypted words are compared to the coded word requested and which is generated by applying the same cryptographic algorithm to the random number. A verification mark is formed as long as the encrypted word and the encrypted words requested are largely but not necessarily completely unanimous. The key and lock system described has some limitations and deficiencies. Transmission between key and lock is carried out wirelessly, so that the message sent is added. As a result, the level of security decreases because of a certain inconsistency between the results calculated in the lock and the key. This may be acceptable when the ticket is sorted, as in this case, but not in the case of a normal lock. Furthermore, the key is limited for use with one particular lock and, consequently, the system is unusable for use in a headlamp system.
European Patent Application EP 0 816 600 discloses a single key system consisting of locks, keys and encoder. The lock has an electronic channel that holds a password and identification code for the keys with certain restrictions. The keys have electronic channels that store passwords for one or a few keys. However, the disadvantage of the single-lane system described is that it is possible to read or retrieve data, thus reducing the level of security.
EP 0 427 465 A discloses a data bank-free security system having a smartphone card and a host computer 600 comprising a authentication device that stores a cryptographic version of a secret code associated with an approved smart card. This prevents the need for personal computer numbers for the user who wants to access the computer on the computer.
EP 0 492 692 A discloses a tarred access system for access to a vehicle. With the use of complex randomization, you can exclude the problems associated with the transmission of radio frequency signals to RF frequencies, which allow you to listen and record these signals in order to relay the songs to use the vehicle.
SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION One of the objects of this invention is to create electrically-operated locking devices of the type mentioned at the beginning, since the user does not find any difference between the use of a bans and a conventional completely mechanical lock.
Another object of the invention is to provide locking devices that are safer and more reliable than other locks known.
Another goal is to create a locker where keys allocation is made easier.
Another goal is to facilitate or grant access permissions to files with the key.
Another aim is to create electro-mechanical locking devices that reliably transfer data and energy between the key and files and with a slight delay in the use of a file.
Another aim is to provide locking devices that facilitate the replacement and upgrading of the locking device of the engine-mechanical locking device in the electrically-operated locking device.
Another aim is to create locking devices as the key system is not limited by mechanical interference.
The invention is based on the understanding that no change of secret code passes between the key and the lock, but the placeholder is the random one that forms the necessary information to determine whether the key is authorized. This random number is used together with a lock or key recognition f to achieve a lock and key combination with improved features.
Accordingly, according to the invention, there are provided key and locking devices as defined in claim 1.
A further preferred embodiment is defined in the dependent claims.
The invention offers key and locking devices and key devices, but with that device at least one of the above-mentioned problems associated with the prior art technology is or eliminated.
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS The invention is now described, by way of example, with reference to the accompanying drawings, in which:
FIGURE 1 is a perspective view of a lock and a key according to the invention;
FIGURE 2a is a side view of the first embodiment of a key according to the invention;
FIG. 2b is a side view of a second embodiment of a key according to the invention;
FIGURE 3 is a cash register of the electronic probe in the key and locking device according to the invention;
FIGURES 4a and 4b are perspective views of the electronic information components of a key and the locks respectively;
FIGURE 5 is a flip chart describing the implementation of the new authentication process, and 25
FIGURE 6 is a flow chart that describes another embodiment of the new authentication process.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION Hereinafter, a detailed description of the invention will be given. MYND1 shows the KEY and lock 20. Both of these parts are in the shape of a familiar device. This means that a user familiar with conventional locks is not difficult to use the lock according to the invention. This also means replacing the current traditional booklet for the file book shown on MYND1. This way you can upgrade a traditional, completely mechanical lock, without any problems.
Preferably, the lock is "link sensing" or "independent<sup>0</sup> a file that offers the option of using the keys with the correct mechanical and electronic code.
One feature of the locking device is that it can block the access of keys to the lock by electronic means. A correct key can rotate the file as long as it is fully intact, and in both directions, depending on the spacebar or the locking box in which the file is in. Once the key has been removed, a new authentication method begins when a key is reinstated.
The locking strip is composed of a casing 21 and a core or connector 22 which is inserted into a cavity in the casing 21 as usual. The file also has a conventional mechanical barrier component (not shown). Electronic barrier and actuator 40 (shown in FIGURE 3) are in list 22 where the role of the activator is to control the barrier. The mechanical and electronic barrier function is to prevent the use of the lock if the key inserted in the lock is incorrectly mechanical and / or electronic.
Consequently, in this case, the user will not be affected by the use of a conventional mechanical key. He or she puts his / her own key in the file and turns it over until the lock or lock is retracted (or moved to the locked position).
The only difference is that the key may have a screen or other display showing the remaining energy in the battery, thus indicating whether the battery has been replaced when it is necessary to replace it.
The type of mechanical barrier can be any kind of ordinary object, such as a rails, sidelines, bubbles and spools or with the loosening of the file.
The default position of the lock is that locking is always on (closed). This ensures that there is no unauthorized access to an unauthorized person
eg if there is a power failure. Locking position should be secured mechanically when the key is extracted from the file or when it has been converted to the position for insertion of a key in the case of a slider.
The key 10 comprises a gripping element 11 and a key bend 12, see Figure 2a.
The grip part consists of a battery 13 and a circuit 14 consisting of a processor with a connected memory, etc., but its functionality will be described later with reference to FIG. 3. The keychain 12 is provided on the outer end with a connector 15 specifically adapted to work with a connector in the lock 20. The circuitry receives power from the battery 13 shown with the interconnection line on FIGURE 2a and which is also connected to the connector 15.
Another embodiment of the key according to the invention is described in FIGURE 2b. In the figure, a connector 15 is located on the edge of the grip portion 11 so that it interacts with a connector on the surface of the lock 20. In all other respects, the connector 15 of FIGURE 2b acts as shown in Figure 2a.
The battery 13 attached to the key 10 is any of the usual batteries tested in stores selling photocopiers and / or from, in pharmacies
etc. The battery is attached to the standard battery compartment. This way you can easily replace the used battery. The only tool to use is a miniature or similar item. In another embodiment, a seal or security opening with a high level of safety is used when considered as youthful.
Data is not erased and there is no effect on functionality if the battery is replaced. However, a clock must be set after replacing the battery. Clock setting is performed by, for example. a key is inserted into a key programming unit.
When the battery has become almost empty, the user is informed that the battery must be replaced. This is done with, for example, an LCD display, a bell or an incremental number of errors in opening barriers. The temperature of the sensor is used to compensate for low voltage and prevent the battery from giving too early warning signals.
Opening barriers occur when the electronic device detects too low a voltage level at normal temperature. The key can only be opened in either experiment, and less often, depending on the line. In this way, the user is notified that there is time to replace the battery.
Electronic Components Electronic circuits in the key 10 and in the lock 20 will be described below accurately.
The electronic device is well suited to any kind of handling, illegal reading or changes in information. For this purpose, precautions have been taken to ensure and isolate all electronic units against external handling, operations and environmental impact. For example, the processor has been designed with measures to protect the integrity of the memory in the chip.
The electronic device of the key 10 will now be described with reference to FIGS. 2a, 2b and 3.
Figure 3 shows that the electronic device of the key includes processor 16 and connected
S memory 17 and 18 and analog electronic channel 19. Battery 13 is connected to the processor
16. It is likewise connected to the connector 15, which allows the energy to be transferred to the battery in the key over the electronic device of the lock.
Processor 16 may be any conventional type. However, it is preferable that it be a custom electron beam that is made of the parts necessary to perform the important algorithm discussed below. Also, this will further increase the speed at which authentication processes are performed, thus preventing unintentional delays in the use of the lock. This encryption algorithm can be run to all or part of any hardware or software within the processor.
[003B] It is a key component 19 of the electronic device of the key, which acts as an interface to the digital electronic device. The corresponding analogue part 29 is locked, see below. In the lock, the analog device 29 acts as an interface with the actuator 40.
The parallel parts also perform various other additional functions, such as sensing that a key is in contact with a lock. They also provide a very important security role; They protect the electronic device and the actuator against the handling / opening of the lock or key by electronic attacks, such as high voltage, current, repeated code tests, etc. This protection can be achieved by deleting the sliding part of the key, and / or the lock, ensuring that the actuator does not move into an obstacle-free position.
FIGURE 3 also shows the memory 17, 18 associated with the processor. The role of the first memory 17 in the key is to store data regarding the key identifier, the badge identifier, etc., see below. The second memory 18 is my fake myth that is being protected from external attempts to read its content. in my memory 18 all secret information is stored, for example, a code for encryption. The software could also be stored in memory for further security.
For security reasons, all important information, which is memorized, is 17.18 encrypted by using the algorithm discussed below. For this reason, it is difficult to interpret the data in the unlikely event that an individual could be able to extract the contents of the memory in bulk.
The electronic device of the lock 20 is almost identical to the one in the key 10, with the exception that there is no battery in the lock, and as an option, an additional electron lock for drive actuator (not shown). The interface 25 has been modified to operate with interface 15 to enable transmission of power and data between key 10 and lock 20. The interface between interface 15, 25 is thus used to transfer both power and data. The key itself, made of a suitable metal, acts as a groundbreaker. Connector 25 is connected to processor 26 with associated memories 27, 28. The hardware of the processor 26 is exactly the same as the one in the processor 16. Thus, it can be achieved at a cost, and it is easier to control the electronic equipment of the keys and the iOS.
One advantage of key and locking devices according to the invention is such that the corresponding key and lock flaps can be used. The microprocessor can operate in different modes, with and without battery connection, with and without continuous power, either lock or key, whether it controls an actuator or not, etc. thus lowering costs. This way you can have a battery in a key, in a file, or in a key and file.
The electronic device port access has been referenced to the memory. To renew the status, a system key is used together with the application software to reset the keys to the file. It will then be possible to test the status with a test field.
The actuator's standard action is to release the shutdown device by electronic means (open) and to mechanically shutdown the device again when the key is removed from the file. Restarting of the equipment can also be performed when the connector is returned to the locked position in the file. The electronic device can also be used to re-check the restraint system electronically on request.
Event Elements All keys and locks have a unique electronic identifier or code that is composed of several information items that control the function of keys and locks.
Details of the key or lock will now be described with reference to PICTURES. 4a and 4b respectively.
Electronic codes are divided into different parts for use by manufacturers, distributors and customers. Some common parts are for common use. In the headlamp system, but the secret part is used for secret information.
For the purposes of this invention, each code for electronykia consists of the following important parts, see Figure 4a:
• Distribution key identification number (PKID)
Identifier Number Secret Code (SKID) • Encryption key (Kdes) Similarly, each electronic lock code includes the following components, see FIGURE
4b;
• General Locker (PLID) • Secret Lock Code (SLID) • Encryption Key (Koes) Basic Elements will now be described in more detail.
PKID / PLID - Push / Lock Identifier PKID / PLID uniquely identifies equipment belonging to the headlamp system. As the name suggests, this information is public, ie no additional safeguards are taken to prevent anyone from reading this information.
SKID / SLID - Secret Identifier / Lock The secret identifier of the device is a random number, which in the chosen embodiment is the same for one device category. As the name suggests, this information is obscured by an outsider, ie. are unreadable information and are used within I equipment.
KnFs - Encryption key Kdes has an encryption key selected at random. In the desired embodiment, DES encryption algorithm is used, in part because of its speed, and then the other three-digit DES (3DES).
(The requested embodiment is Kdes identical to all equipment of the headlamp system.
Kdes can not be read in any way outside and is used in computational processes implemented within the key and locking device. This is a very important feature as this prevents the possibility of backing up a key only by reading the content content in a lesser way.
Kdes can be used (authentication processes that are performed between different devices as in the type described with reference to FIGURE 6. Thus, both key and corresponding lock must have the same Kdes in order to use the key with the lock. Otherwise, the authorization process will fail, as will be explained later.
Source table In each lock, the source is saved in electronic memory. The Source Party determines which key locks on the rows defines. Settings and functionality will now be considered.
In its basic form, the source code simply lists the keys authorized in the respective lock, see Figure 5 under the heading "LOUT." Thus, the PKDI key inserted in the lock must be in the list of household keys to enable to install the authentication process. A key is registered based on its unique authentication, determined by PKID, as explained.
As already mentioned, the corresponding secret ID of the SKID is stored because of the key involved when the key is entered in the table. In the desired embodiment, SKID is identical to all keys in one class of keys and is used for security reasons. Unable to read SKID of keys or locks without having to meet specific authentication processes with a system key.
Authentication process In applications where a source is stored in the file memory to control access permissions at the door, authentication or authentication is performed. First, the basic process will be explained below with reference to FIGURE 5, where steps implemented in key switching devices 14 are displayed on the left and steps performed (the electronic device of the lock is displayed on the right. Before starting the authentication process, the key 10 in question inserted into file 20.
In this example, the PKID is the key inserted in the file "1234" and SKID is "0017". PLID is "9876." The list of authorized keys at the lock has PLID and SLID for all integer keys, ie .PKID_1 and SKID_1 for the first key, PK, D_2 for, and SKID_2 for next key, etc. In the example, data on the first key correspond to data on the key I have suggested.
First, in step 100, the PKID is retrieved from key memory 17 and sent to the electronic device of the lock 24. In this example, information "1234", which is public information, is transmitted. This information is received and processed therefrom. The electronic device of the lock 241 step No. 200, which is searched for in the documentation table to determine whether the received PKID identifier corresponds to any number assigned to the table. The received PKID corresponding to PKID_1 and the authentication process can thus be held Continue to step 210.
At step 210, the electronic device of the lock creates a random word RND, which is "4711" in this example. This random word is sent to the electronic device of the key in step 220, where you get it, step 110. Both key and lock electronics now contain information about RND SKID.
In the following steps, 120 for the key and 230 for the lock, there are encrypted words, on the one hand, CODE_LINE and, on the other hand, CODE_LAY, calculated. In this simplified example, cryptic words are calculated as droplets of RND and SKID, and as a simple addition to RND and SKID. This gives the following calculation:
RND4711
SKID 0017 Code 4728 In step 130, the electronic key key calculates the encrypted word KODE_LIKKILL, "4728", to the lock, which in step 240 receives the transmission and processes the information. In the electronic mode of the lock, then KODIK_LIKKILL and KÓÐI_LÖS are compared together in step 250. If you have the same code, the authentication process is complete and the actuator 40 moves in an obstacle-free state.
Thus, the processors 16 and 26 have the key and each lock code and algorithm. When randomized invitations are sent from lock to key, calculations begin in each processor 16 and 26. The results of the calculations are compared and are exactly the same as the electronic stop device is activated with the aid of the actuator 40.
Thus, the operation of keys and lock can be described as follows:
Key operations (random, secret) = result (key)
Operation of lock (random, secret) = result (file)
If the result (key) = result (register) then in LAGI!
In another embodiment of the authentication process according to the invention, the aforementioned Kdes encryption key is put into operation. Induction Kdes adds another security level. This other embodiment will now be described with reference to Figure 6, where the steps are numbered like IMYND 5 but with an additional code number.
When the encrypted word CODE_LOCK has been created with the key, it is encrypted, see step 130. This encryption is a mix Kdes. SKID, and RND used for dolphin. This provides the means for a safer transfer of information between key 10 and lock 20. After moving from key 10 to lock 20, the code is encrypted by a code KDE, using the information Kdes. SKID_1 and RND stored (the lock and comparison continue as in the first embodiment in steps 250 'and 260'.
Additional features may be added to the processes described above referring to MYNDA 5 and 6. For example, PLID can also be transmitted with RND I step 220. These additional information can be used in more than one way. In the first place, they could be used to update the revision path in the key, ie. to create a list of alia locks where the key has been used. Alternatively, a list may be in the key memory where all locks on which the key is entered are registered. If PKID is not found in the list I key, a authentication process is interrupted in step 110.
In the illustrated examples, the random number RND has been calculated using the electronic device of the lock. However, it is known that these calculations can also be performed with the electronic equipment of the key.
In the examples described, SKID and RND were used as variables when calculating the encrypted words. It is known that other information modules can also be used. For example, you can store a list of authorized locks in the key, with PUD and SLID information units stored in the list. Instead, or in addition, the use of SKID to calculate the encrypted word, you can use SLID. This can be especially convenient in systems with industrial locks with multiple locks but few keys.
The calculator described and used to calculate the encrypted words is very simple to maintain clarity and to be easily understood. It is known that a highly sophisticated algorithm will be used in practice.
S It has been claimed that the total information r is used, for example, to calculate the encrypted words. It is known that only part of the information can be used without sacrificing security. On the contrary, if only a part of a secret identifier is used, it could actually increase the level of security, in the event that an identity-denied person gets access to that secret identifier.
Thanks to the built-in security of key and capability according to the invention, all attacks need to be used by very expensive equipment controlled by highly skilled people with great knowledge to succeed. All such successful attacks do not adversely affect the use of systems other than the system under attack. The system is solved with a new system or it is completely rewritten, which means that similar methods should be used in a new attack should it succeed. In order to ensure such security, there is dual authentication / authentication in the communication between keys and files. In addition, you can use real randomization to further enhance security.
The desired embodiments of the invention have been described above. A person skilled in the art realizes that key and locking devices can be modified according to the invention without departing from the scope of the invention as described in the claims. Thus, it should be at least 17.18 and 27.28 and / or analogue parts of 19.29, the respective 16 and 26 instruments could be integrated, or may be separate flaps depending on the security requirements.
Single battery 13 has been shown in the key. However, since there is a battery in both the key and the lock, there is no need to transfer power through the connectors 15,25.
Contents2
4 sheets
Sheet 1 Sheet 2 Sheet 3 Sheet 4
150 members in 29 offices
Priority claims11
| Document | Office | Kind | Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0000794 | Sweden | A | |
| 0000794 | Sweden | A | |
| 0000795 | Sweden | A | |
| 0000795 | Sweden | A | |
| 0000899 | Sweden | W | |
| 0000899 | Sweden | W | |
| 00007955 | – | – | – |
| PCTSE0000899 | – | – | – |
| SE20000000794 | – | – | – |
| SE20000000795 | – | – | – |
| WO2000SE00899 | – | – | – |
Members150
| Document | Office | Kind | |
|---|---|---|---|
| SE9901643D0 | Sweden | D0 | |
| SE0000794D0 | Sweden | D0 | |
| SE0000795D0 | Sweden | D0 | |
| CA2371179A1 | Canada | A1 | |
| WO0068536A1 | World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) | A1 | |
| AU4792800A | Australia | A | |
| SE0000794L | Sweden | L | |
| SE0000795L | Sweden | L | |
| CA2401210A1 | Canada | A1 | |
| CA2401346A1 | Canada | A1 | |
| US2001021977A1 | United States of America | A1 | |
| WO0166887A1 | World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) | A1 | |
| WO0166888A1 | World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) | A1 | |
| AU3962601A | Australia | A | |
| AU3962701A | Australia | A | |
| US2001028298A1 | United States of America | A1 | |
| IS6142A | Iceland | A | |
| NO20015433D0 | Norway | D0 | |
| NO20015433L | Norway | L | |
| BR0010334A | Brazil | A | |
| EP1181424A1 | European Patent Office (EPO) | A1 | |
| TW482855B | Taiwan Province of China | B | |
| CZ20013987A3 | Czechia | A3 | |
| KR20020033620A | Republic of Korea | A | |
| CN1350611A | China | A | |
| SE517464C2 | Sweden | C2 | |
| SE517465C2 | Sweden | C2 | |
| IL146168D0 | Israel | D0 | |
| IS6541A | Iceland | A | |
| IS6542A | Iceland | A | |
| NO20024312D0 | Norway | D0 | |
| NO20024313D0 | Norway | D0 | |
| HU0202020A2 | Hungary | A2 | |
| HUP0202020A2 | Hungary | A2 | |
| SK16042001A3 | Slovakia | A3 | |
| NO20024312L | Norway | L | |
| NO20024313L | Norway | L | |
| EP1261790A1 | European Patent Office (EPO) | A1 | |
| EP1261791A1 | European Patent Office (EPO) | A1 | |
| HK1045864A1 | Hong Kong, China | A1 | |
| NZ521011A | New Zealand | A | |
| NZ521012A | New Zealand | A | |
| JP2002544415A | Japan | A | |
| ZA200108643B | South Africa | B | |
| NZ514985A | New Zealand | A | |
| EE200100585A | Estonia | A | |
| HU0204497D0 | Hungary | D0 | |
| IL151630D0 | Israel | D0 | |
| IL151631D0 | Israel | D0 | |
| HU0204497A2 | Hungary | A2 | |
| HUP0204497A2 | Hungary | A2 | |
| CN1416493A | China | A | |
| CN1416494A | China | A | |
| CZ20023360A3 | Czechia | A3 | |
| CZ20023361A3 | Czechia | A3 | |
| PL351620A1 | Poland | A1 | |
| HU0300118A2 | Hungary | A2 | |
| HUP0300118A2 | Hungary | A2 | |
| BR0109083A | Brazil | A | |
| BR0109084A | Brazil | A | |
| ZA200206858B | South Africa | B | |
| MXPA01011232A | Mexico | A | |
| TW542956B | Taiwan Province of China | B | |
| TW543313B | Taiwan Province of China | B | |
| ZA200206862B | South Africa | B | |
| JP2003526031A | Japan | A | |
| JP2003526032A | Japan | A | |
| SK14472002A3 | Slovakia | A3 | |
| HU222702B1 | Hungary | B1 | |
| SK14462002A3 | Slovakia | A3 | |
| HK1054255A1 | Hong Kong, China | A1 | |
| HK1054256A1 | Hong Kong, China | A1 | |
| EE200200512A | Estonia | A | |
| EE200200513A | Estonia | A | |
| RU2002127119A | Russian Federation | A | |
| RU2002127121A | Russian Federation | A | |
| AU771848B2 | Australia | B2 | |
| AU2001239627B2 | Australia | B2 | |
| PL357861A1 | Poland | A1 | |
| PL358013A1 | Poland | A1 | |
| RU2237143C2 | Russian Federation | C2 | |
| EP1181424B1 | European Patent Office (EPO) | B1 | |
| AT278090T | Austria | T | |
| ATE278090T1 | Austria | T1 | |
| DE60014362D1 | Germany | D1 | |
| US6822552B2 | United States of America | B2 | |
| AU2001239626B2 | Australia | B2 | |
| DK1181424T3 | Denmark | T3 | |
| CN1187510C | China | C | |
| PT1181424E | Portugal | E | |
| ES2230110T3 | Spain | T3 | |
| HK1045864B | Hong Kong, China | B | |
| IL146168A | Israel | A | |
| RU2261314C2 | Russian Federation | C2 | |
| RU2261315C2 | Russian Federation | C2 | |
| DE60014362T2 | Germany | T2 | |
| HU224668B1 | Hungary | B1 | |
| CN1239801C | China | C | |
| HU224790B1 | Hungary | B1 | |
| EP1261790B1 | European Patent Office (EPO) | B1 |
Numbers
- Publication, DOCDB
- 2327
- Publication, EPODOC
- IS2327B
- Application
- 6142
- Application, DOCDB
- 6142
- Application, EPODOC
- IS20010006142
Titles2
- English
- Key and locking equipment
- Icelandic
- Lykla- og lásbúnaður
Classification
- IPC, 1
- E05B49 00