Generating keys for protection in next generation mobile networks
Abstract
A method comprising: obtaining keys for an authentication process of a first network during an initial access of a user equipment (10) to a second network and / or during a handover process of a user equipment (10) from the first network to the second network, wherein the keys to the authentication process of the first network are produced based on a random value used in the authentication process of the first network; and producing a set of associated keys for an authentication process to be performed in the second network based on the keys of the authentication process of the first network and identities of network entities of the second network.

Term
1.1 yearsto projected expiry
Projected expiry 19 October 2027, counted from filing; an application has no term until it is granted.
- Priority
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- Projected expiry
11 claims: 4 independent, 7 dependent
- 1ES 2 837 540 T3 REIVINDICACIONES 1. Un método que comprende:obtener claves de un proceso de autenticación de una primera red durante un acceso inicial de un equipo de usuario (10) hacia una segunda red y/o durante un proceso de traspaso de un equipo de usuario (10) desde la primera red a la segunda red, en donde las claves del proceso de autenticación de la primera red se producen basándose en un valor aleatorio usado en el proceso de autenticación de la primera red;y producir un conjunto de claves asociadas para un proceso de autenticación que va a realizarse en la segunda red basándose en las claves del proceso de autenticación de la primera red e identidades de entidades de red de la segunda red.
- 2El método de la reivindicación 1, en donde las entidades de red comprenden al menos uno de una estación base, un elemento de gestión de movilidad y un elemento de plano de usuario.
- 3El método de la reivindicación 1, en donde el conjunto de claves asociadas comprende un conjunto de claves de cifrado asociadas y un conjunto de claves de protección de integridad asociadas.
- 4El método de la reivindicación 1, en donde el conjunto de claves asociadas comprende una clave usada para protección de estrato de acceso, una clave usada para protección de estrato de no acceso, y una clave usada para protección de plano de usuario.
- 5Un dispositivo de red (30) que comprende:una unidad de recepción (31) configurada para recibir claves de un proceso de autenticación de una primera red durante un acceso inicial de un equipo de usuario hacia una segunda red y/o durante un proceso de traspaso de un equipo de usuario desde la primera red a la segunda red, en donde las claves del proceso de autenticación de la primera red se producen basándose en un valor aleatorio usado en el proceso de autenticación de la primera red;y una unidad de cálculo (32) configurada para calcular un conjunto de claves asociadas para un proceso de autenticación que va a realizarse en la segunda red basándose en las claves recibidas por la unidad de recepción e identidades de entidades de red de la segunda red.
- 6El dispositivo de red de la reivindicación 5, que comprende adicionalmente:una unidad de transmisión configurada para transmitir las claves a un servidor de abonado doméstico, en donde la unidad de recepción está configurada para recibir claves modificadas del proceso de autenticación de la primera red desde el servidor de abonado doméstico, y la unidad de cálculo está configurada para calcular el conjunto de claves asociadas basándose en las claves modificadas.
- 7El dispositivo de red de la reivindicación 5, en donde las entidades de red incluyen dicho dispositivo de red.
- 8El dispositivo de red de la reivindicación 6, en donde la unidad de transmisión está configurada para transmitir las identidades de las entidades de red hacia dichas entidades de red.
- 9Un producto de programa informático que incluye un programa para un dispositivo de procesamiento, que comprende porciones de código de software para realizar el método de una cualquiera de las reivindicaciones 1 a 4 cuando el programa se ejecuta en el dispositivo de procesamiento.
- 10El producto de programa informático de acuerdo con la reivindicación 9, en el que el programa se puede cargar directamente en una memoria interna del dispositivo de procesamiento.
- 11Un medio legible por ordenador que almacena un programa para un dispositivo de procesamiento, que comprende porciones de código de software para realizar el método de una cualquiera de las reivindicaciones 1 a 4 cuando el programa se ejecuta en el dispositivo de procesamiento.
Independent claims11
118 paragraphs in 4 sections, as filed
ES 2 837 540 T3
DESCRIPTION
Generation of keys for protection in mobile networks of the next generation
Field and background of the invention
The present invention relates to the field of Long Term Evolution / System Architecture Evolution (LTE / SAE) of 3GPP (Third Generation Association Project). In particular, the invention relates to the generation of keys such as Encryption Keys (CK) and Integrity Protection Keys (IK) in 3GPP / SAE LTE.
3GPP LTE / SAE requires separate keys used for AS (Access Stratum), NAS (Non-Access Stratum), and U-plane (user plane) protection.
In UMTS (Universal Mobile Telecommunications System) a security mechanism is provided using an AKA (Key and Authentication Agreement) protocol based on a 'challenge-response' strategy, in which an encryption key and a password are obtained. integrity protection using a random value RAND.
US 2006/0171541 A1 discloses a method for creating and distributing cryptographic keys in a mobile radio system. A first cryptographic key and a second cryptographic key are created by a mobile terminal and by a home communication network computer using authentication key materials. The first cryptographic key is transmitted to a computer on a visited communication network, and the second cryptographic key is transmitted to an application server computer.
International patent application publication number WO 00/76194 A1 discloses an authentication and encryption arrangement method in a telecommunication system comprising two different mobile communication networks, a mobile station communicating with a first of the communication networks mobile.
Valteri Niemi ET AL: UMTS Security, pages 65-67, ISBN: 0-470-84794-8 refers to access security for UMTS and states that it is an absolute prerequisite of UMTS that end users of a system are authenticated. This disclosure further establishes that the most important ingredient in providing security for network operators and their subscribers is cryptography, and goes through the security features introduced in the first release of the 3GPP system, which includes the generation of a vector of authentication.
Summary of the invention
The present invention is defined by the accompanying independent claims. Certain more specific aspects of the invention are defined by the dependent claims.
For example, in case a UE (User Equipment) was handed over from a 2G / 3G (2nd Generation / 3rd Generation) communication system to LTE, there would be a way to derive the keys for AS, NAS, and U-plane. .
In other words, separate keys are needed for NAS signaling protection between the UE (User Equipment) and the MME (Mobility Management Element) and for user plane protection between the UE and the UPE. Furthermore, a different key is also required to protect RRC signaling used between the eNB and the UE.
According to an example, a method is provided, comprising: obtaining keys of an authentication process of a first network during an initial access of a user equipment to a second network and / or during a handover process of a user equipment user from the first network to the second network, where the keys of the authentication process of the first network are produced based on a random value used in the authentication process of the first network; and producing a set of associated keys for an authentication process to be performed in the second network based on the keys of the authentication process of the first network and identities of the network entities of the second network, where the network entities they are associated through the authentication process to be carried out in the second network.
The first network can be a 2G / 3G communication system, and the second network can be LTE.
The associated keys can be the keys for AS, NAS, and U-plane.
According to an example, a set of used random values to be used in the authentication process of the second network can be calculated based on the random value used in the first network authentication process, and the associated key set can calculated based on the set of associated random values.
The set of associated random values can be calculated based on the random value using identities of network entities of the second network, the network entities being associated through the authentication process to be performed in the second network.
ES 2 837 540 T3
According to another example, the keys of an authentication process of the first network are calculated based on the random value, and the set of associated keys is calculated based on the keys using identities of network entities of the second network, being associated network entities through the authentication process to be performed on the second network.
The random value of the first network can be obtained during a handover process of a user equipment from the first network to the second network. The random value of the first network can also be obtained during an authentication process performed in the second network.
The network entities may comprise at least one of a base station, a mobility management element, and a user plane element.
The set of associated keys may comprise a set of associated encryption keys and a set of associated integrity protection keys.
The set of associated keys may comprise a key used for access stratum protection, a key used for no access stratum protection, and a key used for user plane protection.
Figure 1 shows a schematic block diagram illustrating user equipment and network devices according to one example.
A network device 30 such as an MME (Mobility Management Element) comprises a receiving unit 31 and a computing unit 32. The MME 30 may also comprise a transmitting unit 33. The receiving unit 31 receives a random value , such as RAND, used in an authentication process of a first network, such as a 2G / 3G communication system. The computing unit 32 calculates a set of associated keys, such as keys for AS, NAS, and U-plane, for an authentication process to be performed on a second network, such as LTE, based on the random value.
The reception unit 31 can receive keys of the authentication process from the first network, such as CK and IK.
The receiving unit 31 can receive the random value and the keys from a home subscriber server. Alternatively, the receiving unit 31 may receive the random value and the keys from another network element of the first network, and the transmitting unit 33 may transmit the keys to the home subscriber server. The receiving unit 31 can then receive modified keys, such as CKho and IKho, from the authentication process of the first network from the home subscriber server, and the computing unit 32 can calculate the set of associated keys based on the keys modified.
The calculation unit 32 can calculate the set of associated keys using identities of network entities of the second network, the network entities being associated through the authentication process to be carried out in the second network, where the network entities include such a network device.
According to an alternative example, the transmission unit 33 transmits the identities of the network entities of the second network to the home subscriber server, and the reception unit 31 receives a set of associated keys for the authentication process to be performed in the second network from the home subscriber server. The receiving unit 31 may receive the random value in advance from another network element of the first network, and the transmitting unit 33 may also transmit the random value to the home subscriber server. The transmission unit 33 can transmit the identities of the network entities to said network entities.
A network device 20 shown in Figure 1, such as an SGSN, comprises a transmission unit 21 that transmits the random value used in the authentication process of the first network to a network device, such as the MME 30, of the second network during a handover process of a user equipment 10 from the first network to the second network. The transmission unit 21 can also transmit the keys of the authentication process of the first network to the network device of the second network.
The user equipment (UE) 10 shown in Figure 1 comprises a reception unit 11 that receives the identities of the network entities of the second network, and a calculation unit 12 that calculates a set of associated keys for the process of authentication to be performed on the second network using the identities of the network entities. The UE 10 can receive the identities from the MME 30. The identities may be received during an initial access to the second network and / or during a handover process of the UE 10 from the first network to the second network.
A network device such as an eNB or eRAN (Evolved Radio Access Network) 50 shown in Figure 1 comprises a calculation unit 51 that calculates a set of associated keys for the authentication process to be performed in the second network using identities of network entities of the second network, being associated
ES 2 837 540 T3 the network entities through the authentication process to be carried out in the second network, wherein the network entities include said network device 50.
Finally, a network device such as an HSS 40 shown in Figure 1 comprises a receiving unit 41 that receives the keys from the authentication process of the first network, a computing unit 42 that calculates modified keys based on the keys, and a transmission unit 43 that transmits the modified keys to a network element of the second network, such as the MME 30. The keys can be received by the reception unit 41 from the MME 30.
According to an alternative example, the reception unit 41 receives the random value used in the authentication process of the first network and the identities of network entities of the second network, the network entities being associated through a process of authentication to be performed on the second network, the calculation unit 42 calculates a set of associated keys for the authentication process to be performed in the second network based on the random value using the identities, and the transmission unit 43 transmits the set of keys associated with a network element from the second network, such as the MME 30. The random value and identities can be received by the receiving unit 41 from the MME 30.
According to a further example, the transmission unit 43 of the HSS 40 transmits the random value and the keys of the authentication process of the first network to the MME 30, for example, after a request for authentication data transmitted from the transmission unit 33 from MME 30 to HSS 40.
It is to be noted that the terminal and network devices and user equipment shown in Figure 1 may have additional functionality to function, for example, as SGSN, MME, eRAN, HSS and UE. At this point, the functions of the network devices and user equipment relevant to understanding the principles of the invention are described using functional blocks as shown in Figure 1. The arrangement of the functional blocks of the network devices and user equipment is not intended to limit the invention, and the functions may be performed in one block or further divided into sub-blocks.
For the purpose of describing the present invention herein below, it should be noted that
- the method steps are likely to be implemented as pieces of software code and to be executed using a processor in one of the network devices or the terminal, are independent software code and can be specified using any known or developed programming language future;
- the method steps and / or units are likely to be implemented as hardware components in one of the network devices or the terminal, are hardware independent and can be implemented using any known or future developed hardware technology or any hybrids of these , such as MOS, CMOS, BiCMOS, ECL, TTL, etc., using, for example, ASIC components or DSP components, as an example;
- in general, any method step is suitable to be implemented as software or by hardware without changing the idea of the present invention;
- the devices can be implemented as individual devices, but this does not exclude that they can be implemented in a distributed way throughout the entire system, provided that the functionality of the device is preserved.
The present invention provides an extension that does not require changes to the AKA protocol.
According to one embodiment of the invention, changes to a home subscriber server are also not required.
Brief description of the drawings
Figure 1 shows a schematic block diagram illustrating user equipment and network elements according to one embodiment of the invention.
Figure 2 shows a signaling diagram illustrating key generation in accordance with the present invention during an initial access.
Figure 3 shows a signaling diagram illustrating key distribution / conversion during a handover procedure of a 2G / 3G to LTE communication system.
Description of the preferred embodiments
To generate separate keys for protection of AS, NAS and U-plane, according to a solution (1) a longer random value RAND is used (i.e. 3 times longer than RAND used in UMTS), which can be sectioned in RANDrrc, RANDnas and RANDupe.
RAND = RANDrrc || RANDnas || RANDupe
ES 2 837 540 T3
The separate encryption keys and integrity protection keys for AS, NAS, and U-plane can be calculated below as follows:
CKrrc = f3 (K, RANDrrc)
CKnas = f3 (K, RANDnas)
CKupe = f3 (K, RANDupe)
IKrrc = f4 (K, RANDrrc)
IKnas = f4 (K, RANDnas)
IKupe = f4 (K, RANDupe) where CKrrc is the encryption key for AS, CKnas is the encryption key for NAS and CKupe is the encryption key for U-plane, IKrrc is the integrity protection key for AS, IKnas is the integrity protection key for NAS and IKupe is the integrity protection key for the U-plane. f3 and f4 are functions to generate the above key sets and can be predetermined in advance. K in the above formulas can be an encryption key or integrity protection key itself or a default parameter.
However, preferably the length of RAND is the same as in UMTS. According to an embodiment of the invention presented by solution (2), RAND is used together with different identities of AS, NAS and U-plane to generate RANDrrc, RANDnas and RANDupe.
RANDrrc = KDF (RAND, IDas)
RANDnas = KDF (RAND, IDnas)
RANDupe = KDF (RAND, IDupe)
For example, KDF can be an XOR function, IDas can be the identity of a BS (Base Station) or eNB (Evolved Node B), IDnas can be the identity of an MME (Mobility Management Element) and IDupe can be the identity of a UPE (User Plane Element).
RANDrrc, RANDnas, and RANDupe are then used to generate the corresponding CK and IK for AS or RRC (Radio Resource Control), NAS, and U-plane.
CKrrc = f3 (K, RANDrrc)
Cknas = f3 (K, RANDnas)
Ckupe = f3 (K, RANDupe)
IKrrc = f4 (K, RANDrrc)
Iknas = f4 (K, RANDnas)
Ikupe = f4 (K, RANDupe) where CKrrc is the encryption key for AS or RRC, CKnas is the encryption key for NAS and CKupe is the encryption key for U-plane, IKrrc is the integrity protection key for AS , IKnas is the integrity protection key for NAS and IKupe is the integrity protection key for the U-plane. F3 and f4 are functions to generate the above key sets and can be predetermined in advance. K in the above formulas can be an encryption key or integrity protection key itself or a default parameter.
According to an alternative embodiment of the invention presented by solution (3), CK and IK are generated from K and RAND as in UMTS and used to derive the CK and IK used for AS, NAS and U-plane.
CKrrc = f3 (CK, IDas)
CKnas = f3 (CK, IDnas)
CKupe = f3 (CK, IDupe)
IKrrc = f4 (IK, IDas)
IKnas = f4 (IK, IDnas)
IKupe = f4 (IK, IDupe) where CKrrc is the encryption key for AS or RRC, CKnas is the encryption key for NAS and CKupe is the encryption key for U-plane, IKrrc is the integrity protection key for AS , IKnas is the integrity protection key for NAS and IKupe is the integrity protection key for the U-plane. f3 and f4 are functions to generate the above key sets and can be predetermined in advance, and IDas can be the identity of a BS or eNB, IDnas can be the identity of an MME and IDupe can be the identity of a UPE.
According to a further alternative to solutions (1) and (2) as described above, the IKs can also be generated through a function f2 as defined in UMTS.
The CK and IK must be kept in MME as will be described later and must not be transmitted to other network elements.
Since CK and IK are a product of the AKA (challenge-response) authentication protocol, for solution (1) an HSS (Home Subscriber Server) only needs to generate a longer RAND as an authentication vector part and the RAND it will be sectioned in the MME in RANDrrc, RANDnas and RANDupe.
For solution (2) a key derivation function is required to generate RANDrrc, RANDnas, and RANDupe, and
ES 2 837 540 T3 IDas, IDnas and Idupe have to be defined.
Figure 2 shows a signaling diagram illustrating key generation in accordance with the present invention during an initial access.
On an initial access to an SAE / LTE system, a UE issues an initial access request to an MME of the SAE / LTE system (communication 1 in Figure 2). In a communication 2 the MME sends a request for authentication data to an HLR (Home Location Registry) or HSS which is a database located in a home network of the UE, and receives authentication vectors (AV) and a random value RAND, a CK encryption key, and an IK integrity protection key, AUTN (Authenticator for Challenge (AUTN), and XRES (Expected Response) in an Authentication Data Response from the HLR in Communication 3.
In a communication 4 in Figure 2, the MME sends the authentication and encryption requests towards the UE via an eNB, the request including the random value RAND and an identity of the MME, MMEid, as well as AUTN. In a communication 5 in Figure 2, the UE responds with an authentication and encryption response RES, which is transmitted to the MME via the eNB.
After successful authentication, the MME and UE will use CK, IK agreed with RAND currently used as the roof key to create second level keys for protection, CKnas and IKnas in blocks 6b and 6a in Figure 2, as shown described above.
In communication 7 in Figure 2 the MME sends an IP context creation request to a UPE, which is acknowledged in communication 8, and in communication 9 the MME sends an L3 record that includes an identity from the UPE, UPEid, to the UE. Next, in blocks 10a and 10b the UE and MME use the CKs, IK with the RAND currently used as a roof key to create second level keys for protection, CKupe and IKupe, as described above.
The same principle applies for RRC key generation in UE and MME. UE and MME use an eNB identity, eNBid, to derive the RRC keys CKrrc and IKrrc as described above. The key derivation functions are UMTS functions f3 and f4.
In particular, referring to the solution (2) described above, the UE and the MME should be able to derive CKnas, IKnas, CKup, IKup, CKrrc, IKrrc using the existing UMTS function f3 and f4 after each successful authentication.
RANDrrc = KDF (RAND, IDas)
RANDnas = KDF (RAND, IDnas)
RANDupe = KDF (RAND, IDupe) whereby:
KDF = RAND XOR ID IDs are MME id (used in NAS protection), UPE id (used in UP protection), or eNB id (used in RRC protection);
CKrrc = f3 (K, RANDrrc)
CKnas = f3 (K, RANDnas)
CKupe = f3 (K, RANDupe)
IKrrc = f4 (K, RANDrrc)
IKnas = f4 (K, RANDnas)
IKupe = f4 (K, RANDupe) whereby: K = CK / IK
An alternative to using f3 / f4 is to reuse KDF defined in TS33.220 Annex B, that is, SAE_keys = KDF (Ks, static string, RAND, IMPI, SAE_ids). Ks is generated by concatenating CK and IK. The IMPI (IP Multimedia Private Identity) could be obtained from the IMSI (International Mobile Subscriber Identity) as specified in TS 23.003. SAE_ids could be, for example, MME_id, eNB id and UPE_id or the names of MME, eNB and UPE. SAE_keys will then express MME_key, UPE_key, RRC_key. The static string could be LTE_CK and LTE_IK to generate the CK and IK.
In a handover process between a 2G / 3G system and a SAE / LTE system, the distribution of security data (unused authentication vectors and / or current security context data, for example CK, IK, RAND used etc.) is carried out between the SGSN (2G / 3G) and the MME. The following cases are distinguished with regard to the distribution of security data between them.
- Case 1, handover (with separate 3GPP anchor) Inter-RAT (Radio Access Technology): LTE to 2G / 3G:
UMTS and GSM authentication vectors can be distributed between the 2G / 3G MmE and SGSN. Note that originally all authentication vectors (quintets for UMTS / SAE subscribers and triples for GSM subscribers) are provided by the HLR / AuC (Authentication Center). The current security context data can be distributed between the MME and the 2G / 3G SGSN. The MME must be able to perform
ES 2 837 540 T3 the conversion CK, IK-> Kc and XRES-> SES.
- Case 2, Inter-RAT handover (with separate 3GPP anchor): 2G / 3G -> LTE:
The high-level signaling for this case is illustrated in Figure 3.
As shown by communication 1a and 1b in Figure 3, an IP (Internet Protocol) bearer service is established between the UE, a 2G / 3G access node, a 2G / 3G SGSN application and one of 3GPP. In communication 2 in Figure 3 a handover request is issued from the 2G / 3G access node to the 2G / 3G SGSN.
Later, during the handover preparation time, the 2G / 3G SGSN distributes security data to the MME (communication 3 in Figure 3). The security data includes currently used CK, IK and RAND as well as unused AV.
After confirmation received from the eNB (communication 4 in Figure 3), the MME generates three separate keys for NAS, UPE (blocks 5a, 5b in Figure 3) and RRC (not shown in Figure 3). The MME also delivers MME id, UPE id to the UE with, for example, the handover command (communication 6 in Figure 3). Therefore, the UE can generate the same keys for NAS, UPE as well (blocks 7a, 7b in Figure 3).
In addition to the above cases, in a handover from MME to MME in a PLMN (Public Land Mobile Network), the security data in such a case can be distributed without change.
According to the present invention, when a UE is handed over from the 2G / 3G communication system to LTE, according to an embodiment of the invention represented by solution (a), a 2G / 3G SGSN (Support Node of GPRS (General Packet Radio Service) Service) sends a current RAND used in the 2G / 3G communication system together with a CK / IK derived from the current RAND in the 2G / 3G communication system to an MME in communication 3 in Figure 3. The MME then uses f3 and f4 to generate different key sets with AS, NAS, and U-plane identities as described above. The K in the formula will be CK or IK.
The identities of MME and UPE can be sent to the UE via a handover command as shown in communication 6 in Figure 3. The UE can also generate corresponding CK / IK sets for NAS and UPE. The same principle applies to AS except that the MME does not need to send the AS ID to the BS, RRC or eNB. New functions fx and fy can be defined to generate the key sets for RRC, MME, and UPE. If f3 and f4 are reused, the UE must distinguish when to use them to generate CK / IK and when to use them to generate the key sets for RRC, MME, and UPE.
According to an alternative embodiment presented by solution (b), there are several more steps compared to solution (a) to derive a variant of the CK / IK received from the SGSN. The CK / IK derived from the SGSN will be sent from the MME to an HSS of the UE and will be used as a RAND to derive a pair of new CKs and IKs, CKho and IKho, through f3 and f4, that is, CKeo = f3 (K, CK) and IKho = f4 (K, IK). These CKho and IKho will be used to generate the CK / IK sets for AS, NAS and UPE in the MME, UE and AS entity (ie BS, RRC or eNB). The corresponding CKho and IKho can also be generated in Ue / USIM (UMTS Subscriber Identity Module) and in the AS entity.
According to a further alternative embodiment represented by solution (c), when the UE is handover from the 2G / 3G communication system to LTE, the 2G / 3G SGSN sends the currently used RAND to the MME in communication 3 in Figure 3 similar to solution (a). The MME then sends this RAND together with the identities of MME (NAS), AS and UPE (U-plane) to the HSS of the UE and requests authentication vectors. The HSS uses this RAND and the AS, nAs, and U-plane identities to generate new authentication vectors (CKnas IKnas, Ckrrc, IKrrc, etc., as described above), and sends them back to the MME. The K in the formula is then a permanent K stored in HSS and USIM. The identities of MME and UPE can be sent to the UE via the handover command as shown in communication 6 in Figure 3. The UE can also generate corresponding CK / IK sets for NAS and UPE. The same principle applies to AS, except that the MME does not need to send the AS ID to the eNB.
According to solution (c), the random value RAND used to generate the CK / IK in the 2G / 3G communication system needs to be sent to the HSS from the MME. According to solutions (a) to (c), the identities of at least the MME and UPE need to be sent to the UE through the handover command. F3 and f4 are used to generate the key sets for use in LTE.
For solution (a) the MME and UE need to implement f3 and f4 or similar functions named fx and fy. For solution (b) there are more steps to generate CKho and IKho. For solution (c) the HSS needs to be modified to generate longer authentication vectors.
According to solution (a) there is no change to HSS. However, solution (c) is more secure. Disclosure of
ES 2 837 540 T3 the CK / IK in 2G / 3G will not affect the CK / IK sets used in LTE. Solution (b) is also secure since CK / IK will not cause disclosure of CK / IK sets used in LTE.
It should be understood that the foregoing description is illustrative of the invention and should not be construed as limiting the invention. Various modifications and applications may occur to those skilled in the art without departing from the scope of the invention as defined by the appended claims.
Contents4
3 sheets
Sheet 1 Sheet 2 Sheet 3
16 members in 7 offices
Priority claims9
| Document | Office | Kind | Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| 852967P | United States of America | – | |
| 85296706 | United States of America | P | |
| 85296706 | United States of America | P | |
| 2007061223 | European Patent Office (EPO) | W | |
| 2007061223 | European Patent Office (EPO) | W | |
| 852967P | – | – | – |
| PCTEP2007061223 | – | – | – |
| US20060852967P | – | – | – |
| WO2007EP61223 | – | – | – |
Members16
| Document | Office | Kind | |
|---|---|---|---|
| WO2008046915A1 | World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) | A1 | |
| US2008184032A1 | United States of America | A1 | |
| KR20090068293A | Republic of Korea | A | |
| EP2080346A1 | European Patent Office (EPO) | A1 | |
| CN101536463A | China | A | |
| RU2009117476A | Russian Federation | A | |
| RU2416882C2 | Russian Federation | C2 | |
| KR20110053495A | Republic of Korea | A | |
| KR101048560B1 | Republic of Korea | B1 | |
| CN101536463B | China | B | |
| US9554271B2 | United States of America | B2 | |
| EP2080346B1 | European Patent Office (EPO) | B1 | |
| EP3761598A1 | European Patent Office (EPO) | A1 | |
| ES2837540T3This record | Spain | T3 | |
| EP3761598B1 | European Patent Office (EPO) | B1 | |
| ES2968518T3 | Spain | T3 |
Numbers
- Publication
- 2837540
- Publication, DOCDB
- 2837540
- Publication, EPODOC
- ES2837540T
- Application
- 7821587
- Application, DOCDB
- 07821587
- Application, EPODOC
- ES20070821587T
Titles2
- Spanish
- Generación de claves para protección en redes móviles de la siguiente generación
- English
- Generation of keys for protection in mobile networks of the next generation
Classification
- CPC, 5
- H04W12/062
- H04W12/0431
- H04L63/062
- H04L63/0869
- H04W12/06
- IPC, 3
- H04W12 04
- H04W12 06
- H04L29 06