Method for providing information security for wireless transmissions

0001The present invention relates generally to cryptographic schemes, and specifically to cryptographic schemes relating to wireless applications.

BACKGROUND

0002Information security is required to secure many types of transactions performed electronically using a wide range of computing and communication technologies. As consumers demand more flexible, convenient services, technologies such as wireless networks, paging infrastructures and smart cards are being deployed to support critical, information sensitive applications including account inquiries, electronic cash, secure communications and access control. One of the key features of each of these technologies is that they offer consumers the convenience of service anywhere, any time. The convenience offered to consumers results in a challenge for the vendors to create smaller and faster devices while providing a high level of security for information computed and transmitted.

0003Information security is provided through the application of cryptographic systems (commonly referred to as cryptosystems). The two main classes of cryptosystems are symmetric and public key. In a symmetric cryptosystem, two users wishing to participate in a secure transaction must share a common key. Therefore, each user must trust the other not to divulge the key to a third party. Users participating in a secure transaction using public key cryptosystems will each have two keys, known as a key pair. One of the keys is kept secret and is referred to as the private key, while the other can be published and is referred to as the public key. Typically, applications use a combination of both these classes of cryptosystems to provide information security. Symmetric technologies are typically used to perform bulk data encryption, while public key technologies are commonly used to perform key agreement, key transport, digital signatures and encryption of small messages.

0004Since the introduction of public key cryptosystems, there have been many implementations proposed. All of these public key systems are based on mathematical problems which are known to be hard, that is, it is thought that breaking a system is equivalent to solving a hard mathematical problem. These problems are generally easy to solve for numbers that are small in size, but become increasingly difficult as larger numbers are used. One of the differences among the systems is how large the numbers have to be so that the system is too hard to solve given present and anticipated computing power. This is typically linked to the length of the key and referred to as the key size. A system using a small key size while maintaining a high level of security is considered better, as it requires less information to be transmitted and stored.

0005Diffie-Hellman key agreement provided the first practical solution to the key distribution problem by allowing two parties to securely establish a shared secret over an open channel. The original key agreement protocol provides unauthenticated key agreement. The security is based on the discrete logarithm problem of finding integer x given a group generator <i>a</i>, and an element β, such that α^x = β<i>.</i>

0006Rivest Shamir Adleman (RSA) was the first widely deployed realization of a public key system. The RSA system is a full public key cryptosystem and can be used to implement both encryption and digital signature functions. The security of the RSA cryptosystem depends on the difficulty of factoring the product of two large distinct prime numbers. To create a private key/public key pair, a user chooses two large distinct primes <i>P</i> and <i>Q,</i> and forms the product <i>n</i> = <i>PQ.</i> With knowledge of <i>P</i> and <i>Q,</i> the user finds two values <i>e</i> and <i>d</i> such that ((<i>M</i>)<i>^e</i>)<i>^d</i> mod <i>n</i> = <i>M.</i>

0007The public key of the user is the pair (<i>e</i>, <i>n</i>) while the private key is <i>d.</i> It is known that the recovery of <i>d</i> from and <i>e</i> and <i>n</i> requires the recovery of <i>P</i> and <i>Q,</i> and thus is equivalent to factoring <i>n.</i>

0008Elliptic curve cryptosystems are based on an exceptionally difficult mathematical problem. Thus, elliptic curve systems can maintain security equivalent to many other systems while using much smaller public keys. The smaller key size has significant benefits in terms of the amount of information that must be exchanged between users, the time required for that exchange, the amount of information that must be stored for digital signature transactions, and the size and energy consumption of the hardware or software used to implement the system. The basis for the security of the elliptic curve cryptosystem is the assumed intractability of the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem. The problem requires an efficient method to find an integer k given an elliptic curve over a finite field, a point <i>P</i> on the curve, another point <i>Q</i> such that <i>Q</i> = <i>kP.</i>

0009In this system, the public key is a point (<i>Q</i>) on an elliptic curve (represented as a pair of field elements) and the private key is an integer (<i>k</i>). Elliptic curves are defined over an underlying field and may be implemented over the multiplicative group Fp, (the integers modulo a prime <i>p</i>) or characteristic 2 finite fields (<i>F_2m</i>, where <i>m</i> is a positive integer).

0010There are typically three levels in a cryptosystem, which are encryption, signatures, and certificates. These three levels can be implemented using the above mentioned systems or a combination thereof.

0011The first level of a cryptosystem involves encrypting a message between correspondent A and correspondent B. This level is vulnerable to attack since there is no way for correspondent A to verify whether or not correspondent B sent the message, or if a third party in the guise of correspondent B sent the message.

0012Therefore, the second level of signing a message was introduced. Correspondent B can sign the encrypted message using, for example, a hashing function to hash the original message. If correspondent A uses the same hashing function on the decrypted message and it matches the signature sent by correspondent B, then the signature is verified. However, a third party may act as an interloper. The third party could present itself to correspondent A as if it were correspondent B and vice versa. As a result, both correspondents would unwittingly divulge their information to the third party. Therefore, the signature verifies that the message sent by a correspondent is sent from that correspondent, but it does not verify the identity of the correspondent.

0013To prevent this type of attack, the correspondents may use a trusted third party (TTP) to certify the public key of each correspondent. The TTP has a private signing algorithm and a verification algorithm assumed to be known by all entities. The TTP carefully verifies the identity of each correspondent, and signs a message consisting of an identifier and the correspondent's public key. This is a simple example as to how a TTP can be used to verify the identification of the correspondent.

0014Some of the most significant emerging areas for public key cryptosystems include wireless devices. Wireless devices, including cellular telephones, two-way pagers, wireless modems, and contactless smart cards, are increasing in popularity because of the convenience they provide while maintaining a low cost and small form factor.

0015However, implementing the above mentioned cryptosystems requires computational power, which is limited on such wireless devices, Therefore, there is a need for a cryptosystem that provides all of the advantages as described above, but requires less power from the wireless device.

0016<nplcit id="ncit0001" npl-type="b"><text>MENEZES, OORSCHOT, VANSTONE: "Handbook of Applied Cryptography", 1996, CRC PRESS </text></nplcit>XP002661167 discusses digital signatures, which is a fundamental aspect of cryptography.

0017<patcit id="pcit0001" dnum="EP0942568A2"><text>EP0942568 A2</text></patcit> discloses a method for managing centralized certificates in a proxy server device (114) for a plurality of thin client devices (302, 304, 306) coupled thereto through a data network (102).

GENERAL

0018The present teaching provides a method as detailed in claim 1. Also provided is a correspondent in accordance with claim 12. Further provided is a computer program product according to claim 13. Advantageous features are provided in dependent claims. The invention is defined in the independent claims. Particular embodiments are set out in the dependent claims.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

0019An embodiment of the invention will now be described by way of example only with reference to the following drawings in which: <ul id="ul0001" list-style="none" compact="compact"><li><figref idref="f0001">Figure 1</figref> is a schematic drawing of a pager system;</li><li><figref idref="f0002">Figure 2</figref> is a representation of a registration process for the system of <figref idref="f0001">figure 1</figref></li><li><figref idref="f0003">Figure 3</figref> is a representation of a message transfer system for the system of <figref idref="f0001">figure 1</figref></li><li><figref idref="f0004">Figure 4</figref> is a schematic representation of an alternative embodiment of a communication system.</li></ul>

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

0020For convenience, like numerals in the description refer to like structures in the drawings. Further, although the description refers only to pagers, it is intended that the description includes wireless devices in general.

0021Referring to <figref idref="f0001">figure 1</figref>, a paging system is represented generally by the numeral 100. A first pager 102 is operatively coupled with a first home terminal 104 through a wireless communication. The first home terminal 104 is operatively coupled to a second home terminal 106 via a network 108 and the second home terminal 106 in turn is operatively coupled to a second pager 110. The pagers 102, 110 are typically coupled to their respective home terminals 104, 106 by radio frequency. The network 108 is typically a public switched telephone network (PSTN), but can include a data network, and the Internet.

0022Before a pager 102 can communicate with the home terminal 104 it must be registered. Every pager 102 contains a subscriber unit address and a public key <i>Qc</i> of the pager manufacturer or service provider (herein referred to as the company public key). This information is loaded at the manufacture stage. The company public key <i>Qc</i> is derived from a company private key <i>d_C.</i>

0023Each home terminal 104 has a private key <i>d_H</i> and a public key <i>Q_H.</i> The public key <i>Q_H</i> is signed by the company private key <i>d_C</i> to create a certificate denoted <i>C_M</i> The company public key <i>Q_C</i> could be system wide or defined for a given region. A subscriber purchases a pager 102 from a retail outlet and the pager is then loaded with a home index 112 and identifier ID using the protocol outlined below. The home index is typically a 32-bit index which uniquely identifies the pager 102 and correlates it with a specific home terminal 104.

0024The subscriber calls a number, typically a toll-free number, to contact a service provider and a home terminal 104 is assigned. The home terminal 104 sends the pager 102 its public key <i>Q_H</i> and its certificate <i>C_M</i>. The pager verifies <i>Q_H</i> with the company public key <i>Q_c.</i> The pager generates a private key <i>dp</i> and a corresponding public key <i>Qp</i> which is communicated to the home terminal 104. The pager 102 sends to the home terminal 104 the necessary authorization information (including identification, credit card number, subscriber unit address, and the like) encrypted under the home terminal public key <i>Q_H</i>)<i>.</i> The home terminal gets authorization from a central repository that this subscriber unit has not already been activated and thereby prevents counterfeiting of subscriber units. The home terminal 104 sets up a subscriber account and sends the pager 102 its home index and identifier ID encrypted under <i>Q_P</i> and signed by the home terminal.

0025Each pager 102 in a paging infrastructure 100 is registered with a home terminal using the registration protocol described above. The pagers have a private and public key pair, <i>d_p, Q_p,</i> each of which are approximately 20 bytes in length. The home terminals 104 have a private and public key pair <i>dh, Q_H</i> each of which are approximately 25 bytes in length. It is desirable to have a longer key length at the home terminal for providing additional security. Further, since the home terminal 104 does not have the same power constraints as the pager 102, the extra computational power required for the longer key is not a significant issue. The additional security at the home terminal 102 is important since a compromise of the home terminal would permit counterfeiting of subscriber units.

0026To reduce the computational requirements on the pager thereby reducing the power required to encrypt a message M, each of the pagers 102 has a certificate registered for it at the home terminal 104. The certificate, cert_ca, validates the public key <i>Q_p,</i> and identity ID. Each of the home terminals maintains a table for the pagers and their associated certificate. Rather than having the pager sign the certificate and send the message to the home terminal, the certificate cert_ca is signed by the pager's home terminal. The transmission process used to implement such a protocol is described in detail below.

0027Referring once again to <figref idref="f0001">figure 1</figref> and <figref idref="f0003">figure 3</figref>, the first pager <i>P₁</i> wishes to send a message M to a recipient, e.g. a second pager <i>P</i>₂ having a public key <i>Q_p1.</i> The sender <i>P₁</i> initially obtains an authentic copy of recipient's public key <i>Q_p2.</i> The first pager <i>P₁</i> calculates ciphertext with of a signed message M such that <i>W</i> = <i>EQp₂</i> (<i>S_p2</i> (<i>M</i>)), where <i>EQ_p2</i> is encryption under the public key <i>Qp₂</i> and <i>Sp₁</i> is the signature of the first pager on message <i>M</i> using the private key dp.

0028The first pager also calculates a signature <i>m</i>_α = <i>S_P1</i>(<i>h</i>(<i>w</i>) ∥<i>CN</i>∥ <i>ID_P1</i>) where <i>h(w)</i> is a hash of <i>W</i>, such as SHA-1. <i>CN</i> is a timestamp or some other nonce, <i>ID_P1</i> is the unique identifier of the first pager, and ∥represents concatenation. The first pager then transmits the signature, <i>m_a</i>, and the signed, encrypted message, <i>W</i>, to the first home terminal.

0029The signature, <i>m_a</i>, is used by the home terminal 104 associated with pager <i>P</i>₁ to verify that <i>P₁</i> is a legitimate user. In order to avoid a challenge-response authentication to save time and bandwidth, the message <i>W</i>and a nonce <i>CN</i>, which is unique for each transmission, are coupled with the <i>ID</i> of <i>P₁</i> and signed. The nonce is used to prevent replay of the transmission, <i>W</i> is a signed, encrypted form of the message <i>M</i>. Signing then encrypting is preferred over encrypting then signing.

0030The first home terminal receives <i>m_a</i> and <i>W</i> from <i>P₁</i> and uses <i>m_a</i> to verify that <i>P₁</i> is a legitimate user. <i>IDp₁</i> is recovered from <i>m_a</i>, and the first home terminal retrieves the certificate, <i>Cert_ca</i> for <i>P₁</i> from the corresponding table and attaches it to <i>W. Cert_ca</i> is a full certificate such as X.509 and consists of <i>1</i> bytes. There is no loss of security in storing the <i>Cert_ca</i> certificates at the first home terminal.

0031In addition to saving computational power on the pager, the bandwidth requirements of the transmission from the pager to the base are reduced since the pager does not have to transmit a certificate.

0032The first home terminal 104 stores a pre-computed table of values which allows it to increase the speed of verifying P<i>₁'s</i> signature. Alternately, if verification is fast enough, as would be the case with a hardware implementation, the table of values is not required.

0033The first home terminal then removes the signature component <i>M_a</i> and transmits the signed, encrypted message <i>W</i> and the certificate <i>Cert_ca</i> to the recipient. Since the recipient in this example is the second pager 110, <i>W</i> and <i>Cert_ca</i> are sent to the second home terminal 106 that has public and private keys <i>Qp₃ dp₃</i> respectively.

0034The second home terminal, 106 receives the transmission and verifies <i>Q_P1</i> using <i>Cert_ca (Qp₁, IDp₁).</i> To save bandwidth, the second home terminal 106 signs <i>Q_P1</i> according to the signature function <i>S_dp2</i>(<i>W</i> ∥ <i>Q_P1</i> ∥ <i>ID_P1)</i> and sends it along with <i>W</i> to <i>P₂.</i> A time stamp <i>CN₁</i> may be included to prevent replay attacks. <i>P₂</i> trusts the second home terminal to do this honestly. The pager <i>P₂</i> can then verify <i>W</i> and recover the message <i>M</i> using its private key <i>dp₂</i> and the senders public key <i>Qp₁. Qp₁</i> has been validated by the signature of the home terminal 104 and therefore communicating between the second home terminal 106 and the second pager 110 in this manner keeps the certificates off the transmission channel and reduces bandwidth requirements.

0035An example of the bandwidth requirements for such a method is described as follows. Suppose <i>M</i> consists of <i>t</i> bytes. If the Nyberg-Rueppel protocol is used for signing the message, t+20 bytes are required for <i>S_P1,</i> (<i>M</i>)<i>.</i> A further 20 bytes are used to encrypt <i>S_P1</i> (<i>M</i>), therefore <i>W</i> is t+40 bytes in length. Hashing <i>h(W</i>) uses 20 bytes if SHA-1 is used. The nonce <i>CN</i> uses 4 bytes and the identification <i>ID_p1,</i> uses 4 bytes. Once again, if Nyberg-Rueppel is used for signing, 20 additional bytes are used. Hence <i>m_a</i> will be 48 bytes. Therefore, the transmission between the first pager and the first home terminal uses t+92 bytes.

0036For the transmission from the first home terminal to the second home terminal, <i>W</i> uses t+40 bytes, <i>Cert_ca</i> uses <i>1</i> bytes, and therefore the bandwidth required is t+<i>1</i>+40 bytes.

0037For the transmission from the second home terminal, <i>W</i> uses t+40 bytes, <i>Qp₁</i> uses 20 bytes,ID<i>_P1</i> uses 4 bytes, and <i>CN₁</i> uses 4 bytes. Therefore, using Nyberg-Rueppel for signing, the bandwidth used in sending <i>W</i> and <i>S_dp3(W</i> ∥<i>Q_P1</i>∥ <i>ID_P1)</i> and the nonce <i>CN₁,</i> is a total of 25 + (t + 40) + 20 + 4 + 4 = t + 93 bytes.

0038In the above example, the transmission is from pager to pager. However, the protocol may be used from the input devices, for example, a DTMF telephone as illustrated in <figref idref="f0004">figure 4</figref>. In this case, the transmission T, would be With and <i>Cert_ca</i> (<i>Q_d, ID_D</i>) where <i>Q_D</i> and <i>ID_D</i> are the public key and identity of the telephone.

0039The transmission T2 would be W and <i>cert_ca (Q_d; ID_D)</i> and the transmission T3 to the pager, after verification of <i>cert_ca</i> would be <i>Q_D,</i> With <i>ID_D</i> and <i>CN</i> all signed by the home terminal.