Method for permanent disturbance/destruction of electronics, in particular of a blast case or the like

p0001The invention relates to a method by means of which a permanent disturbance / destruction of a transmitter or a receiver, for example as a component of an explosive trap, is possible and thus a receiver-side triggering can be prevented.

p0002Spikes or so-called IEDs are devices which generally consist of four main groups, a trigger for the electrical release of the device, a safe and arm unit, explosives alone or in combination with toxic chemicals, biological toxins or radiological material, and an effector . For the triggering of the internal electrical trigger, radio-triggering units, so-called RCIED, are generally used. Is used.

p0003A known method or a known device for disturbing a communication path between at least one transmitter and at least one receiver is the use of jamming jammers. The task of a jammer is usually to disturb all receivers within the range of its range of action. For this purpose, a disturbance signal, for example a noise signal without information content, of a sufficient strength is impressed on a useful signal transmitted between the transmitter and the receiver so as to cover the useful signal and prevent it from being used by the receiver. However, as soon as the jamming range of the jamming is exceeded, the risk of tripping is again present. In addition, a jammer does not send continuously but in time intervals.

p0004The <patcit id="pcit0001" dnum="US2006082488A"><text>US 2006/082488 A</text></patcit> Relates to a device for detecting the electromagnetic position of electronic equipment. The device comprises means of an emitter for providing enhanced electromagnetic energy by using an applied electromagnetic field generated by emitter and receiver means for receiving unintentional and intended electromagnetic emission signature of such targeted electronic device.

p0005The object of the invention is to specify a method and a device which make it possible to create a permanent interruption between a transmitter and a receiver cooperating therewith.

p0006The object is achieved by the features of the patent claim 1. Advantageous embodiments are shown in the subclaims.

p0007The invention is based on the consideration that, in particular, a permanent communication fault can be realized if a destruction of the transmitter, but preferably of the receiver electronics, takes place and thus communication between the two is made impossible.

p0008This approach to the destruction of electronics is known from the non-lethal destruction of targets. In addition to high-power microwave sources (HPM = high-power-microwave), high-power microwave generators (RF = radiofrequency) are used here, which can be used to target the electronics of a target by directing RF beams Disturbances without destroying the target itself (<patcit id="pcit0002" dnum="DE19959358A1"><text>DE 199 59 358 A1</text></patcit>).

p0009In principle, the method for disturbing / destroying the electronics for the communication interruption can be performed by utilizing the detection possibility of an electronics by means of NLJD. This NLJD method has the ability to detect circuits built up with semiconductor devices. By means of the non-linear behavior of individual components, signals of a fixed frequency which are coupled into the circuit are converted into signals with the multiple of the irradiated frequency and are radiated again. Such a method and a corresponding non-linear transition detector are described in the<patcit id="pcit0003" dnum="US6163259A"><text>US 6,163,259</text></patcit> described in detail. Another non-linear transition detector is used with the<patcit id="pcit0004" dnum="WO02065419A1"><text>WO 02/065419 A1</text></patcit> Is disclosed. Another<patcit id="pcit0005" dnum="WO2004038455A1"><text>WO 2004/038455 A1</text></patcit> Is concerned with a method and a device for the detection of so-called monitoring devices. In principle, the method operates by evaluating a 2nd and a 3rd harmonic primary frequency reflected at the target. From these two harmonics, the information about the presence or absence of an electronic circuit is then drawn.

p0010In a further development of the invention, a so-called frontdoor coupling as well as backdoor coupling is possible for the permanent interference of the communication. In the case of the frontdoor coupling, the input or output stages of the receiver or transmitter are destroyed. In the case of the backdoor coupling, the power can be coupled into the transmitting or receiving structure via slots, openings and / or lines such as, for example, signal lines, voltage supply etc., and thus the destruction can be effected. However, known NLJD systems operate at a fixed frequency. However, in order to ensure effective destruction, the frequencies for the optimum coupling should be known for both the frontdoor and the backdoor coupling.

p0011Here, in the further step, the invention engages the idea of ​​incorporating tunable transmitters and detectors (receivers) into the detection systems and using a narrow-band, frequency-variable signal in order to determine the frequencies for the optimum coupling.

p0012If the detection system knows these frequencies, whether with the simple NLJD methods or the latter, the destruction of a sender communicating with the receiver of the target or the receiver itself can be initiated in the second step of the invention. For this purpose, after the determination of the preferably optimum frequencies, for example, a powerful signal is transmitted into the local area of ​​the destination or of the receiver with the determined / determined frequency.

p0013The scannable frequency range should be chosen for the detection as well as later destruction of the electronics so that it covers both the theoretical limits for the backdoor coupling (derivable from the geometry of the target) and the frontdoor frequencies typical of the communication systems. The frequency range is preferably between 10 and 1000 MHz. The reception frequency for the 2nd and 3rd harmonic is adjusted according to the transmission frequency.

p0014On the basis of further technical information, such as frequency plan, typical transmission channels, etc., as well as non-technical information, such as reconnaissance, blocked channels, etc., one or more frequencies are preferably selected by the detection system for the control. Furthermore, the detection system determines the angle of the space in which the target is located in the system. The destruction and / or control of the target is then carried out on the determined frequencies and in the defined spatial angle by means of a broadband tunable power transmitter.

p0015If the target is a radio, then the receive gain of the target can be used if the transmission frequency is within the range of the target.

p0016Closed systems such as an IED have the property of being able to communicate with the environment only through transmission windows / open doors / slots. Through the tunable transceivers of the detection system (of the detection systems), it is now possible to find the frequency holes or working frequencies of a particularly shielded target / target.

p0017A further advantage of this solution is that in environments where devices with different frequencies are present, these frequencies are not taken into account for detection, but rather are excluded when scanning the frequency. This makes the process faster.

p0018Due to the inclusion of the backdoor coupling, it is no longer absolutely necessary that the entire frequency range, which is known to be used for communication, has to be determined since the frequency range for the backdoor coupling is very much dependent on the geometric dimensions of the target.

p0019If electronic components are destroyed in the target, the spectral radiations will also change. This provides the possibility of being able to measure the spectral radiation and to detect / destroy the destruction after the execution or in suitable time windows during the irradiation.

p0020The invention is explained in more detail by means of an exemplary embodiment with a drawing.

p00211 shows a device 10 with a detection system 1, in this case a non-linear transition detector 1, consisting of at least one transmitter 1.1 and at least one receiver 1.2, which are located in a housing 1.3 in a preferred embodiment for detecting the electronics 2.1 of a target (Target) 2. Separate arrangements of transmitter 1.1 and receiver 1.2 are also possible. Furthermore, at least one further transmitter 5 is provided for emitting a transmission frequency f₄ For destroying the electronics 2.1 of the target 2 into the device 10. A transmitter communicating with the target 2 is indicated at 20. The evaluation unit is marked with 6. It controls the transmission frequency f and evaluates the incoming signals to the detection system 1

p0022The transition detector 1 has at least one antenna 3 via which a narrow-band signal can be emitted within a bandwidth of several 100 MHz. This one antenna 3 is a broadband antenna capable of transmitting and receiving in both polarizations. Two or three antennas (not shown in detail) are also possible, whereby, for example, an individual antenna can be assigned to each transmitter 1.1, 5 and to each receiver 1.2.

p0023According to the radiated frequency f₁ In the reception range of the detector 1.2 only signals of the frequencies f₂= 2 * f₁ and f₃= 3 * f₁ And evaluated in the evaluation unit. The frequency f₁ Can be varied by an electronics 4 both linearly and in certain steps. This change takes place until an optimum transmission frequency f₁ . (This can be seen in the fact that the two harmonic signals with a maximum signal strength again impinge on the receiver 1.2, whereby it can be assumed that the optimum transmission frequency f₁ As well as the harmonics coincide with the so-called frequency holes of the target 2 and represent the reception bandwidth of the target.)

p0024With this optimum or optimized frequency f₁ The target 2 is now irradiated and the transformed response in the detector 1.2 is used to infer the presence of nonlinear circuits or components in the target 2. This optimized frequency f₁ Also permits a greater distance measurement between the transition detector 1 and the target 2.

p0025Through this target detection the frequency range f₄ Of the communication line S_k (Reception bandwidth) in the frontdoor or the coupling-in window in the backdoor area of ​​the transmitter 20 as well as the location of the RCIED 21 (the destination 2) in the evaluation unit 6 are determined. After determining the optimum frequencies by the evaluation unit 6, a powerful signal is transmitted by the transmitter 5 into the local area on the frequency f determined by the detection system 1₄ Posted. As a result, the detected frontdoor or backdoor frequency is now coupled into the RCIED 21 of the electronics 2.1, and the electronic components, preferably the receiving part, are destroyed.

p0026In cases where the input amplification of the target 2 is used, it is recommended to choose a frequency typical for the communication of these targets 2.