Card having a chip and a physical security element logically linked to the chip

0001A secure portable object comprising an object body, a microchip and means for enabling communication with said object the outside world, and a method of securing such an object.

0002It relates more particularly cards chip.

0003Smart cards are standardized objects comprising a card body, a chip and an interface communication with the outside world.

0004The card body comprises data that can be fixed, that is to say which do not depend on its holder or so, variables. These data are often printed on the card body. This is by example of a card number or a photograph.

0005Similarly, the chip comprises different types of data including fixed and variable data, these data being stored in a memory of the chip.

0006The communication interface between the card and the outside world is formed by flush contacts the card body or an antenna embedded in the body of map. According to the media in which it features, the map is said to contact, contactless, hybrid or dual interface (dual interface).

0007It is possible to secure smart cards adding, to the card body, fixed data, for traceability of a batch of cards, or data variables on a security linked to the object carrier.

0008For maximum security, this data is hidden on the object body.

0009Such security by adding data hidden may for example be in the form a hidden image printed on the card body. This image is then printed during the printing of visual background if the data are fixed, and then, the during the step of personalization of the card, if the data variables. It can be performed according to different techniques such as digital watermarking (Watermarking) or marketed Technical under the names CRYPTOGLYPHE ™, SCRAMBLED INDICIA ™, IPI ™ or ICI ™.

0010Security by adding hidden data may also be produced by the addition of an element physical security to the object body. This is by eg nano physical barcode with response Safe, in particular a magnetic signal, or any other inviolable security features.

0011One particular technique used to connect the security element to another element of the object portable. This is the technique developed by the NOVATEC ™ for the security element called PROOFTAG ™, and based on the generation of bubbles random. In this case, the base querying data for decoding the PROOFTAG ™ is accompanied by a check with the magnetic strip or with data printed card body.

0012However, in general, the audit after reading the physical security information hidden requires access to a database, which engendre des difficultés de stockage de ces données, de Securing stored data and, quite simply, Access to this data.

0013Given the above, a problem that solved by the invention is to provide an object secure portable, and a method of securing such an object, which overcome the aforementioned disadvantages of the prior art and which does not require access to a database for verifying the element secured.

0014The solution of the invention that has been a problem for first object, a secure portable object comprising a object body, an electronic chip and means for enabling communication with said object the world outside, characterized in that it further comprises data, encoded data corresponding to these data and a key, and in that the encoded data are adapted to be decoded by means of a cryptographic algorithm and said key.

0015Its second object a security method a portable object having an object body, a chip and electronic means for enabling a said object communication with the outside world, characterized in that it comprises the following steps, according to which: the object is provided with data, encoded data corresponding to the data and a key ; the encoded data is decoded by means of a cryptographic algorithm and the key; and data encoded and decoded data are compared to.

0016As the key of the cryptographic algorithm is recorded in the object, in particular in a memory the chip, it is possible to use this key to decrypting the encrypted data and order data decoded corresponding to native data. A comparison between these data and decoded data native can thus be performed to verify the absence fraud on the subject, without however necessary to access a database.

0017The invention will be better understood on reading the non-limiting description which follows, written in the accompanying drawings, in which:<ul><li>1A and 1B show, respectively top view and in cross section a mode of producing a card of the invention; and</li><li>2 illustrates a mode of implementation of the method of the invention.</li></ul>

0018The secure portable object according to the invention is a smart card or any other secure portable object integrating an electronic chip. It may therefore be a secure electronic passport or a visa. In the case a smart card, the card may be in contact, without contact, called hybrid or dual interface.

00191A and 1B refer to a smart card contacts. This card has a card body 11, a chip 12 as well as means for allowing communication of said card with the world outside, these means being formed by a set of contact pads 13.

0020The card body is formed by a plurality of thermoplastic sheets joined by rolling hot. These dimensions are defined by ISO 7810. They are 86 mm long, 54 mm the width and 0.76 mm thick.

0021The card body 11 has fixed data, and consequently common to a lot of cards, or so, variables, and unique result for each card. In Example 1A and 1B, these data are visible data variables consist of a 14 visible photograph of the cardholder. In Further, the card body 15 includes encoded data and a connecting link between the data not said encoded native and the encoded data. Indeed, the encoded data is formed from the image data native obtained by encoding by means of an algorithm and cryptographic key. In the present example, it is a digital signature obtained from image data of the cardholder, the signature being obtained by a cryptographic algorithm asymmetric to private / public key such as RSA (Rivest, Shamir, Adleman) algorithm or the Diffie Hellman.

0022The encoded data are arranged on the printed card body. They may be hidden according to the known methods of the prior art and in particular cited in the preamble of the present description, or then they may be visible. Anyway, according to the invention it is not possible to verify immediate way of mapping data native 14 and 15 without the encoded data knowledge of the algorithm for the decoding and the key, a public key in the case of RSA.

0023The chip 12 is particularly provided with a microcontroller volatile memory (RAM) and non-volatile EEPROM. It may contain, for some applications safe, a crypto processor associated. This chip 12 includes pads, these pads are connected to the beaches contact 13 of the card by conductors 16 son (Wire bonding) of Example 1A and 1B. She is further coated with a protective resin, all chip 12, son conductors 16, and protective resin conductive pads 13 forming an embedded micromodule in a cavity of the card body 11.

0024According to the invention the key to the decoding encoded data is stored in the card. She is is recorded in a nonvolatile memory of the chip, or printed and hidden on the card body, by example in the form of a bar code printing sufficient capacity, which will decode the encoded data even in the case where the chip does not work.

0025Figure 2 shows the different steps of the method for securing a card of the invention.

0026As shown in this figure, native data, fixed or variable, customization of the card are first obtained 21. This is by example of digital data from one of recording scan of a photograph of cardholder or a serial number of the map.

0027The data obtained are then encoded to 22 obtaining encoded data by means of an algorithm encryption and a private key generated for encoding, this private key being such a private key 128 bits commonly used in systems Current cryptographic.

0028In order to further improve the security of method of the invention, the private key which allowed encoding is destroyed 23. Thus, without knowledge the private key, it is not possible to encrypt the new data to obtain data encoded. A fraudster will therefore not reproduce encoded data, even if he wishes.

0029Then the card has native data and 24. If these data encoded data is data destinées au corps de carte, par exemple une photographie and a signature of this photograph, they are printed on the card body during the physical card personalization. In the case where these data is digital data to be recorded in the or one of the chip card, example, a serial number of the card and encoding this number, they are saved in the Electrical personalization of the card. different embodiments are possible here as the invention either native data and data encoded are positioned on the card body; is native data and encoded data recorded in one or more chips; either native data are positioned on the card body and the encoded data is stored in the chip (Which will usually be the case); or whether the data native is stored in the chip and data encoded are positioned on the card body.

0030Finally, according to the step referenced 25 to 2, the public key capable of ensuring the decoding of the encoded data in combination with an algorithm of decryption is stored in a memory chip or a chip if the card has several. The key public can also be hidden in the card body.

0031For the verification of the absence of fraud on card of the invention, the public key, which is recovered in the chip or on the card body, is used to decrypt the encoded data 26.

0032The decrypted data is then compared with 27 native data so as to verify their correspondence. If this match exists, then the card does not normally the subject of fraud. Yes this correspondence does not exist, then the card has subject to fraud. No access to a database is required.

0033Ultimately, there is a secure link between Physical security element hidden (data encoded) in general on the object body and the chip (Non-contact or contact) and this link allows - to refrain from the use of databases for the Verification of variable data; - To fight the times against fraud on the chip by example, in the case of a contact chip card, fight against the exchange of the card body module and against forgery of the card body, by example, in the case of a personalized card, for fight against the falsification of photography printed; and - print the security level the physical element the optimal security level of the chip.

0034Furthermore, this secure link between the element of physical security hidden, fixed or variable, and or Flea of ​​the object is achieved through a system cryptographic which can be: - secure data Physical security element to the hidden or fleas ; or - secure data or fleas to the physical data of the security element Physical hidden.

0035Of course, many embodiments according to the invention which is not disclosed in this description and are within reach of the skilled having knowledge of this disclosure, are contained within the broad scope of the invention. The examples which following are some embodiments among others. Examples 1 to 4 are examples in which the security association is performed in the direction of securing the carrier to the physical data chip. Examples 5 and 6 are examples in which the security association is performed in the direction of secure data to the chip data Physical carrier.

Example 1: card with a photograph and

the blurred image of this photograph

0036During the personalization of a card, photograph of the holder is scanned and then encoded as the form of a blurred image by an algorithm A with a private key. The photograph of the card holder and the blurred image of this photograph is then printed on the card body, the image being blurred hidden in photography through technical type digital watermarking, CRYPTOGLYPHE (TM) SCRAMBLED INDICIA (TM), IPI (TM) or HERE (TM). Once set circulation, to verify that the card has not subject to fraud, just scan the image blurred, the decoding algorithm with a B (Corresponding to the algorithm A) and the public key previously stored in the chip. This decoding the blurred image provides a photograph that Simply superimpose specific benchmarks for this photography with the same marks on the photograph original card body to check the validity of the map. A reference example can be a point the axis between the eyes of the card holder such represented on a digital photograph.

Example 2: first variant of the example 1

0037In this example, encoded data of Example 1, that is to say, the blurred picture, are not printed on the card body. They are merely registered in the chip, or even in a second chip of the map.

Example 3: second variant of Example 1

0038In this example, the information of the hidden image read and then decrypted by the B algorithm is compared by chip with printed information on the card other than printing the scrambled data code such as a bars in one dimension or in two dimensions or Online OCR (Optical Character Recognition - Recognition Optical Character).

Example 4: third variant of Example 1

0039In this example, an additional test is performed to verify that the card has not been counterfeit, although it could decrypt the information hidden, may be to: - enter characteristic of the printed image after printing; - Store these Unique features for the hardware; and - use this data as a response control element true / false, in addition to reading the hidden information decrypted.

Example 5: card for which data of the chip is encoded

0040In this case, it is the variable data stored in the smart card chip, or one chip if the card has several that are encrypted an algorithm A using a private key generated in this chip to be transformed into an encoded image hidden using a technique of digital type watermarking, CRYPTOGLYPHE ™, SCRAMBLED INDICIA ™, IPI ™ or ICI ™, the encoded image is printed at the personalization of the card. While decrypting with the public key, also registered in the chip, a algorithm B corresponding to the algorithm A, allows decode the hidden encoded image and thus verify information with data stored in the chip. In practice, the data are subject to encoding are the founder of the number or the serial number of the card.

Example 6: variant of Example 5

0041In this example, the encrypted data are not data such as the chipmaker number or number Series card but a response from the holder map to a given question such as, for example, maiden name of the mother of the owner. To check the authenticity of the card according to the invention, the data encrypted and decrypted and the response is compared with the response in otherwise on the card body and / or with the answer given by the holder of the map.