Encryption of system paging file
10 claims: 10 independent, 0 dependent
- 1A method of protecting a virtual memory comprising:storing data in a plurality of pages of a volatile memory;determining to move contents of a first one of said plurality of pages from said volatile memory to a paging file (206) stored on a disk;providing said contents to a file system (208) with instructions to store said contents in a paging file, said paging file being marked for encryption, said file system causing said contents to be encrypted with a session key (302) prior to storing said contents in said paging file, said session key being required to decrypt information contained in said paging file;andwherein the file system causes said contents to be encrypted by communicating with an encryption component (304), the encryption component encrypting files that have been marked by the file system for encryption,characterised in that: said session key is stored in a manner such that a reboot of a machine on which said session key is stored causes said session key to be lost;said session key is generated upon a boot of said machine, andprior to generation of said session key, a block of said volatile memory for use as a workspace for the encryption component is reserved, whereby use of the workspace avoids the need to copy volatile memory contents to disk prior to generation of the session key. Procédé de protection d'une mémoire virtuelle comprenant : le stockage de données dans une pluralité de pages d'une mémoire volatile,la détermination du déplacement du contenu d'une première depuis ladite pluralité de pages de ladite mémoire volatile jusqu'à un fichier de pagination (206) stocké sur un disque,la fourniture dudit contenu à un système de fichiers (208) avec des instructions pour stocker ledit contenu dans un fichier de pagination, ledit fichier de pagination étant marqué en vue d'un cryptage, ledit système de fichiers provoquant le cryptage dudit contenu grâce à une clé de session (302) avant le stockage dudit contenu dans ledit fichier de pagination, ladite clé de session étant requise pour décrypter les informations contenues dans ledit fichier de pagination, etdans lequel le système de fichiers provoque le cryptage dudit contenu en communiquant avec un composant de cryptage (304), le composant de cryptage cryptant des fichiers qui ont été marqués par le système de fichiers en vue de cryptage,caractérisé en ce que : ladite clé de session est stockée de manière telle qu'un réamorçage d'une machine sur laquelle est stockée ladite clé de cryptage provoque la perte de ladite clé de session,ladite clé de session est générée sur un amorçage de ladite machine, etavant la génération de ladite clé de cryptage est réservé un bloc de ladite mémoire volatile en vue d'une utilisation comme espace de travail pour le composant de cryptage,grâce à quoi l'utilisation de l'espace de travail évite le besoin de copier le contenu de la mémoire volatile sur un disque avant la génération de la clé de session. Verfahren zum Schutz eines virtuellen Speichers, umfassend: Speichern von Daten in einer Vielzahl an Seiten eines flüchtigen Speichers;Beschließen, die Inhalte einer ersten Seite der Vielzahl an Seiten von dem flüchtigen Speicher zu einer auf einer Platte (disk) gespeicherten Auslagerungsdatei (206) zu verschieben;Bereitstellen der Inhalte einem Dateisystem (208) mit Anweisungen die Inhalte in einer Auslagerungsdatei zu speichern, wobei die Auslagerungsdatei für eine Verschlüsselung markiert wird, wobei das Dateisystem veranlasst, dass die Inhalte mittels eines Sitzungsschlüssels (302) vor dem Speichern der Inhalte in der Auslagerungsdatei verschlüsselt werden, wobei es erforderlich ist, dass der Sitzungsschlüssel in der Auslagerungsdatei enthaltene Information entschlüsselt;undwobei das Dateisystem veranlasst, dass die Inhalte durch Kommunizieren mit einer Verschlüsselungskomponente (304) verschlüsselt werden, wobei die Verschlüsselungskomponente Dateien verschlüsselt, die durch das Dateiensystem für eine Verschlüsselung markiert worden sind,dadurch gekennzeichnet, dassder Sitzungsschlüssel auf eine Art und Weise gespeichert wird, dass ein erneutes Hochfahren des Geräts, auf dem der Sitzungsschlüssel gespeichert ist, dazu führt, dass der Sitzungsschlüssel verloren geht;wobei der Sitzungsschlüssel bei einem Hochfahren des Geräts erzeugt wird, undvor der Erzeugung des Sitzungsschlüssels ein Block des flüchtigen Speichers für die Verwendung als eine Arbeitsumgebung für die Verschlüsselungskomponente reserviert wird,wobei die Verwendung der Arbeitsumgebung die Notwendigkeit ausschließt, die Inhalte des flüchtigen Speichers vor der Erzeugung des Sitzungsschlüssels auf der Platte zu speichern.
- 2Procédé selon la revendication 1, comprenant en outre :la réservation d'un bloc de ladite mémoire volatile dans laquelle peuvent être passées dans un sens et dans l'autre des données entre le système de fichiers et le composant de cryptage. The method of claim 1, further comprising: reserving a block of said volatile memory in which data may be passed back and forth between the file system and the encryption component. Verfahren nach Anspruch 1, des Weiteren umfassend: Reservieren eines Blocks des flüchtigen Speichers, in dem Daten zwischen dem Dateisystem und der Verschlüsselungskomponente hin- und hergeschoben werden können.
- 3A system for maintaining an encrypted paging file that stores virtual memory data for a computer, the system comprising:an encryption component that receives data and performs encryption and decryption operations on said data using a key;a virtual memory manager that copies or moves data from volatile memory to disk by requesting that a file system store the copied or moved data in a paging file, the file system calling upon the encryption component to encrypt the copied or moved data with said key;characterised in that: the system comprises a mechanism that generates said key upon a boot of the computer;a storage location in the computer that stores said key in a manner that causes said key not to persist across boots of the computer;and in that it is further configured such that the encryption component reserves a block of memory upon startup which is used as a workspace for the encryption component prior to generation of said key, and such that sufficient space for storage of said encryption component's operating data exists in said volatile memory prior to generation of said key. System zur Aufrechterhaltung einer verschlüsselten Auslagerungsdatei, die virtuelle Speicherdaten für einen Computer speichert, wobei das System umfasst: eine Verschlüsselungskomponente, die Daten empfängt und Verschlüsselungs- und Entschlüsselungsoperationen der Daten unter Anwendung eines Schlüssels durchführt;einen virtuellen Speicherverwalter, der Daten vom flüchtigen Speicher zu der Platte kopiert oder verschiebt, indem er fordert, dass ein Dateisystem die kopierten oder verschobenen Daten in einer Austauschdatei speichert, wobei das Dateisystem die Verschlüsselungskomponente aufruft, um die kopierten oder bewegten Daten mittels des Schlüssels zu verschlüsseln,dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass: das System einen Mechanismus umfasst, der den Schlüssel bei einem Hochfahren des Computers erzeugt;einen Speicherplatz in dem Computer, der den Schlüssel auf eine Art und Weise speichert, die dazu führt, dass der Schlüssel über Vorgänge des Hochfahrens des Computers hinweg nicht bestehen bleibt;und dadurch, dass es des Weiteren so konfiguriert ist, dass die Verschlüsselungskomponente beim Neustart vor der Erzeugung des Schlüssels einen Block des Speichers reserviert, der als eine Arbeitsumgebung für die Verschlüsselungskomponente verwendet wird,und dadurch, dass ausreichend Platz zur Speicherung der Betriebsdaten der Verschlüsselungskomponente in dem flüchtigen Speicher vor der Erzeugung des Schlüssels existiert. Système de support d'un fichier de pagination cryptée qui stocke des données de mémoire virtuelle pour un ordinateur, le système comprenant : un composant de cryptage qui reçoit des données et effectue des opérations de cryptage et de décryptage sur lesdites données en utilisant une clé,un gestionnaire de mémoire virtuelle qui copie ou déplace des données de la mémoire virtuelle sur le disque en demandant qu'un système de fichiers stocke les données copiées ou déplacées dans un fichier de pagination, le système de fichiers appelant le composant de cryptage pour qu'il crypte les données copiées ou déplacées avec ladite clé,caractérisé en ce que : le système comprend un mécanisme qui génère ladite clé lors de l'amorçage de l'ordinateur,un emplacement de stockage dans l'ordinateur qui stocke ladite clé de manière à ce que ladite clé ne persiste pas d'un amorçage à l'autre de l'ordinateur, et en ce qu'il est en outre configuré de sorte à ce que le composant de cryptage réserve un bloc de mémoire au démarrage, lequel est utilisé comme espace de travail pour le composant de cryptage avant la génération de ladite clé, et de sorte à ce qu'un espace suffisant pour le stockage desdites donnés d'exploitation du composant de cryptage soit ménagé dans ladite mémoire volatile avant la génération de ladite clé.
- 4System nach Anspruch 3, wobei der Speicherblock als ein Puffer verwendet wird, um Information zwischen dem Dateisystem und der Verschlüsselungskomponente weiterzugeben. Système selon la revendication 3, dans lequel le bloc de mémoire est utilisé comme mémoire tampon pour passer des informations entre le système de fichiers et le composant de cryptage. The system of claim 3, wherein the block of memory is used as a buffer to pass information between the file system and the encryption component.
- 5System nach Anspruch 3, wobei der Schlüssel erzeugt wird, bevor der virtuelle Speicherverwalter die Speicherung der Daten in die Auslagerungsdatei einleitet. Système selon la revendication 3, dans lequel ladite clé est générée avant que ledit gestionnaire de mémoire virtuelle oriente le stockage de données dans le fichier de pagination. The system of claim 3, wherein said key is generated before said virtual memory manager directs the storage of data into the paging file.
- 6System nach Anspruch 3, wobei der Schlüssel in dem flüchtigen Speicher gespeichert wird, und wobei keine Kopie des Schlüssels in irgendeinem nichtflüchtigen Speicher oder Speichervorrichtung des Computers gespeichert wird. Système selon la revendication 3, dans lequel ladite clé est stockée dans ladite mémoire volatile, et dans lequel aucune copie de ladite clé n'est stockée dans une quelconque mémoire non volatile ou autre dispositif de stockage de l'ordinateur. The system of claim 3, wherein said key is stored in said volatile memory, and wherein no copy of said key is stored in any non-volatile memory or storage device of the computer.
- 7System nach Anspruch 3, wobei die Verschlüsselung der Daten nach einem oder mehreren der nachstehenden Algorithmen durchgeführt wird:Daten-Verschlüsselungs-Standard (DES: Data Encryption Standard);Dreifach-DES (3DES);oderFortgeschrittener Verschlüsselungsstandard (AES: Advanced Encryption Standard). Système selon la revendication 3, dans lequel le cryptage des données est effectué en fonction de la de plusieurs des algorithmes suivants : la norme de cryptage de données (DES),la norme triple DES (3DES), oula norme de cryptage avancé (AES). The system of claim 3, wherein encryption of the data is performed according to one or more of the following algorithms: Data Encryption Standard (DES);Triple-DES (3DES);orAdvanced Encryption Standard (AES).
- 8System nach Anspruch 3, wobei das System des Weiteren die Inhalte des virtuellen Speichers schützt, indem es sicherstellt, dass alle Anwendungen und Daten im Benutzermodus, die in dem virtuellen Speicher gespeichert sind, verschlüsselt sind, wenn sie in der Auslagerungsdatei gespeichert werden. Système selon la revendication 3, dans lequel le système protège en outre le contenu de la mémoire virtuelle en garantissant que toutes les applications en mode utilisateur et les données qui sont stockées dans la mémoire virtuelle sont cryptées lorsqu'elles sont stockées dans le fichier de pagination. The system of claim 3, wherein the system further protects the contents of the virtual memory by ensuring that all user mode applications and data that are stored in the virtual memory are encrypted when being stored in the paging file.
- 9A computer-readable medium encoded with computer executable instructions to perform a method that takes place upon startup of a computer, the method comprising:retrieving information indicating that virtual memory data stored on disk is to be encrypted;marking a paging file as an encrypted file;receiving, from a memory manager, data from a volatile storage device that is to be stored on disk in the paging file;andprotecting the received data from observation by encrypting the received data with a session key prior to storing said data in the paging file;characterised in that: a session key is generated upon a boot of the computer;said session key is stored in a non-persistent manner that does not survive across machine boots;and in that a block of memory prior to generation of the session key is reserved, wherein the block of memory is used either as: a buffer to pass data between a file system that maintains the paging file and an encryption component that performs encryption and decryption of the data with the session key;ora workspace usable by the encryption component prior to generation of the session key. Computerlesbares Medium, codiert mittels computerausführbaren Anweisungen, um ein Verfahren durchzuführen, das beim Starten eines Computers stattfindet, wobei das Verfahren umfasst: Abruf von Information, die angibt, dass auf einer Platte gespeicherte virtuelle Speicherdaten verschlüsselt werden sollen;Markieren einer Auslagerungsdatei als eine verschlüsselte Datei;Empfangen, von einem Speicherverwalter, von Daten aus einer flüchtigen Speichervorrichtung, die auf einer Platte in der Auslagerungsdatei gespeichert werden sollen;undSchützen der erhaltenen Daten vor einer Beobachtung durch Verschlüsseln der empfangenen Daten mittels eines Sitzungsschlüssels vor der Speicherung der Daten in der Auslagerungsdatei;dadurch gekennzeichnet, dassein Sitzungsschlüssel bei einem Hochfahren des Computers erzeugt wird;der Sitzungsschlüssel in einer nicht-persistenten Art und Weise gespeichert wird, bei der er über Hochfahrvorgänge des Geräts hinweg nicht bestehen bleibt;und dadurch, dassein Block des Speichers vor der Erzeugung des Sitzungsschlüssels reserviert wird,wobei der Block des Speichers verwendet wird, entweder als: ein Puffer, um Daten zwischen einem Datensystem, das die Auslagerungsdatei beibehält, und einer Verschlüsselungskomponente, die die Verschlüsselung und Entschlüsselung der Daten mittels des Sitzungsschlüssels durchführt, weiterzugeben;oder alseine Arbeitsumgebung, die vor der Erzeugung des Sitzungsschlüssels durch die Verschlüsselungskomponente genutzt werden kann. Support pouvant être lu par un ordinateur codé avec des instructions exécutables par ordinateur pour réaliser un procédé qui prend place au démarrage d'un ordinateur, le procédé comprenant : la récupération d'informations indiquant que des données en mémoire virtuelle stockées sur un disque doivent être cryptées,le marquage d'un fichier de pagination comme fichier crypté,la réception, en provenance d'un gestionnaire de mémoire, de données provenant d'un dispositif de stockage volatil, lesquelles doivent être stockées sur disque dans le fichier de pagination, etla protection des données reçues de toute observation en cryptant les données reçues grâce à une clé de session avant de stocker lesdites données dans le fichier de pagination,caractérisé en ce que : une clé de session est générée lors d'un amorçage de l'ordinateur,ladite clé de session est stockée de manière non persistante, laquelle ne survit pas d'un amorçage de machine à l'autre, et en ce queun bloc de mémoire est réservé avant la génération de la clé de session, le bloc de mémoire étant utilisé soit : comme mémoire tampon pour transférer les données entre un système de fichiers qui maintient un fichier de pagination et un composant de cryptage qui effectue un cryptage et un décryptage des données avec la clé de session, soitcomme espace de travail utilisable par le composant de cryptage avant la génération de la clé de session.
- 10Computerlesbares Medium nach Anspruch 9, wobei der Sitzungsschlüssel in der flüchtigen Speichervorrichtung gespeichert wird, und keine Kopie des Sitzungsschlüssels auf einer Platte gespeichert wird. Support pouvant être lu par ordinateur selon la revendication 9, dans lequel la clé de session est stockée dans le dispositif de stockage volatil et dans lequel aucune copie de la clé de session n'est stockée sur disque. The computer-readable medium of claim 9, wherein the session key is stored in the volatile storage device, and no copy of the session key is stored on disk.
Independent claims10
42 paragraphs in 4 sections, as filed
FIELD OF THE INVENTION
The present invention relates generally to the file of computing, and, more particularly, to a mechanism for encrypting and decrypting a virtual memory paging file.
BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION
Modern computer systems typically provide a virtual memory facility in order to make available memory capacity beyond the size of the physical random access memory (RAM). Virtual memory systems provide a virtual address space, which may be larger than the physical address space. In order to keep the virtual memory from overflowing the contents of the physical address space, pages are copied out of the physical memory when more space in the physical memory is needed, and into the physical memory when a program needs to access those pages. When a page is copied out of the physical memory, the contents of the page is stored on disk in a file called a "paging file."
A problem with storing images of memory pages on disk - even temporarily - is that it is difficult to protect the contents of those pages from unauthorized observation. The physical memory is generally a volatile memory that will lose its contents if power to the system is removed. Therefore, there is assurance that any secret data stored in the volatile memory cannot be recovered by an unauthorized observer if the system is turned off, crashes, or is rebooted. However, if data from the volatile has been copied to the paging file, then this data can be observed by anyone with access to the disk, and this data will still exist on disk following a power-off event, crash, or reboot. This potential presents a security risk if the data is secret, or otherwise sensitive, since an attacker could obtain this data from the disk.
In view of the foregoing, there is for a mechanism to protect a paging file that overcomes the drawbacks of the prior art.
<patcit id="pcit0001" dnum="US20020099946A"><text>US 2002/0099946</text></patcit> is directed to a cryptographically protected paging subsystem. Virtual memory uses external memory devices such as hard disk drives, magnetic tape, to ameliorate the physical memory constraints of RAM. Virtual memory has a hierarchical structure based on a page directory, page tables, and page frames. An encryption/ decryption engine encrypts outgoing pages and decrypts incoming pages at an interface before sending them to an external storage or integrity check engine, respectively.
<patcit id="pcit0002" dnum="US6003117A"><text>US 6,003,117</text></patcit> is directed to a secure memory management unit which utilizes a system processor to perform page swapping. A soft secure memory management unit, within an integrated circuit, monitors data accesses by a processor. When second data needs to be swapped back from a main memory to an external memory, the processor oversees encryption of the second data and oversees transfer of the second data to the external memory.
<patcit id="pcit0003" dnum="US5825878A"><text>US 5,825,878</text></patcit> is directed to a secure memory management unit for microprocessor. Information passing from and to an external memory is loaded on a page-by-page basis. The system employs a virtual memory concept to load encrypted instructions from the external memory.
<patcit id="pcit0004" dnum="US20030133574A"><text>US 2003/0133574</text></patcit> is directed to a secure CPU and memory management unit with cryptographic extensions. A processor provides virtual address information to a memory management unit. In response, the memory management unit retrieves a key tag and physical address information corresponding to the virtual address information.
<patcit id="pcit0005" dnum="US20030033537A"><text>US 2003/0033537</text></patcit> is directed to a tamper resistant microprocessor using fast context switching. An operation information saving unit is configured to encrypt operation information indicating an operation state of the microprocessor by using a secret key generated by a temporary key generation unit and store encrypted operation information into an external memory.
The present invention provides a method according to claim 1 and a system according to claim 3 and protects a paging file by encrypting the data stored in the paging file. In accordance with the invention, the paging file is marked for encryption. The paging file is stored in a file system that has a file encryption facility. File systems that provide for file encryption are described in <patcit id="pcit0006" dnum="US6249866B"><text>U.S. Patent No. 6,249,866</text></patcit>, which is incorporated herein by reference. When the virtual memory manager passes to the file system data to be stored in the paging file, the file system sees that paging file is marked for encryption and causes the data to be encrypted prior to storing the data in the paging file. The file system may communicate with an encryption component in order to perform the actual encryption. The encryption component receives clear text from the file system, applies an encryption key to create ciphertext, and passes ciphertext back to the file system to be stored in the paging file.
Existing file encryption systems generally encrypt the file, and also persist a copy of the key that is needed to decrypt the file. Persistent key storage makes sense in the case of ordinary files, because these files are intended for long-term storage, and it is usually necessary to be able to decrypt these files across boots of the machine. Paging files are different from ordinary files in the sense that paging files are temporary repositories for data that is meaningful only in the context of a single instantiation of a computing environment (e.g., between boots of a machine). Thus, the paging file data has little value after the system has been rebooted, and storage of this data in a usable form is a liability in the sense that it poses a security risk. Thus, persisting the key that is needed to decrypt paging file data may be disadvantageous, since doing so may allow data - including secret or sensitive data - to be decrypted in some unpredictable context (e.g., after the hard disk has been removed from its intended machine and installed on a hacker's machine). In accordance with one feature of the invention, a session key is generated once per boot, and the session key is used to encrypt and decrypt the contents of the paging file only during a single run of the system (e.g., between a startup and a shutdown). The session key is not persisted across boots of the machine.
Since it may be necessary to copy pages of physical memory to the paging file at any time after boot, the session key is preferably generated very shortly after the machine is booted in order to ensure that the key is ready to service any request to write the paging file. Preferably, the component that generates the key reserves a block of physical memory very shortly after startup. This reserved memory may be used as a workspace for the encryption component to encrypt data destined for the page file, and/or as a buffer to pass data between the file system and the encryption component.
Other features of the invention are described below.
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
The foregoing summary, as well as the following detailed description of preferred embodiments, is better understood when read in conjunction with the appended drawings. For the purpose of illustrating the invention, there is shown in the drawings exemplary constructions of the invention; however, the invention is not limited to the specific methods and instrumentalities disclosed. In the drawings: <ul id="ul0001" list-style="none" compact="compact"><li><figref idref="f0001">FIG. 1</figref> is a block diagram of an example computing environment in which aspects of the invention may be implemented;</li><li><figref idref="f0002">FIG. 2</figref> is a block diagram of a computer memory and its relationship to a file system;</li><li><figref idref="f0003">FIG. 3</figref> is a block diagram of a mechanism that encrypts files;</li><li><figref idref="f0004">FIG. 4</figref> is a flow diagram of a process that prepares a system for paging file encryption;</li><li><figref idref="f0005">FIG. 5</figref> is a flow diagram of a process for encrypting memory data to be stored in a paging file;</li><li><figref idref="f0006">FIG. 6</figref> is a block diagram of a memory manager, which retrieves a page from an encrypted paging file.</li></ul>
DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION
Overview
A virtual memory manager provides a virtual address space that may be larger than the physical volatile memory of a machine. The virtual memory manager performs this task by copying data into an out of the volatile memory as needed. When data is copied out of the volatile memory, the data is stored on disk in a paging file. The present invention provides a mechanism whereby data stored in the paging file may be protected from unauthorized observation, by storing the paging file data in an encrypted form.
Example Computing Arrangement
<figref idref="f0001">FIG. 1</figref> shows an exemplary computing environment in which aspects of the invention may be implemented. The computing system environment 100 is only one example of a suitable computing environment and is not intended to suggest any limitation as to the scope of use or functionality of the invention. Neither should the computing environment 100 be interpreted as having any dependency or requirement relating to any one or combination of components illustrated in the exemplary operating environment 100.
The invention is operational with numerous other general purpose or special purpose computing system environments or configurations. Examples of well known computing systems, environments, and/or configurations that may be suitable for use with the invention include, but are not limited to, personal computers, server computers, hand-held or laptop devices, multiprocessor systems, microprocessor-based systems, set top boxes, programmable consumer electronics, network PCs, minicomputers, mainframe computers, embedded systems, distributed computing environments that include any of the above systems or devices, and the like.
The invention may be described in the general context of computer-executable instructions, such as program modules, being executed by a computer. Generally, program modules include routines, programs, objects, components, data structures, etc. that perform particular tasks or implement particular abstract data types. The invention may also be practiced in distributed computing environments where tasks are performed by remote processing devices that are linked through a communications network or other data transmission medium. In a distributed computing environment, program modules and other data may be located in both local and remote computer storage media including memory storage devices.
With reference to <figref idref="f0001">FIG. 1</figref>, an exemplary system for implementing the invention includes a general purpose computing device in the form of a computer 110. Components of computer 110 may include, but are not limited to, a processing unit 120, a system memory 130, and a system bus 121 that couples various system components including the system memory to the processing unit 120. The processing unit 120 may represent multiple logical processing units such as those supported on a multi-threaded processor. The system bus 121 may be any of several types of bus structures including a memory bus or memory controller, a peripheral bus, and a local bus using any of a variety of bus architectures. By way of example, and not limitation, such architectures include Industry Standard Architecture (ISA) bus, Micro Channel Architecture (MCA) bus, Enhanced ISA (EISA) bus, Video Electronics Standards Association (VESA) local bus, and Peripheral Component Interconnect (PCI) bus (also known as Mezzanine bus). The system bus 121 may also be implemented as a point-to-point connection, switching fabric, or the like, among the communicating devices.
Computer 110 typically includes a variety of computer readable media. Computer readable media can be any available media that can be accessed by computer 110 and includes both volatile and nonvolatile media, removable and non-removable media. By way of example, and not limitation, computer readable media may comprise computer storage media and communication media. Computer storage media includes both volatile and nonvolatile, removable and non-removable media implemented in any method or technology for storage of information such as computer readable instructions, data structures, program modules or other data. Computer storage media includes, but is not limited to, RAM, ROM, EEPROM, flash memory or other memory technology, CDROM, digital versatile disks (DVD) or other optical disk storage, magnetic cassettes, magnetic tape, magnetic disk storage or other magnetic storage devices, or any other medium which can be used to store the desired information and which can accessed by computer 110. Communication media typically embodies computer readable instructions, data structures, program modules or other data in a modulated data signal such as a carrier wave or other transport mechanism and includes any information delivery media. The term "modulated data signal" means a signal that has one or more of its characteristics set or changed in such a manner as to encode information in the signal. By way of example, and not limitation, communication media includes wired media such as a wired network or direct-wired connection, and wireless media such as acoustic, RF, infrared and other wireless media. Combinations of any of the above should also be included within the scope of computer readable media.
The system memory 130 includes computer storage media in the form of volatile and/or nonvolatile memory such as read only memory (ROM) 131 and random access memory (RAM) 132. A basic input/output system 133 (BIOS), containing the basic routines that help to transfer information between elements within computer 110, such as during startup, is typically stored in ROM 131. RAM 132 typically contains data and/or program modules that are immediately accessible to and/or presently being operated on by processing unit 120. By way of example, and not limitation, <figref idref="f0001">FIG. 1</figref> illustrates operating system 134, application programs 135, other program modules 136, and program data 137.
The computer 110 may also include other removable/non-removable, volatile/nonvolatile computer storage media. By way of example only, <figref idref="f0001">FIG. 1</figref> illustrates a hard disk drive 140 that reads from or writes to non-removable, nonvolatile magnetic media, a magnetic disk drive 151 that reads from or writes to a removable, nonvolatile magnetic disk 152, and an optical disk drive 155 that reads from or writes to a removable, nonvolatile optical disk 156, such as a CD ROM or other optical media. Other removable/non-removable, volatile/nonvolatile computer storage media that can be used in the exemplary operating environment include, but are not limited to, magnetic tape cassettes, flash memory cards, digital versatile disks, digital video tape, solid state RAM, solid state ROM, and the like. The hard disk drive 141 is typically connected to the system bus 121 through a non-removable memory interface such as interface 140, and magnetic disk drive 151 and optical disk drive 155 are typically connected to the system bus 121 by a removable memory interface, such as interface 150.
The drives and their associated computer storage media discussed above and illustrated in <figref idref="f0001">FIG. 1</figref>, provide storage of computer readable instructions, data structures, program modules and other data for the computer 110. In <figref idref="f0001">FIG. 1</figref>, for example, hard disk drive 141 is illustrated as storing operating system 144, application programs 145, other program modules 146, and program data 147. Note that these components can either be the same as or different from operating system 134, application programs 135, other program modules 136, and program data 137. Operating system 144, application programs 145, other program modules 146, and program data 147 are given different numbers here to illustrate that, at a minimum, they are different copies. A user may enter commands and information into the computer 20 through input devices such as a keyboard 162 and pointing device 161, commonly referred to as a mouse, trackball or touch pad. Other input devices (not shown) may include a microphone, joystick, game pad, satellite dish, scanner, or the like. These and other input devices are often connected to the processing unit 120 through a user input interface 160 that is coupled to the system bus, but may be connected by other interface and bus structures, such as a parallel port, game port or a universal serial bus (USB). A monitor 191 or other type of display device is also connected to the system bus 121 via an interface, such as a video interface 190. In addition to the monitor, computers may also include other peripheral output devices such as speakers 197 and printer 196, which may be connected through an output peripheral interface 195
The computer 110 may operate in a networked environment using logical connections to one or more remote computers, such as a remote computer 180. The remote computer 180 may be a personal computer, a server, a router, a network PC, a peer device or other common network node, and typically includes many or all of the elements described above relative to the computer 110, although only a memory storage device 181 has been illustrated in <figref idref="f0001">FIG. 1</figref>. The logical connections depicted in <figref idref="f0001">FIG. 1</figref> include a local area network (LAN) 171 and a wide area network (WAN) 173, but may also include other networks. Such networking environments are commonplace in offices, enterprise-wide computer networks, intranets and the Internet.
When used in a LAN networking environment, the computer 110 is connected to the LAN 171 through a network interface or adapter 170. When used in a WAN networking environment, the computer 110 typically includes a modem 172 or other means for establishing communications over the WAN 173, such as the Internet. The modem 172, which may be internal or external, may be connected to the system bus 121 via the user input interface 160, or other appropriate mechanism. In a networked environment, program modules depicted relative to the computer 110, or portions thereof, may be stored in the remote memory storage device. By way of example, and not limitation, <figref idref="f0001">FIG. 1</figref> illustrates remote application programs 185 as residing on memory device 181. It will be appreciated that the network connections shown are exemplary and other means of establishing a communications link between the computers may be used.
Storage of Memory Pages in a Paging File
<figref idref="f0002">FIG. 2</figref> shows a computer memory, and a file system in which pages of memory may be stored. A computer system includes a memory, such as RAM 132. RAM 132 is comprised of bytes of memory that may be organized into pages. Each page is a contiguous block of memory of a defined size - e.g., a typical system may support page sizes of 4 kilobytes, or 4 megabytes, or both sizes simultaneously. In the example of <figref idref="f0002">FIG. 2</figref>, RAM 132 contains pages 202(1), 202(2), 202(3), 202(4), 202(5), ..., 202(n).
File system 208 stores data on disk in the form of files, and also contains the software and/or hardware needed to organize the files (e.g., by maintaining directories of the files), perform storage and retrieval of the files, and perform other tasks related to the maintenance of files. In the example of <figref idref="f0002">FIG. 2</figref>, file system 208 stores files 204(1), 204(2), ..., 204(m). Additionally, file system 208 may store one or more paging files, such as paging file 206. Paging file 206 is a file that is used to store copies of pages from disk. Any program may maintain a paging file, although it is most typical for the operating system (e.g., operating system 134, shown in <figref idref="f0001">FIG. 1</figref>) to maintain a paging file for all applications and processes to share. In this example, paging file 206 is the paging file maintained by operating system 134. The MICROSOFT WINDOWS operating systems are examples of operating systems that maintain such a paging file. Operating system 134 copies pages of memory into paging file 206, when necessary to free up memory space. For example, operating system 134 may decide to free up space in RAM 132 by copying the contents of page 202(4) into paging file 206, and then reallocating the physical memory of page 202(4) for the storage of other data. Conversely, when operating system 134 receives a request to access data that is not stored in RAM 132 because the data is located on a page that was previously copied to paging file 206 (e.g., when a page fault exception is generated based on an attempt to access a page marked "not present" in the virtual address translation tables), operating system 134 copies the contents of the sought page out of paging file 206 and places it into a physical page frame of RAM 132 (and also adjusts the address translation tables to point to the new page's location).
One feature that may be provided by file system 208 is a file encryption component, as shown in <figref idref="f0003">FIG. 3</figref>. File system 208 stores a plurality of files (e.g., files 204(1), 204(2), 204(3)), as previously shown and discussed in connection with <figref idref="f0002">FIG. 2</figref>. Encryption component 304 exposes functionality that encrypts and decrypts files using a key 302. Preferably, file system 208 can store any file in either encrypted or clear form. In this case, each file stored in file system 208 is associated with a flag that can be either set or unset, according to whether the file is to be maintained in an encrypted form. In the example of <figref idref="f0003">FIG. 3</figref>, flag 310 (associated with file 204(2)) is set, indicating that file 204(2) is encrypted.
Encryption component 304 exposes functionality to encrypt and decrypt files. Thus, when file system 208 receives a request to store data in file 204(2) (or any other file whose flag is marked for encryption), file system 208 calls encryption component 304, and passes to encryption component 304 the cleartext 306 that is to be stored. Encryption component 304 then uses key 302 to encrypt cleartext 306, and passes back ciphertext 308 to file system 208. The ciphertext is then stored in file 204(2). If file system 208 receives a request to retrieve information from file 204(2), file system 208 will see at that time that file 204(2) is marked for encryption, and will pass the encrypted ciphertext from that file to encryption component 304. Encryption component 304 will then decrypt the ciphertext using key 302 and return cleartext; file system 208 will then pass the cleartext back to the requestor. In a preferred embodiment, encryption component 304 performs encryption and decryption using a symmetric key algorithm such as Data Encryption Standard (DES), Triple-DES (3DES), or Advanced Encryption Standard (AES).
In a preferred embodiment, encryption component 304 includes the functionality to generate key 302, and encryption component 304 provides key 302 to the software that manages file system 208. As described below in connection with <figref idref="f0004">FIG. 4</figref>, key 302 is generated very shortly after system startup and is not persisted in non-volatile storage.
Preferably, the system may have a local or centrally configured security policy that determines whether the paging file should be created with the encryption flag set or unset. For example, there may be a registry entry that indicates whether encryption of the paging file is to be performed. Upon startup - when the system creates the paging file for a given session - the system may examine the registry to determine whether or not to set the encryption flag for the paging file.
Preparation of System for Paging File Encryption
<figref idref="f0004">FIG. 4</figref> is a flow diagram of a process by which a system is prepared for paging file encryption. Initially, the system in which the encrypted paging file will be used is booted (402). Following the boot, blocks of memory are reserved for certain uses (404). In particular, the reserved blocks of memory may have the following uses: First, some of the reserved memory may be used as a buffer through which data may be written back and forth between the file system and the encryption component. (If an attempt is made to write data between the file system and encryption component, and the reserved memory is insufficient, then either the write can be split into multiple stages, or else an attempt can be made to allocate more memory.) Second, some of the reserved memory may be used as a workspace for the encryption component.
Next, the session key that will be used to encrypt the paging file is created, and stored in volatile memory that may not be paged to disk, etc (406). The session key is preferably not stored in a manner that would persist the key across boots; thus, encrypted paging file data that was generated in one boot cannot be decrypted beyond the current session, thereby protecting the security of that data. (For example, if the hard disk is removed from the computer and stolen, the disk should not contain a copy of the session key that would allow the paging file data to be decrypted when the disk is installed on another machine.) Preferably, the session key is stored in non-paged memory so that it does not end up being paged to disk. (Paging the key to disk not only could create security issues, but can also result in deadlock since the key would be needed to decrypt the paging file in which the key would be stored.) It should be noted that, while <figref idref="f0004">FIG. 4</figref> shows the session key being created after the blocks of memory are reserved, this sequence is not required by the invention.
A paging file is then created with the encryption flag on the file is set (408). At this point, the system has been prepared for paging file encryption. As the memory manager moves data back and forth between memory and the paging file, the data is encrypted/decrypted with the session key (410). The process of moving data between a memory and an encrypted paging file is more particularly described in connection with <figref idref="f0005">FIG. 5</figref>.
<figref idref="f0005">FIG. 5</figref> shows a process by which encrypted data is stored in a paging file. At some point during the operation of a system, the memory manager determines that data stored in memory needs to be moved to disk (e.g., to free up space in the memory). The memory manager then passes the contents of a memory page to the file system with an instruction to write that contents to the paging file (502). The file system then checks whether the encryption flag on the paging file is set (504). If the encryption flag is not set, then the data provided by the memory manager is written to the paging file as cleartext (506).
If the encryption flag is set for the paging file, then the file system calls the encryption component to encrypt the data (508). The encryption component then encrypts the data using the session key (510), in order to generate ciphertext. The ciphertext is then passed back to the file system (512), and the file system stores the ciphertext in the paging file (514). It should be noted that the applicable symmetric encryption algorithm (e.g., DES, 3DES, AES, etc.) is typically a block cipher that encrypts data in defined-sized blocks; thus, the ciphertext that is generated (and written to the paging file) is at least the size of the blocks used by the encryption algorithm.
The process of retrieving data from an encrypted paging file is analogous to the storage process described in <figref idref="f0005">FIG. 5</figref>: When a request to retrieve data from the paging file comes in from the memory manager, if the paging file is marked for encryption, then the file system provides the ciphertext stored in the paging file to the encryption component, which decrypts the ciphertext with the session key and returns cleartext. An example system in which this process is performed is shown in <figref idref="f0006">FIG. 6</figref>. A request to access a particular page of memory is received, and the memory manager determines (based on the page map) that the requested page is not present in memory. The non-presence of the page causes a page fault to be generated. The fault handler makes a file access request in order to retrieve the requested page from the paging file. The file system 208 receives this access request, and sees that the paging file is marked for encryption. Thus, file system 208 calls upon encryption component 304 to decrypt the requested page with the session key. Encryption component 304 then passes the decrypted page back to the file system, which returns the decrypted page to memory manager 602. Memory manager 602 then writes the contents of the retrieved page into a physical memory page frame, and adjusts the page map to reflect the page's presence (and new location) in the physical memory. Preferably, the process of encrypting and decrypting paging file data is transparent to the memory manager, which can make requests to store and retrieve data without regard to whether that data will be encrypted.
It is noted that the foregoing examples have been provided merely for the purpose of explanation and are in no way to be construed as limiting of the present invention. While the invention has been described with reference to various embodiments, it is understood that the words which have been used herein are words of description and illustration, rather than words of limitations. Further, although the invention has been described herein with reference to particular means, materials and embodiments, the invention is not intended to be limited to the particulars disclosed herein; rather, the invention extends to all functionally equivalent structures, methods and uses, such as are within the scope of the appended claims.
Contents4
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| US5825878A | Cites | United States of America |
| US6003117A | Cites | United States of America |
| US2002099946A1 | Cites | United States of America |
| US2003033537A1 | Cites | United States of America |
| US2003133574A1 | Cites | United States of America |
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Priority claims5
| Document | Office | Kind | Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| 721562 | United States of America | – | |
| 72156203 | United States of America | A | |
| 72156203 | United States of America | A | |
| 721562 | – | – | – |
| US20030721562 | – | – | – |
Members9
| Document | Office | Kind | |
|---|---|---|---|
| US2005114688A1 | United States of America | A1 | |
| KR20050050530A | Republic of Korea | A | |
| CN1622061A | China | A | |
| EP1536307A1 | European Patent Office (EPO) | A1 | |
| JP2005158043A | Japan | A | |
| US7325115B2 | United States of America | B2 | |
| CN100495364C | China | C | |
| KR101120779B1 | Republic of Korea | B1 | |
| EP1536307B1This record | European Patent Office (EPO) | B1 |
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Numbers
- Publication
- 1536307
- Publication, DOCDB
- 1536307
- Publication, EPODOC
- EP1536307
- Application
- 40253247
- Application, DOCDB
- 04025324
- Application, EPODOC
- EP20040025324
Titles3
- German
- Systemdateiblockverschlüsselung
- English
- Encryption of system paging file
- French
- Chiffrement du fichier système de pagination
Classification
- CPC, 6
- G06F12/145
- G06F12/00
- G06F21/62
- G06F21/6281
- G06F21/80
- G06F2221/2143
- IPC, 7
- G06F21 62
- G06F21 80
- G06F12 14
- G06F12 00
- G06F12 08
- G06F21 60
- G09C1 00
Designated states28
- Contracting states, 28
- Austria
- Belgium
- Bulgaria
- Switzerland
- Cyprus
- Czechia
- Germany
- Denmark
- Estonia
- Spain
- Finland
- France
- United Kingdom
- Greece
- Hungary
- Ireland
- Italy
- Liechtenstein
- Luxembourg
- Monaco
- Netherlands (Kingdom of the)
- Poland
- Portugal
- Romania
and 4 moreShow fewer
- Sweden
- Slovenia
- Slovakia
- Türkiye
