Method and system for obtaining digital signatures

Description of equivalent WO 02059728 A2

METHOD AND SYSTEM FOR OBTAINING DIGITAL SIGNATURES

Field of the Disclosure

The present disclosure relates generally to digital signatures, and in particular, to a

method and system for obtaining digital signatures.

Description of the Related Art

Encryption is one of the most commonly utilized methods of securing the contents of

data. Encryption is often used to secure data in transport and storage. In its basic form,

encryption typically involves the use of algorithims for transforming plaintext data into an

unintelligible form referred to as ciphertext. The algorithms used in encryption can be defined

by the parameters used therein known as keys. Two well known encryption methods are

symmetric methods using only private keys, and asymmetric methods which use public and

private keys.

Using symmetric private key encryption, a sender encrypts data using a private key. The

receiver then decrypts the data using the same private key. One deficiency of symmetric private

key encryption is that both the sender and receiver must know the same private key. Thus,

exchanging the key between sender and receiver can result in security risks including the risk of

compromise or forgery of the private key.

Public key encryption is an asymmetrical encryption method involving the use of key

pairs. Each key pair includes a public key and a private key. The holder of the private key can

encrypt data using the private key. Only holders of the public key corresponding to the private

key can decrypt the data using the public key. In turn, holders of the public key can encrypt data using the public key. The encrypted data can then be safely forwarded to the holder of the

private key, since only the holder of the private key can decrypt the data. Typically, each user's

public key is published in a public key file or embedded in a certificate. The user's private key

can thus be kept secret.

Public key encryption provides increased security over private key encryption, since a

holder's private key need not be revealed to anyone. Public key encryption also allows a

recipient of data to prove the origin of the data. For example, the sender encrypts the data using

their own secret private key. To validate the data, the recipient decrypts the data using the

sender's public key. If the message is successfully decrypted using the sender's public key, the

message must <img file="WO02059728A2_D0001.tif" /> originated from the sender, since only the sender has access to their private

key.

In addition, digital signatures can provide a further level of protection. A sender can

"sign" the data by encrypting it using their own private key. The sender can then package the

signed data by further encrypting it using the recipient's public key. At the receiving end, the

recipient decrypts the package using their own private key and then validates the sender's

signature by further decryption using the sender's public key.

Digital signatures may also be formed using other methods. For example, data can be

digested (hashed) into a single block using a one-way hash function. A one-way hash function

has a property that it is computationally infeasible to construct any data that hashes to that value

or to find data patterns that hash to the same digest. The digest can than be encrypted with the

sender's private key. The resulting encrypted digest can then be appended to the encrypted or

unencrypted data (encrypted using recipient's public key) as a signature. Upon receipt, the recipient decrypts the digest using the sender's public key. The recipient also digests (hashes)

the data which was received unencrypted. If the data was received encrypted, it is first decrypted

using the recipient's private key and then digested (hashed) using the same one-way hash

function used by the sender. By checking the decrypted digest against the recipient generated

digest, the senders's signature can be verified. This type of digital signature provides verification

of the integrity of the data. That is, any modification of the data being sent will result in a

different digest at the recipient's end and thus a comparison with the sender generated digest will

provide an indicator that the data has been comprised. This type of digital signature also

provides authentication of the origin of the data. For example, only the holder of the private key

corresponding to the public key used to validate the digest could have signed the data.

To allow one user to identify another user for transmission of data in a manner that

ensures the user's possession of a private key, the first user must be able to obtain the other

user's public key from a trusted source. A Certification Authority (CA) provides such a trusted

source. A CA issues public key certificates. Each certificate typically contains the user's name

and public key, the issuing CA's name, a serial number and a validity period. The framework for

public key certificates is defined in CCITT, "X.509: The Directory: Authentication Framework,"

April, 1993 ("X.509"), which is herein incorporated by reference. In effect, the public key

certificates bind a user's name to the public key and are signed by a trusted issuer (e.g., the CA).

Typically the certificate is signed by an authority of the CA prior to distribution. Recipients of

data from the user can trust the signature, provided that the recipient recognizes the authorities

public key enabling verification of the CA authority's signature and to the extent the recipient

trusts the CA. One difficulty with the CA framework is that the certificates do not provide any

indication of the degree of trust or the level of responsibility with which the sender of the

message should be given. That is, the CA only certifies that the identified trusted authority (CA)

recognized the sender's public key as belonging to that person.

Attribute certificates provide a further degree of protection. Attribute certificates certify a

digital signature in a way which indicates the authority that has been granted to the party being

certified. The attribute certificates include, in addition to information identifying the public key

and the name of the party being certified, an authority level which is being granted and

limitations and safeguards which are being imposed. This information may indicate issues of

concern to the certificate. For example, the information may include a monetary limit for the

certifee and/or the level of trust given to the certifee.

Typically, in a coiporate or business environment, each employee is assigned their own

digital certificate. Each employee can use their public key to sign any document they like. The

receiver of the signed document is then required to verify that the signer's certificate has not

been repudiated. This is typically accomplished by the recipient checking a certificate revocation

list in the sender the company's directory. The recipient can also verify that the employee was

authorized to sign the document by retrieving the employee's attribute certificates from the

company's directory.

However, these traditional methods do have drawbacks. For example, the recipient

whom often w orks for a different company than the signer, has the burden of checking the

authorization level of the employee. This exposes potentially sensitive internal corporate

information to anyone the organization sends a signed document. For example, to properly verify the senders authority, the recipient requires access to potentially sensitive corporate

information regarding who has authority within the company to sign what.

Another limitation is that as employees leave a company, their certificates must be

revoked. A certificate may be revoked by placing it on a certificate revocation list (CRL). The

recipient of a document must then also check that the signer's certificate has not been revoked,

adding an additional burden to the recipients duties and providing the recipient with additional

potentially sensitive internal corporate information.

SUMMARY

A digital signature system comprises a database holding access control rules that identify

documents authorized users are allowed to have electronically signed and a signing system

capable of receiving signature requests from a plurality of authorized users, each signature

request including a document to be signed. The signing system parses the document to be signed

and compares information obtained thereby to the access control rules stored in the database to

determine whether the authorized user is authorized to have the document signed. If it is

deteπnined that the authorized user is authorized to have the document signed, the signing

system signs the document using authentication infoπnation unique to the signing system.

The access control rules may identify at least one of a type and attribute of documents

each user is authorized to have signed and the signing system may parse the document to be

signed to determine at least one of a type and attribute of the document and compare the

deteπnined type and attribute of the document to the access control rules stored in the database to

determine whether the user is authorized to have the document signed. The request may further include user authentication information unique to the requesting

user, wherein the signing system authenticates the user via the user authentication information

and does not parse the document unless the user authenticates. The user authentication

infomiation may comprise a digital certificate, with coπesponding public and private keys. The

digital certificate may comprise an X-509 certificate.

The system may further comprise an email interface, wherein the signature request is in

the foπτι of an email from the user addressed to the signing system and the user authentication

infomiation may comprise a user's email address. The signing system may authenticate the user

by comparing the user's email address to email addresses stored in the database.

A method of digitally signing documents using a signing system is also disclosed and

comprises storing access control rules that identify documents authorized users are allowed to

have electronically signed, receiving a signature request from at least one user, the signature

request including a document to be signed and deteπnining whether the user is authorized to

have documents signed. If the user is authorized, the document to be signed is parsed.

Infomiation obtained by the parsing is compared to the stored access control rules to determine

whether the authorized user is authorized to have the attached document signed and if it is

determined that the authorized user is authorized to have the attached document signed, the

document is signed using authentication information unique to the signing system.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

A more complete appreciation of the present systems and methods and many of the

attendant advantages thereof will be readily obtained as the same becomes better understood by reference to the following detailed description when considered in connection with the

accompanying drawings, wherein:

Fig. 1 is a block diagram of a signing system according to an embodiment;

Fig. 2 A is a block diagram and Fig. 2B is a functional diagram of a signing system

according to another embodiment;

Fig. 3 is a flow chart for describing a method of providing digital signatures according to

an embodiment;

Fig. 4 is a functional diagram of a digital signature system according to another

embodiment;

Fig. 5 is flow chart for describing a method of providing digital signatures according to

the embodiment shown in Fig. 4;

Fig. 6 is a table for describing the types of information stored in a database according to

an embodiment:

Fig. 7 is a lable for describing the types of information stored in a database according to

an embodiment:

Fig. 8 is a block diagram for describing a digital certification authority according to an

embodiment;

Fig. 9 is a chart showing an audit log according to an embodiment; and

Fig. 10 is an example of an email used according to an embodiment.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

In describing preferred embodiments illustrated in the drawings, specific terminology is employed for sake of clarity. However, the present systems and methods are not intended to

be limited to the specific terminology so selected and it is to be understood that each specific

element includes all technical equivalents which operate in a similar manner.

A system for signing documents according to an embodiment is shown in Fig. 1. The

system includes a signing system 100 for electronically signing documents using a certificate or

private key uniquely associated with signing system 100, and a signing policy database 100a

which stores infomiation indicating the types and attributes of documents each authorized user is

allowed to have signed. At least one signature requestor 102a-102n is authorized by signing

system 100 to have specific documents signed by signing system 100. Each requestor 102a-102n

may submit a request to have any document they like signed. However, signing system 100 will

only sign those documents that the requestor is authorized to have signed. For example, a

requestor will prepare a request to have a document signed and forward the request along with

the document, to signing system 100. Signing system 100 will parse the document to determine

its type and attributes.

Document parsing involves breaking a document into tokens or words, using lexical

analysis and/or other techniques, for example, and then recognizing patterns of the tokens or

words. For example, an XML document may be broken down into start tags, end tags,

comments, elements, etc. An XML invoice, for example, may be characterized by a set of valid

start and end tags, the attributes associated with the tags and constraints on the elements

contained within the document. When parsing a document, the signing system will determine if

a document is a valid XML document, for example. If a valid XML document, it will then

determine if it is a valid XML invoice. The system identifies the attributes of the document (e.g., Total Amount = S 1 ,000). The system may then compare this information with defined document

types. For example, in this case, the invoice might be classified as an "Invoice Under $2,500".

Of course, other document types may be used

Signing system 100 then compares the document's type and attributes to the information

stored in its database 100a to determine if the requestor is authorized to have the document

signed. If the requestor is authorized to have the document signed, signing system 100 signs the

document using its own unique signature certificate. The signed document is then forwarded to

the intended recipient or recipients 103a-103n. The recipient(s) of the signed document then

only have to <img file="WO02059728A2_D0002.tif" /> that the signing system's signature certificate has not been revoked. Utilizing

signing system 1 0. the onus of checking the authorization level of each signer can thus be

maintained w ithm the business or organization where it belongs. This lessens the work of the

recipient of the signed document In addition, internal corporate information is not needlessly

exposed to outsiders and as employees leave the organization, there is no visible effect seen

outside the company.

A more detailed explanation of a signing system according to an embodiment, will now

be described by l elerence to Figs. 2A and 2B. Fig 2A shows the system in block diagram form

and Fig 2B show s the system in functional form. The signing system, according to this

embodiment, includes a document signing server (DSS) 2, secure audit server (SAS) 4 and

document \ ahdation server (DNS) 6. DSS 2, SAS 4 and DVS 6 are refeπed to collectively

herein as signing system 1 and each is provided on a network 9, as shown in Fig. 2A. As shown

Fig. 2B, DSS 2. SAS 4 and DNS 6 each include a secure application program interface (API)

which allows for secure communications between the servers and the requestors 8 and administrators 12.

Although network 9 is described as a local area network (LAN) in this embodiment, it

will be appreciated that network 9 may instead be a wide area network (WAN) or other type of

network such as the Internet, for example. To provide a further degree of security, servers 2-6

may be provided on a separate secure LAN which is connected to one or more LANs or the

Internet via secuie routers, for example. Also connected to network 9, are one or more

administrator workstations or teπninals 5 which allow administrators access to one or more of

the servers 2-6. Although not shown, each server 2-6 may include a modem or other type of

communication system for allowing remote access by authorized personnel. The network 9 may

also have user w oi kstatioπs or terminals 7 connected thereto which allow employees or other

authoπzed personnel (requestors) access to signing system 1 to request documents to be signed

and/or to allow signed documents to be validated by signing system 1. Each workstation or

teπninal 5, 7 may consist of a personal computer (PC), for example. As shown in Fιg.2B, each

user workstation oi teπninal 7 may include one or more graphical user interfaces (GUIs) 25

providing a usci iriendh interface between one or more requestors 8a-8n and signing system 1.

In addition, other applications 1 running on workstation or terminals 7 may use the secure APIs

to have documents signed, to validate signed documents and to track the history of signed

documents. Each administrator workstation or teπninal 5 may include one or more GUIs 26

providing a user fπendh interface between one or more administrators 12a-12n and signing

system 1.

A method and system for obtaining signatures according to this embodiment may be

implemented in an organization wide environment so that all documents requiring a digital signature are signed by signing system 1. For example, a company can implement a policy so

that the signing system 1 signs all documents requiring an electronic signature. In this

embodiment, each requestor 8a-8n represents an employee of company X. Of course, requestors

can also include nonemployees authorized by company X to have corporate documents signed.

Signing system 1 includes a signing policy database 14 which defines the type and/or

attributes of the documents that each authorized person is allowed to have signed. Each

requestor 8a-8n can request that signing system 1 sign any document they like. However,

signing system 1 w ill only sign those documents which the requestor is authorized to have

signed. For example, a requestor 8a can prepare a request for a document to be signed, using

signature request GUI 17 at a teπninal 7. The request, including the document to be signed, can

then be packaged using the requestor's own certificate 10a and sent to DSS 2 via the secure API

2a. DSS 2 will parse the document to determine its type and attributes and may classify the

document according to predefined company document type. DSS 2 will retrieve the types and

attributes of documents that the requestor is allowed to have signed. DSS 2 then compares the

document's type and attributes to the database infomiation. DSS 2 will only sign the document

if the employee is authorized to have documents of that type and having those attributes signed.

If requestor 8a is authorized to have the document signed, DSS 2 will sign the document using a

single company w ide certificate 27 which, in this embodiment, is an X-509 certificate. DSS 2

will then return the officially signed document to requester 8a. Requestor 8a can then forward

the signed document to the recipient as is, or by further enclosing the signed document in an

electronic envelope using the requestor's own certificate (e.g., X-509 certificate 10a). In the

alternative, requestor 8a when preparing the request, can include the recipients email address, for example, and request that the signed document be delivered directly to the end recipient by DSS

2, after DSS 2 signs the document. DSS 2 can then forward the signed document directly to the

recipient electronically via email, for example.

The recipient whom is typically, but not necessarily, an outsider to Company X, then only

has to verify that the signing company's signature certificate 27 has not been revoked. This can

be done, for example, via a certificate authority (CA). Typically, the signing system's certificate

will only be revoked when the pπvate key has been compromised. The recipient of the signed

document then know s that the originator of the document was authorized by company X's

signing policies to <img file="WO02059728A2_D0003.tif" /> e the document signed, otherwise signing system 1 would not have signed

the document

Utilizing signing system 1 , the onus of checking the authorization level of each signer is

maintained w lth the business or organization where it belongs. This lessens the work of the

recipient of the signed document In addition, internal corporate information is not needlessly

exposed to outsidci s and as employees leave the organization, there is no visible effect seen

outside the companx

As mentioned abo\ e, the system's signing policies are stored in signing policy database

14. As also mentioned above, the policies define, for example, whom is allowed to have

particular types of documents signed. For example, the policies may limit the specific type of

document (contract, quote, bid, internal corporate document, etc.) that each requestor can have

signed. The policies may also define document attributes for identifying the attributes of

documents each requestor is allowed to have signed. For example, the policies may set quote

price limits or purchase price limits within the document that the requestor is allowed to have signed. Signing Policy GUI 11 allows one or more authorized administrators 12a-12n access to

the system to define and modify the signing policies which are stored in signing policy database

14.

Figure 6 depicts an example of the types of information that may be stored in database

14. As shown in this example, each employee has an authorization limit and a purchase type

limit specifying limits on the attributes of the documents each requestor is allowed to have

signed. Each requestor is also limited to the type of document they are allowed to have signed

(e.g., contract, quote, bid, etc.). Although Fig. 6 only depicts one department of Company X,

database 14 may store information for each employee of the company authorized to sign

documents, indicating the types and attributes of the documents they may have signed. In this

example, each employee will only be allowed to have documents signed which have total

purchase amounts less than their authorization limits and only for the particular types of items for

which they are given authority to purchase. Each employee will also only be allowed to have a

document signed, if it is of the type for which they are authorized. Of course, the signing policy

database may include infomiation identifying other document types and attributes.

Returning to Fig. 2B, document validation GUI 23 may be used by a requestor 8 to

request signing system 1 to validate a signed document. That is, if a requestor 8 receives a

signed document, the requestor can forward the signed document to signing system 1 to have it

validated. DVS 6 is responsible for validating signed documents in response to the request.

DVS 6 will parse the document, determine the type and attributes of the document, determine

whether the document has been signed and if so, whether the signature is valid. DNS 6 will

construct a list of the attributes and their values found in the document and this infomiation can then be returned to the requestor.

As will be described in more detail below, SAS 4 maintains logs of all transactions

requested to be performed by DSS 2 and DNS 6. Requestors 8 may request infomiation about

signed documents from SAS 4 using document history GUI 21. For example, a requestor may

request the status of a signature request placed earlier, in order to determine if and when the

signed document was sent to the recipient. SAS 4 is capable of reviewing and searching its logs

in response to an authorized request and providing an appropriate response to the requestor. For

added security, the logs can be digitally signed and tamper-proof so that unauthorized parties do

not have access thereto.

Overall operation of an embodiment of signing system 1 will now be explained by

reference to the flowchart shown in Fig. 3. Each employee (requestor) within an organization,

for example, is given a digital certificate which is generated using any available public key

infrastructure (PK1) system. For purposes of this embodiment, each employee is provided with

an X-509 certificate. In step S20, a requestor 8a, for example, prepares a request to DSS 2 using

signature request GUI 17. For example, signature request GUI 17 may prompt the requestor for

specific input necessary to prepare the request. The request may, for example, be a request that a

purchase order for a particular item at a particular cost be signed by DSS 2. The request will

include a copy of the document (the purchase order) to be signed. The requestor then signs the

request using their own certificate (Step S22) and forwards the signed request to DSS 2 (Step

S24) via secure API 2a. Upon receipt, DSS 2 retrieves the requestor's public key from database

14 and authenticates the request (Step S26). If the request does not authenticate (No, Step S28),

notification is provided to the requestor that their request did not authenticate (Step S30) and the process ends. SAS 4 may also be notified at this time that the request did not authenticate, so

that a log of the failed request can be maintained. If the request successfully authenticates (Yes,

Step S28), DSS 2 parses the document to be signed to determine its type and attributes (Step

S32). DSS 2 then compares the document's type and attributes to the authorization limits of the

requestor, as stored in database 14 (Step S33), to determine whether the requestor is authorized

to have the requested document signed. If the requestor is not authorized to have the document

signed (No, Step S34), the requestor and/or SAS 4 are so notified (Step S32) and the procedure

ends. If the requestor is authorized (Yes, Step S34), DSS 2 signs the document using its own

private signing key 27 (Step S3S). The signed document is then returned to the requestor or

forwarded directly to the recipient (Step S40) depending on the request. SAS 4 may also be

notified that the document was successfully signed. If the requestor requested that the signed

document be returned to the requestor, instead of directly to the end recipient, the signed

document is returned to the requestor. The requestor can then send the document to the end

recipient as is. or can further package it (e.g., in an electronic envelope) using their private key

and then forw ard the packaged document to the end recipient. Upon receipt, the end recipient

opens the package using the sender's public key and authenticates the document with the DSS 2

public key, as w ill be further described below. On the other hand, if the signed document was

sent directly from the signing system 1 to the recipient, the document may be authenticated using

the DSS 2 public key.

Employees (requestors) may also be identified and authenticated in other ways besides by

use of certificates. For example, Fig. 4 depicts another embodiment in which each employee

30a-30n is identified and authenticated by their e-mail address (32a-32n). An employee prepares an email request such as that in Fig. 10. The email request includes a "DATE" field

indicating the date that the email was sent by the employee. The email request also includes a

"MESSAGE-ID" field which provides information for identifying the email. The "FROM" field

is an email address uniquely associated with the employee sending the email request and can be

used to identify the employee. The "TO" field is the email address of the DSS 42. The

"SUBJECT" field is typically used to provide a quick identification of the subject matter in the

email. According to this embodiment, the "SUBJECT" field of the email may include a

predefined phrase such as "SIGNATURE REQUEST", for example, identifying this email as a

signature request. A message field "MESSAGE" can be a message for providing additional

infomiation to DSS 42, including, for example, a request that the email be forwarded directly to

the recipient after signing and providing the recipient's email address. In the alternative, the

"MESSAGE" Held may request that the signed document be returned to the employee requestor.

The document to be signed is attached to the email as a file attachment.

After receipt of the email, DSS 42 parses the "SUBJECT" field of the email, recognizes it

as a signature request, and identifies the requestor by their email address. DSS 42 also parses the

"MESSAGE" field of the email request, determines that the signed document is to be forwarded

directly to the recipient, and stores the recipient's email address for later reference. DSS 42 then

downloads and parses the attached document. Using the signing policies stored in database 31,

DSS 42 determines if the employee is authorized to have the requested document signed. If the

employee is authorized, the DSS 42 signs the document using the system's private signing key

47. DSS 42 then prepares an email, attaching the signed document and forwards the signed

document to the recipient at the recipient's email address. Of course, if the request was to return the signed document to the employee requestor, the signed document can be emailed back to the

employee's email address as indicated in the "FROM" field of the request. The employee may

also use e-mail to retrieve infomiation about signed documents from SAS 44 and to validate

signed documents via DNS 46.

Fig. 5 is a flowchart describing overall operation of the system shown in Fig. 4. In Step

S60, an employee prepares an email requesting DSS 42 to sign a document. The email may

include as an attachment, the document to be signed. The email is forwarded by the employee to

DSS 42, by directing it to a unique email address associated with DSS 42 (Step S62). Upon

receipt, DSS 42 compares the requestor's email address as shown in the "FROM" field of the

email to its database of stored email addresses (Step S64) as stored in database 31. An example

of the types of infomiation stored in database 31 is shown in Fig. 7. The database includes the

names and corresponding email addresses of each authorized employee as well as the type and

attributes of the documents each employee is authorized to have signed. If the requestor's email

address can not be matched to an employee in the database (No, Step S66), notification is

returned to the requestor's e-mail address indicating, for example, that they are not authorized to

use the system (Step S68). SAS 44 may also be notified that authorization was denied, logging

the time of the request, the message-id of the email request, the email address of the requestor,

etc. The process then ends. If the employee's email address is stored in the database, the

employee is authorized to use the system to have documents signed (Yes, Step S66). DSS 42

downloads the document to be signed from the email attachment (Step S70). DSS 42 then parses

the document to deteπnine its type and attributes (Step S72). DSS 42 compares the document

type and attributes to the authorized document type and attributes for the employee (Step S74) as retrieved from database 31 to determine if the employee is authorized to have the document

signed. If the employee is not authorized to have the document signed (No, Step S76), the

employee is notified (Step S78). Notification may also be provided to SAS 44. The process then

ends. If the employee is authorized (Yes, Step S76), DSS 42 signs the document using its

certificate (Step S80). DSS 42 can then prepare an e-mail to the employee or the recipient (Step

S82) and e-mail the signed document back to the employee or the recipient (Step S84) depending

on the request made. If returned to the employee, the employee is responsible for fonvarding the

officially signed document to the recipient.

Although shown above in separate embodiments, certificate authentication of the

requestor as described w ith respect to Figs. 2A and 2B and email authentication of the requestor

as described with respect to Fig. 4 may be implemented in one system. In this way. the system

can authenticate requestors via their certificate or their email address, depending on the type of

system used to forward the request. For example, if an employee is away from the office and

does not have access to a terminal including the appropriate GUIs, the employee may still have

access to the system by email.

Fig. 8 depicts a system for providing digital certificates to organizations, companies etc.

for use by their digital signing systems. Digital certification authority 86 acts as a certificate

authority. Each company^'s X509 certificate (80, 82, 84) is stored in directory 88 of digital

certificate authority 86. A certificate revocation list 90 is also provided at digital certificate

authority 86. Each company X, Y and Z has a contract or agreement with digital certificate

authority 86 obligating the company to honor their digitally signed documents. If the contract or

agreement expires, or if the company's key has been compromised, the company's certificate is revoked and added to the certificate revocation list 90. A new certificate would then need to be

issued to the company.

Upon receipt of a digitally signed document, the recipient contacts digital certificate

authority 86. where the certificate revocation list 90 is checked to determine whether the sending

company's certificate has been revoked. If not revoked, the recipient is provided with the

company's public key, thus enabling the received document to be opened by the recipient. If the

document was sent to the recipient sealed using the sending employee's own certificate also, the

recipient obtains the sending employee's public key from either authority 86 or the appropriate

authority that issued the employee's certificate. The recipient then unseals the signed document

using the employee^'s public key and then contacts the digital certificate authority 86 to check the

revocation list to determine if the company's DSS certificate 27 has been revoked and to obtain

the company's public key. The recipient may then open the signed document.

Referring again to Fig. 2B, administrators 12 may each be provided with an X509

certificate. Each administrator is then authenticated using their X509 certificate when

perfoπning maintenance on the system, when perfoπning an audit of the system, etc. A database

(not shown) can be provided in signing system 1 which indicates the level of access each

administrator has to areas of the system. For example, an administrator may be given access to

the secure audit server 18, and be denied access to DVS 8 and DSS 2, while another

administrator is given access to the entire system. In addition to the signing policy GUI 1 1 ,

GUIs for use by the administrators may include a document type GUI 15. GUI 15 displays a list

of predefined document classes (e.g., text, HTML, XML, CSN, etc.), each class having a number

of defined attributes. An administrator 12 may create a document type by selecting a document class and specifying the name of the document type. The attributes associated with the document

class can be displayed, allowing the administrator to specify permissible values and/or ranges of

values for particular attributes. The administrator may also specify whether particular attributes

are allowed, required or prohibited in documents of the document type. After all information has

been specified for the document type, the administrator can instmct signing system 1 to create

the document type. The administrators may also use a secure audit GUI 13 which provides the

administrators secure access to SAS 4.

As described above, all requests and results can be logged by SAS 4. The stored logs

may contain, for example, the name of the party accessing the system, the type of action

requested, the result of the request, the reason for denial of a request and the date of the request.

SAS 4 may also maintain an archive of all documents signed by the system. Fig. 9 shows an

example of a portion of an audit log sheet which can be retrieved from SAS 4 by an administrator

having proper authority. The audit log sheet can be compiled by the administrator by date, by

requestor name, by document ID or by document type, for example, and retrieved. The

transaction log as shown in Fig. 9, may include the name of the party requesting an action, the

action requested, the result, indicating whether the request was denied or approved, the reason

for a denial and the date of the activity, for example. Of course, various other types of

infomiation may also be logged. For example, the requestor's department, the authorization

amount/type requested, the email request Message-Id, etc. may be logged for periodic review or

audit purposes.

It will be appreciated that although the above embodiments have been described as

determining whether a requestor is authorized to have a document signed by comparing authorized document types and attributes to those of the document to be signed, variations are

possible. For example, it may be desirable to arrange the system so that employees are

authorized to sign any type of documents having any attributes, except documents having of the

type and having the attributes listed in the database in the document signing server. In other

words, the database can be arranged to include documents which the requestors are not allowed

to have signed.

The above-described systems may be conveniently implemented using one or more

conventional general purpose digital computers and/or servers programmed according to the

teachings of the present specification. Appropriate software coding can readily be prepared by

skilled programmers based on the teachings of the present specification. The described

systems may also be implemented by the preparation of application specific integrated circuits

or by interconnecting an appropriate network of conventional component circuits.

Numerous additional modifications and variations of the described systems are possible

in view of the above-teachings. It is therefore to be understood that within the scope of the

appended claims, the present systems may be practiced other than as specifically described

herein.