Challenge-response signatures and secure diffie-hellman protocols

A method of exchange between two interconnected by a device or network parts, said method comprising: a receiving part, hereinafter referred verifier, which chooses a secret value x to calculate a value X = F1 (x), where F1 comprises a first function default having at least one argument, said value x one of at least one argument of F1; one signatory party, hereinafter referred signer chooses a secret value and to calculate a value Y = F2 (y), where F2 comprises a second predetermined function having at least one argument, said value and one of said at least one argument F2; obtaining that said signer value X, said signer private key by a public key B; and calculating the signer a value s = F3 (y, b, X), where F3 comprises a third predetermined function having at least three arguments, said value and said private key by said X three arguments of such value at least three arguments F3, where a fourth predetermined function F4 to calculate a value s' = F4 (x, Y, B), with F4 at least three arguments, said value x, the value Y, and said public key B three arguments said at least three arguments of F4, but the value s is not an argument of F4, there is no shared secret between said verifier and such party to serve as a basis for any argument in any of these F1, F2, F3 and F4, and said verifier can consider these values ​​s and s '' as valid authenticators if it is determined that the value s '' is related in a predetermined manner with the value s.